2000 Synopsis -- Residential Chapter

PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD

SYNOPSIS OF REPRESENTATIVE CASES

 RESIDENTIAL DECISIONS 

 PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD

Section 16-190 of the Property Tax Code

(35 ILCS 200/16-190, Illinois Compiled Statutes)

Official Rules - Section 1910.76

Printed by Authority of the State of Illinois

www.state.il.us/agency/ptab

 RESIDENTIAL CHAPTER

Table of Contents

The subject properties consist of 6 parcels located in Morgan County, Illinois.

The appellant submitted evidence to the Property Tax Appeal Board through its attorney and claimed overvaluation as the basis of the appeal. The appellant claimed the board of review incorrectly assessed the subject parcels and should have granted them the preferential treatment or assessment allowed under Section 10-30 of the Property Tax Code. (35 ILCS 200/10-30). The appellant explained that the subject parcels were originally part of a 119.493 acre site used as farmland. The acreage was platted in accordance with the Plat Act. The appellant argued the platting of the original 119.493 acre site satisfies all of the requirements set forth in Section 10-30 of the Property Tax Code.

The appellant first gave a historical overview regarding the subject parcels. Applebee Farms, first edition, an adjacent subdivision containing 33.443 acres, was developed by the appellant and was platted in 1996. During construction of this development, the appellant considered developing adjacent land for use as an office park, a golf course, and 10 residential lots.

The adjacent land contains 119.493 acres and was mostly located in a proposed expansion of an Enterprise Zone. The appellant had a preliminary plat drawn of this acreage. Subsequently, a local ordinance passed by the City of Jacksonville, Morgan County, annexed the aformentioned 119.493 acres including the six parcels under appeal. Additionally, an amendment to the ordinance was enacted excluding single family residential lots from the Enterprise Zone. As a result, the appellant split the 10 single family lots into a separate plat and it was recorded with Morgan  County. The plat was commonly known as Applebee Farms, second edition, and contained 6.20 acres. The division of the acreage also resulted in another separate plat containing 27.72 acres commonly known as Northridge Park, first edition. This plat was also recorded with Morgan County and comprised of the future office park. The remaining acreage was dedicated to the golf course. Both plats were recorded separately but at the same time with the county. The appellant argued the two separate subdivisions were developed simultaneously as one project and contain more than 10 acres. Thus, the appellant argued both subdivisions were platted and developed as one project and should receive the preferential assessment described in Section 10-30 of the Property Tax Code (ILCS 200/10-30) based on legislative intent.

In support of this contention, the appellant provided a legal memorandum detailing its argument. The appellant’s memorandum cited Section 10-30 of the Property Tax Code and outlined the reasons why the subject parcels’ assessments should be calculated in accordance with the statute’s prescribed methodology. The appellant claimed the subject parcels meet the requirements established in Section 10-30 because of the following: (1) the subject parcels were platted and subdivided in accordance with the Plat Act; (2) the platting occurred after January 1, 1978; (3) at the time of the original platting, the subject parcels were part of a tract which contained over 10 acres; and (4) at the time of platting the subject parcels were vacant or used as a farm as defined in Section 1-60 of the Property Tax Code. (35 ILCS 200/1-60). The appellant then argued that Section 10-30(a)(3) of the Property Tax Code does not require that the final plat, which is recorded, be in excess of 10 acres. Moreover, it claimed there is no such recording requirement contained within the statute, but rather only a platting requirement, which was satisfied by the original platting of the 119.493 acre tract. Based on the evidence contained in the record, the appellant requested the Property Tax Appeal Board lower the subject parcels’ land assessments to reflect assessments based on Section 10-30 of the Property Tax Code.

The board of review submitted its "Board of Review Notes on Appeals” wherein the subject parcels’ assessments were disclosed. In support of its assessments, the board of review also provided a copy of Section 10-30 of the Property Tax Code and a letter of opinion form the Illinois Department of Revenue, Legal Services Office. Evidence indicates the county does not assess lots or parcels individually until they have been actually recorded. In addition, the letter submitted by the board of review argued that when platted the subject parcels did not total 10 acres and therefore should not receive the preferential treatment as detailed in Section 10-30 of the Property Tax Code. (35 ILCS 200/10-30).  Based on the plain language detailed in the statute, the board of review requested confirmation of the subject properties’ land assessments. 

After reviewing the record and considering the evidence, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal. The Property Tax Appeal Board further finds no reductions are warranted. The primary issue involved in the subject appeal is whether the preferential treatment or assessment available under Section 10-30 of the Property Tax Code applies to the subject parcels. More specifically, the issue is whether the 10 acre size requirement of Section 10-30 of the Property Tax Code should be determined by the original platting of the tract of land or if it should be determined by the platting and actual recording of a tract of land. 

The Property Tax Appeal Board finds the board of review properly denied the subject parcels preferential treatment or assessment offered by Section 10-30 of the Property Tax Code. Clearly, the subject parcels, which were subject of a subsequent platting and recording for a larger project, did not contain the ten acres as required by Section 10-30(a)(3) of the Property Tax Code. In fact, the appellant did not refute the fact the subject parcels failed to meet the 10 acre requirement. In contrast, the appellant argued the subject parcels should be viewed as if one project in conjunction with other contiguous land developments. The Board also finds the appellant’s contention that the initial platting of the 119.493 acre tract, which included the subject parcels, was sufficient to satisfy the intent of the 10 acre requirement of Section 10-30(a)(3) of the Property Tax Code, is without merit. 

The Board finds Grundy County National Bank v. Property Tax Appeal Board is similar to the subject appeal and is controlling. In Grundy, a developer claimed that his preliminary platting of an 18.96 acre tract was sufficient to satisfy the 10 acre requirement. However, as in the subject appeal, the developer failed to actually record the initial platting, but subsequently platted and recorded a smaller area of the original tract for development, which was less than 10 acres. The appellate court held that the Plat Act (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1991, ch. 109, par.2, now codified at 765 ILCS 205/0.01 et.seq.),  required a platting and recording with the county in which the land is situated. Grundy County National Bank v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 297 Ill.App.3d 774 (3rd Dist. 1998).  Therefore, the Board finds in the subject appeal, since the tract containing the subject parcels which was platted and recorded (emphasis added) with Morgan County was not in excess of 10 acres, the board of review properly denied the appellant the preferential treatment offered by Section 10-30 of the Property Tax Code. The preliminary platting of the 119.493 acre tract was not sufficient because it was never recorded with the county. 

As a result of this analysis, the Board finds the board of review properly assessed the subject parcels pursuant to state statute and correctly denied the preferential assessment. In conclusion, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds the subject properties’ assessments as established by the board of review are correct and no reductions are warranted.

The subject property consists of a part one and part two story brick single family dwelling constructed in 1926 containing 5,200 square feet of living area. 

The appellant appeared before the Property Tax Appeal Board and presented a brief arguing the subject should be assessed no more than the 1998 assessment plus equalization based on section 16-80 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/16-80).  The appellant indicated the subject’s 1998 assessment was reduced to $425,000 by the board of review based on its recent sale.  Adding the 1999 equalization factor for Shields Township of 1.0054 would result in an assessment of $427,295. 

The appellant submitted the Lake County Board of Review’s final assessment notices for the subject for 1998 and 1999.  The subject’s 1999 assessment was originally $508,372.  The township assessor requested the board lower the assessment to $458,218.  The board of review acquiesced and, on its own motion, lowered the assessment to $458,218.  The appellant filed the instant appeal within thirty days after the board of review’s final assessment decision for the subject property.  Based on this evidence, the appellant requested a reduction in the subject property’s assessment. 

The board of review presented "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" wherein the subject's final assessment of $458,218 was disclosed.  The board argued the assessor initiated the assessment reduction and the board of review reduced the assessment and issued its final decision.  The appellant did not file an appeal with the board of review and the board of review lowered the assessment on its own motion.  The board argued the appellant should not be allowed to file an appeal with the Property Tax Appeal Board to request a further reduction under these circumstances.  The board offered no evidence in support of the assessment and offered no reason for the increased assessment. 

After hearing the testimony and reviewing the record, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal. The appellant argued the subject’s assessment for 1999 should reflect the 1998 assessment plus equalization.

Section 16-80 of the Property Tax Code states: 

In any county with fewer than 3,000,000 inhabitants, if the board of review lowers the assessment of a particular parcel on which a residence occupied by the owner is situated, the reduced assessment, subject to equalization, shall remain in effect for the remainder of the general assessment period as provided in Sections 9-215 through 9-225, unless the taxpayer, county assessor, or other interested party can show substantial cause why the reduced assessment should not remain in effect, or unless the decision of the board is reversed or modified upon review.  (35 ILCS 200-16-80). 

Section 16-160 of the Property Tax Code states in pertinent part: 

In counties with 3,000,000 or more inhabitants...and for all property in any county other than a county with 3,000,000 or more inhabitants, any taxpayer dissatisfied with the decision of the board of review or board of appeals as such decision pertains to the assessment of his or her property for taxation purposes...may...within 30 days after the date of the board of review notice...appeal the decision to the Property Tax Appeal Board for review...  (35 ILCS 200/16-160). 

The Property Tax Appeal Board finds the subject property is an owner occupied residence.  The Board also finds the Shields Township general assessment period started in 1996 and runs to January 1, 2000.  The Board further finds the appellant properly filed an appeal within thirty days after the board of review’s final decision for 1999.  Section 16-160 does not prohibit an appeal where an assessment is lowered on the board of review’s own motion rather than through a complaint filed by the owner or taxpayer.  The Board also finds the record contains no evidence or support for the increased assessment from $425,000 in 1998 to $458,218 in 1999. 

Based on this analysis of the record, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds the record supports the appellant’s argument that the subject property’s assessment is excessive.  Therefore, the Board finds a reduction in the assessment of the subject property is warranted. 

The subject property consists of a residential condominium unit located in the appellant’s complex.

The appellant appeared before the Property Tax Appeal Board by counsel arguing that the fair market value of the subject was not accurately reflected in its assessed value.  In support of that argument, the appellant indicated the subject condominium unit is used as a residence by the complex janitor.  The subject’s property manager was present and verified the janitor’s use of the unit.  The appellant argued this use as a janitor’s residence is consistent with the definition of common areas in the Illinois Condominium Property Act and is owned by the association as required by the Act.  The appellant also submitted sections of the Illinois Condominium Property Act indicating common areas are to be assessed at $1.00 per year and that a janitor’s unit could be conveyed to the condominium association.  Therefore, the subject unit, by statute, should receive a $1 assessment.

As evidence, the appellant submitted an amendment to its declaration indicating its intent to convert one unit from an association owned unit to common elements.  It also states the effective date is the date the amendment is recorded.  However, the copy of the amendment was not dated, signed or attested.  The appellant indicated the amendment was signed on December 13, 1999, and recorded in February of 2000.  A resolution to amend the association by-laws was submitted indicating the association board declared the subject unit to be part of the common area on February 17, 1999.

The deed to the subject unit was also presented.  A rider to the appellant’s deed indicated the subject unit was deeded from the association to common elements of the complex.  Also included in this rider was the exclusive privilege to use a specified indoor parking unit.  The rider stated the unit’s undivided interest in the common elements was also transferred.  Each unit’s monthly association assessment and the percentage of the total association dues assessment to maintain the common elements was submitted.  The tax bill for the subject unit was also included.  Based on this evidence, the appellant requested the assessment of the subject unit be reduced to $1.00.

During questioning from the board of review, the appellant’s attorney stated and the property manager verified that each unit is billed individually and pays a percentage of the common areas and that the subject unit is part of those common areas.  Prior to the amendment the unit was owned by the association as an individual residential unit and the property taxes for the unit were paid by the association.

The board of review presented "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" wherein the subject's final assessment of $35,071 was disclosed.  The assessment reflects an estimated value of $105,604 using the three year median level of assessments for 1998 for Lake County of 33.21%.  The board of review had previously informed the appellant that the declaration must state the subject unit is part of the common area in order to be considered for the $1.00 common area assessment.  The board stated at the hearing the appellant has now complied with this requirement.  No other evidence was presented by the board of review.

After hearing the testimony and reviewing the record, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal.  The Board further finds the record does not support the appellant’s claim the subject property was overvalued in 1998.

Section 10-35(a) of the Property Tax Code states in pertinent part: 

Residential property which is part of a development, but which is individually owned and ownership of which includes the right, by easement, covenant, deed or other interest in property, to the use of any common area for recreational or similar residential purposes shall be assessed at a value which includes the proportional share of the value of that common area or areas.

Property is used as a "common area or areas" under this Section if it is a lot, parcel, or area, the beneficial use and enjoyment of which is reserved in whole as an appurtenance to the separately owned lots, parcels, or areas within the planned development.

The common area or areas which are used for recreational or similar residential purposes and which are assessed to a separate owner and are located on separately identified parcels, shall be listed for assessment purposes at $1 per year.  (35 ILCS 200/10-35(a)). 

Section 605/2(d) of the Illinois Condominium Property Act defines "unit" as "a part of the property designed and intended for any type of independent use."  (765 ILCS 605/2(d).  The Act defines "common elements" as "all portions of the property except the units, including limited common elements unless otherwise specified."  (765 ILCS 605/2(e).  "Limited common elements" are defined as portions "of the common elements so designated in the declaration as being reserved for the use of a certain unit or units to the exclusion of other units, including but not limited to balconies, terraces, patios and parking spaces or facilities."  (765 ILCS 605/2(s)).

Section 10 of the Condominium Property Act states in part that "[f]or purposes of property taxes, real property owned and used for residential purposes by a condominium association, including a master association, but subject to the exclusive right by easement, covenant deed or other interest of the owners of one or more condominium properties and used exclusively by the unit owners for recreational or other residential purposes shall be assessed at $1.00 per year."  (763 ILCS 605/10(a).

Case law indicates the definition of common elements in the Act may be further defined or supplemented through the condominium declaration.  In 400 Condominium Association v. Thomas M. Tully, Cook County Assessor, et al., 79 Ill.App.3d 686, 398 N.E.2d 951, 35 Ill.Dec. 1 (1979), the First District stated "although the Declaration of Ownership cannot supersede the Act, it can, if the condominium owners agree, supplement the statute, including statutory definitions such as unit and common elements.  (Id. at 953).   In Cambridge-On-The-Lake Homeowners Association, et al. v. Thomas C. Hynes, Cook County Assessor, et al., 116 Ill.App.3d 63, 452 N.E.2d 37, 72 Ill.Dec. 105, 1983, the court discussed the strict language of Illinois’ Condominium Property Act.  However, the court again stated that while a condominium declaration may not supersede the Act, it can supplement the statute, "including statutory definitions such as "common elements."  (Id. at 106).

The Board finds the Illinois Condominium Property Act does not designate with any particularity those areas that are to be common areas.  The only portion specifically excluded from consideration as common areas are the units.  Therefore, the Board finds the subject unit would be excluded from the condominium association common areas.  However, case law indicates condominium associations, through their individual declarations, may supplement the Act by including with specificity those areas to be included as common elements in a particular condominium community.

The Board further finds the appellant association, through its by-laws and amended declaration, recorded in February of 2000, properly converted the association owned subject janitor’s unit to a common element.  However, the Board finds this conversion in the year 2000 did not affect the status of the subject unit in the 1998 assessment year at issue in this appeal.  Based on this analysis, the Board finds the subject unit was an individually owned condominium unit subject to real property assessment in 1998.  Therefore, the Board finds no reduction in the assessment of the subject property is warranted for 1998.

The subject property consists of lots 5 and 6 of block 35 in the City of Grafton, Jersey County, Illinois.  The lots, which measure 100 feet by 100 feet, are vacant.  The appellant contends overvaluation as the basis of the appeal.

In support of the overvaluation contention, the appellant submitted data evidencing the purchase price of $3,500 for the subject property in August 1993.  The documentation further disclosed that prior to the purchase of the property the City of Grafton was experiencing the flood of 1993 and an emergency road was constructed diagonally across the subject property.  The disturbed soil was later identified by the Illinois Historic Preservation Agency (IHPA) in a December 14, 1993, memo as an ancient Indian burial grounds, exposing several 5,000 year old skeletons and related ceramic material from a pit area.  The IHPA identified at least ten additional Indian burial sites present on the subject property dating back to the Late Woodland era. 

The appellant contends the subject property cannot be used for the purpose for which it was purchased because of the encumbrances of existing legislation, codes and statutes governing and controlling the use of ancient Indian burial grounds.  As a result, the appellant contends the subject property’s market value has been reduced to a negligible amount. 

The appellant cites Section 15-45 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/15-45), which states: 

All property used exclusively as graveyards or grounds for burying the dead is exempt. 

The appellant also submitted Act 3440, Human Skeletal Remains Protection Act (20 ILCS 3440/2), Act 3435, Archaeological and Paleontological Resources Protection Act (20 ILCS 3435/3.1), 17 Illinois Administrative Code (CH, VI, SEC. 4170) covering Title 17, Conservation; Chpt. VI, Illinois Historic Preservation Agency; Part 4170, Rules for the Protection and Inventory of Unmarked Human Burial Sites and Unregistered Graves; and Subpart A, Protection of Unmarked Human Burial Sites and Unregistered Graves. 

The appellant noted that at no time prior to the purchase of the subject property did he have any knowledge regarding the circumstances or restrictions of use on this property.  The subject property was simply purchased for personal use and investment purposes.  He states that prior to the archeological find and subsequent classification as ancient Indian burial grounds, he considered the subject property to have market value.  However, as previously stated, he is of the opinion the subject has little value and requested an assessment of $10.  The subject is currently assessed at $3,000. 

The appellant further states that he is not utilizing the subject property as a cemetery, permits for use as a cemetery have not been sought and there are no plans to inter any additional remains.  The appellant emphasizes the subject property cannot be disturbed for any use.  He notes the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) representative has explained that once this property was identified as an archeological Indian burial mound, the federal government was responsible for putting the site back into its original condition, prior to the construction of the emergency road.  Further, due to the significant delicate precautions necessary to prevent any further disruption of the burial mound, the cost of renovation is estimated at approximately $37,000.  Because of the prohibitive costs to renovate the property or to completely excavate the property to remove, catalog, and transport the remains in accordance with statutory guidelines, the appellant contends the property is useless to him as a property owner. 

The board of review submitted "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" wherein the subject’s assessment totaling $3,000 was disclosed.  The subject’s assessment reflects a market value of $9,331 using the county’s three median level of assessments for 1998 of 32.15%.  The board of review was of the opinion the appellant should apply for tax exempt status with the Illinois Department of Revenue.  No further data was submitted by the board of review. 

After considering the evidence and reviewing the record, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal.  The Board further finds that a reduction in the subject property’s assessment is warranted based on the appellant’s contention of overvaluation.  The appellant’s appeal was fully documented showing the subject property was not usable for residential purposes once the property was declared an ancient Indian burial ground.  The subject property was purchased for residential purposes in 1993 for $3,500.  After the purchase, it was discovered the property had been used as an Indian burial ground.  The subject’s assessment currently reflects a market value of $9,331.  There was no evidence from the board of review to support the assessment assigned to the subject property.  Because the subject property must not be disturbed, other than the removal of the emergency road, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds the subject has a nominal value and should be assessed at $150.  This is the amount that must be imposed in order to generate a tax bill on the property.  Section 18-40 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/18-40) states in part: 

If the equalized assessed value of any property is less than $150 for an assessment year, the county clerk may declare the imposition and collection of all tax for that year to be extended on the parcel to be unfeasible and canceled.  No tax shall be extended or collected on the parcel for that year and the parcel shall not be sold for delinquent taxes. 

In order for the subject property to have a zero assessment, the appellant should apply for a tax exemption.  Section 15-45 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/15-45) states that property used exclusively as graveyards or grounds for burying the dead is exempt.  Section 15-5 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/15-5) sets forth the steps for creating an exemption.  Under this section an application must be filed with the county board of review.  Section 16-70 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/16-70) sets forth the guidelines for determining whether property is exempt from taxation.  The Property Tax Appeal Board has no authority and plays no part in determining the exemption of real property from taxation.  Section 1910.10(f) of the Official Rules of the Property Tax Appeal Board states: 

The Property Tax Appeal Board is without jurisdiction to determine the tax rate, the amount of a tax bill, or the exemption of real property from taxation. 

In conclusion, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that a reduction in the subject’s assessment to $150 is warranted.

The subject property consists of a one story and unfinished attic, frame, single-family dwelling containing 1,398 square feet of living area, situated on a 100 foot by 150 foot lot.  The subject property has 100 feet of river frontage.  The subject site is also improved with a detached, two car garage. 

The appellant appeared before the Property Tax Appeal Board and claimed overvaluation as the basis of the appeal.  The appellant's second contention was based on Section 10-20 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/10-20) which states: 

Maintenance and repairs to residential property owned and used exclusively for a residential purpose shall not increase the assessed valuation of the property.  For purposes of this Section, work shall be deemed repair and maintenance when it (1) does not increase the square footage of improvements and does not materially alter the existing character and condition of the structure but is limited to work performed to prolong the life of the existing improvements or to keep the existing improvements in a well maintained condition; and (2) employs materials, such as those used for roofing or siding, whose value is not greater than the replacement value of the materials being replaced.  Maintenance and repairs, as those terms are used in this Section, to property that enhance the overall exterior and interior appearance and quality of a residence by restoring it from a state of disrepair to a standard state of repair do not "materially alter the existing character and condition" of the residence. 

The appellant testified that he purchased the subject property in 1995 for $35,000, which included the dwelling and a detached, two-car garage.  He explained that at the time of purchase, the subject property was used as a summer cottage.  The dwelling was an 87 year old, one story structure with a low-pitched roof, prior to renovation.  The appellant explained that because the subject property is located in a flood plain the footprint of the existing house could not be increased.  Renovation began in 1997.  He stated the dwelling is now a one-story structure with a high-pitched roof.  He testified the attic area is currently being finished.  He testified the house was raised and a new foundation was constructed.  The structure was torn down to the floors.  He stated the floors were the only part of the original structure that remained at the conclusion of the project.  The appellant submitted the Contractor's Statement, which was marked Appellant's Exhibit One.  The document indicated a total cost of $98,370 to reconstruct the subject dwelling on January 21, 1998.  The costs included the original sale price of $35,000.  The appellant testified that some of the labor was performed by him and was included in the Contractor's Statement at a cost of $15,060.  Under cross-examination, the appellant stated he was unsure if the labor costs performed by him and listed on the statement would be typical scale labor wages.  He also stated the excavation costs and the cost to install the new septic system were not included in the Contractor's Statement.  He stated that he was the general contractor of the project and this cost was not included.

The appellant submitted one comparable sale property located on a 2.48 acre tract.  This property was located three doors from the subject property and has 120 feet of river frontage.  This property was between 26 and 50 years of age and contained 1,300 square feet of living area.  The amenities, as testified to by the appellant, included a two car attached garage, a wet bar, a fireplace, two bathrooms and three bedrooms.  This property sold for $175,000 or $134.62 per square foot in June 1998.  The appellant stated this property is located next to a house on one side and a conservation district on two sides.  He stated the subject has dwellings on three sides.  He also stated the subject property has just one bathroom and two bedrooms. 

In conclusion, the appellant requested a total assessment of $32,789 or a market value of approximately $98,367.  He stated this represents the money that he has invested in the property. 

The board of review submitted "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" wherein the subject's assessment totaling $58,348 was disclosed.  The subject's assessment reflects a market value of $175,483 or $125.52 per square foot using the county's three-year median level of assessments for 1999 of 33.25%.  The deputy township assessor was present and testified to his assessment procedures.  He stated that based on exterior measurements, the subject property contains 1,398 square feet of living area.  Prior to renovation, the subject property contained 819 square feet of living area and an enclosed porch containing 423 square feet.  The subject's property record cards were submitted and marked Board of Review's Exhibit One.  The records contained the sketch of the subject prior and subsequent to reconstruction.  He stated that after the building permit was issued on July 2, 1996, he inspected the property and remeasured the home.  The dwelling is now a one-story home with an unfinished attic area.  He stated that prior to inspection, the subject dwelling was assessed at $125 because it was in an uninhabitable condition.  The dwelling is currently assessed at $44,021. 

In support of the subject's assessment, three suggested comparable properties were submitted and detailed on a grid analysis.  The testimony disclosed these properties were located over 10 miles from the subject on the upper river.  The subject is located on the lower river.  These properties had lot sizes ranging from .24 to .45 acres.  The dwellings were one story or one and one-half story, frame structures constructed between 1900 and 1953.  They ranged in size from 1,104 to 1,475 square feet; they sold for prices ranging from $159,000 to $174,900 or from $118.58 to $149.46 per square foot and the transactions occurred from June 1998 to November 1998.  The assessor stated that none of these properties have been updated or maintained like the subject. 

In conclusion, the board of review maintained the new windows installed in the subject property and the new roofline do alter the existing character of the property.  Based on the comparable data contained in the record, the board asked for confirmation of the subject property's assessment. 

After hearing the testimony and reviewing the record, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal.  The Board further finds that the appellant has not supported his contention that the assessment of the subject dwelling should not be increased as set forth in Section 10-20 of the Property Tax Code.  This section states in part that: 

Maintenance and repairs to residential property owned and used exclusively for a residential purpose shall not increase the assessed valuation of the property.  For purposes of this Section, work shall be deemed repair and maintenance when it (1) does not increase the square footage of improvements and does not materially alter the existing character and condition of the structure. . . .  

The Board finds that the renovation of the subject property goes beyond maintenance and repairs.  The testimony disclosed that the only part of the original structure remaining at the conclusion of the project was the floors.  The entire structure was razed with the exception of the floors.  Moreover, the roofline was changed.  Prior to renovation, the subject dwelling was a one-story structure with a low-pitched roof.  After reconstruction, the dwelling was a one story and unfinished attic with a high-pitched roof.  Thus, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that this provision of the tax code does not apply to the subject property. 

The appellant also claimed overvaluation and submitted a copy of the contractor's statement.  It was disclosed that he was the contractor and that some cost items were not included such as excavation, installation of the new septic system and contractor's fees.  Moreover, the appellant was unsure if the labor costs performed by him and listed on the statement would be indicative of typical scale wages.  Thus, the Board finds that the contractor's statement indicating a total cost of $98,370 for the subject property is not representative of the subject's market value because of the omissions noted above. 

The remaining valuation data contained in the record supports the market value assigned to the subject property.  The appellant submitted one suggested comparable property.  This property was not newly reconstructed like the subject.  It consisted of a larger site and the square feet of living area was slightly less than the subject property.  This property sold for $175,000 or $134.62 per square foot.  The subject property's assessment reflects a market value of $175,483 or $125.52 per square foot, a slightly lower unit value than the comparable property.  The board of review submitted sales data on three suggested comparable properties.  These properties were also not newly reconstructed like the subject property.  The testimony disclosed these properties were located approximately 10 miles from the subject on a different part of the river than the subject property.  These three properties sold for $118.58, $140.71 and $149.46 per square foot.  With one exception, the subject's assessment reflects a lower unit value than these properties.  As a result, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that the subject's assessment as established by the board of review is correct and no reduction is warranted.

The subject property consists of a one and one half story style single family dwelling of frame construction containing 1,920 square feet of above grade area. However, the one half story section of the dwelling is not finished. Thus, the subject contains 1,280 square feet of living area. The subject was constructed in 1994 and amenities include central air conditioning, a two-car garage, an open frame porch, a patio, and an unfinished basement.

The appellants appeared before the Property Tax Appeal Board represented by their attorney, contending unequal treatment in the assessment process. Specifically, the appellants argued residential properties 10 years of age or newer located in the Village of Ohio are valued at a higher assessment level in comparison to older residential properties. As authority for support of the lack of uniformity argument the appellants relied upon the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Walsh v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 181 Ill.2d 228, 229 Ill.Dec. 487, (1998).  In Walsh, the Pekin Township Assessor had not performed a quadrennial reassessment since 1957. For each new statutory quadrennial assessment period, the assessor merely applied annual equalization factors based upon the Illinois Department of Revenue's three-year sales ratio studies. In 1992, the subject property was removed from the mass appraisal system and was assessed according to its recent sale price. The court concluded the removal of one property or a group of properties from the aformentioned mass appraisal system was in violation of the constitutional requirements of both equity in the assessment methodology and equality in the tax burden. 

The appellants’ attorney argued the subject appeal has factual similarities in comparison to the Walsh decision. He quoted the   court’s opinion which states in part: 

[t]he evidence presented by both the board of review and the plaintiffs disclosed that sales-assessment ratios of other Pekin Township properties ranged from 7% to 68%... At the time of the Pekin Township Assessor’s 1992 assessments, many Pekin properties had assessed values unrelated to their fair cash value...To the extent that Pekin Township’s assessed valuations bear little relationship to fair cash value, they result in the unequal sharing of the collective tax burden and thus violate the Property Tax Code, as well as the Illinois Constitution’s uniformity clause. Walsh, 229 Ill.Dec. at 490. 

The appellants presented tables identifying sales to assessment ratios of single-family dwellings which sold between 1996 and 1998 in Ohio Township (Exhibit E). No descriptions of the suggested sales were detailed in the record. The appellants’ attorney noted the Bureau County Chief Assessment Officer supplied the sales ratio data. Nine sales occurred in 1996 and sales ratios ranged from 14.96% to 56.20%. Six sales occurred in 1997 and the sales-assessment ratios ranged from 20.45% to 74.83%. Six sales occurred in 1998 and sale ratios ranged from 20.40% to 48.57%. The sales ratios were derived by using the comparables' total assessment of the year prior to that of the sale date divided by the sale price. He noted sales ratios ranged widely from 14.96% to 74.83% of fair cash value over a three-year period. Thus, the appellants argued the subject appeal is similar to the Walsh decision. He noted the statutory level of assessments should be 33 1/3% of fair market value. 

The appellants further asserted that four sales detailed on the 1996 through 1998 sales ratio tables (Exhibit E) are anomalies. These properties sold for prices of $6,000, $7,000, $20,000 and one property was located in a different subdivision. No substantive explanation or evidence was submitted indicating these sales were anomalies. More importantly, there was no evidence submitted into the record indicating these transactions were not of an arm’s-length nature. After removing these entries, the average sales ratio for the years 1996, 1997, and 1998 in Ohio Township was calculated to be 23.70%. 

In further support of the inequity claim, the appellants detailed five sales that occurred in 1999. No detailed descriptions were provided regarding these sales such as age, size, style, and amenities.  They had sales ratios ranging from 13.34% to 26.46% based upon their recent sale prices and corresponding 1999 total assessments. The sales ratios averaged 19.73%. 

The appellant also submitted property record cards and a spreadsheet detailing four assessment comparables in support of the inequity claim. The comparables consist of three, one-story style and one, two-story style single family dwellings of brick or frame construction containing from 1,312 to 2,112 square feet of living area. The comparables were located from adjacent to the subject property to .6 miles from the subject. Two comparables are 29 and 43 years old and the ages of the two other comparables were not disclosed. The comparables' amenities were not disclosed. The appellants explained the ages of comparables one and two were not detailed on property record cards. However, notwithstanding age, the appellants argued these comparables are similar to the subject based on the photographs presented. The comparables’ 1999 improvement assessments ranged from $15,530 to $21,670 or from $7.73 to $16.12 per square foot of living area. The subject property has an improvement assessment of $29,620 or $23.14 per square foot of living area. The appellants noted comparables three and four are assessed at one-half to one-third of the subject’s per square foot improvement assessment. 

The appellants' attorney also contends the Walsh case provides a remedy for the sales-assessment inequity. He quoted the court’s opinion in part wherein the court cites Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Stuckart, 286 Ill. 164, 173, 121 N.E. 629 (1918). The court stated that: 

[o]ne person cannot be compelled to pay a greater proportion of taxes, according to the value of his property, than another, and where assessors have disregarded the injunction of the law and made an assessment of a property far below its real cash value, their misconduct must also follow the principle of uniformity and their assessments of all persons must be at the same proportional value. Walsh, 229 Ill. Dec. at 491. 

Based on the aformentioned evidence and analysis, the appellants requested the Board find Bureau County’s Chief Assessment Officer and board of review violated Illinois Law and the Illinois Constitution’s uniformity clause as outlined in the Walsh decision. In addition, the appellants requested a reduction in the subject’s improvement assessment to a level of 20% of fair market value based upon the average sales ratios detailed by the evidence. The appellants argued the 20% level of assessment should be applied to the subject’s 1999 estimated market value as reflected by its assessment. The request calculates to an improvement assessment of $17,424 or a total assessment of $20,424. The appellants opined the subject’s estimated market value as reflected by its assessment may be inflated, however, no market value evidence in support of this claim was submitted. Thus, the appellants asserted the estimated market value for the subject, as reflected by its assessment could be used as a benchmark to apply the 20% level of assessment. 

During questioning, the appellants stated there was some disparity in the manner in which the subject’s market value was calculated. However, the appellants were accepting the subject’s assessed value as a benchmark to apply the 20% level of assessment. With regard to the Walsh decision, the appellants were unaware if the sales ratio study was performed over one or three years; they did not know the number of sales used in that study; and were not aware that there are different acceptable levels of assessments given the size of an assessment jurisdiction. The board of review argued that Pekin Township is a more urban area and is a larger assessment jurisdiction compared to the subject's jurisdiction. Questioning from the hearing officer revealed the appellants' believed the assessment comparables detailed may not have similar market values due to differences in age and condition. However, the appellants argued the comparables should all be assessed similarly on a proportionate basis. 

The board of review submitted its "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" wherein the subject’s assessment of $34,040 was disclosed. The subject property has an estimated market value of $102,592 or $80.15 per square foot of living area including land using Bureau County’s 1999 three year median level of assessments of 33.18%, as determined by the Illinois Department of Revenue. The subject property has an improvement assessment of $29,620 or $23.14 per square foot of living area. 

The board of review submitted documentation indicating the appellants purchased the subject property in June 1994 for $84,000 or $65.63 per square foot of living area including land. The subject was not placed on the assessment books until January 1, 1995 although it was sold in 1994. At the time of its 1994 sale and using its 1995 total assessment, the subject property had a sales ratio of 28.83% which is below the 33.33% statutory level of assessment. The board of review also pointed out the subject property contains a garage that is not currently assessed. The board of review argued the subject’s assessment was not changed as a result of its 1994 sale price, but was increased as a result of the application of annual equalization factors. The same equalization factors were applied to all non-farm properties in the subject's township. The board of review further explained the subject’s assessed value was derived using the Illinois Real Property Appraisal Manual adjusted by market data. Testimony indicated that this methodology was utilized to determine the assessments of all residential parcels in Bureau County. The Bureau County Chief Assessment Officer testified that assessors do not "chase" sales to arrive at their final assessments. For example, assessors do not alter properties' assessments merely because a sale occurred. 

In rebuttal to the appellants’ comparables, the board of review pointed out that the appellant submitted the wrong property record for comparable one. The board of review testified this comparable was identified by the photograph submitted by the appellants. The board submitted its property record card indicating this comparable is a one-story 880 square foot frame dwelling built in 1980. Amenities include a full basement, attached garage, and an open frame porch. It has a 1999 improvement assessment of $19,280 or $21.91 per square foot of living area. The board of review also submitted documentation indicating this comparable sold for $75,000 in June 1999 or $85.23 per square foot of living area. 

With regard to the appellants’ comparable number two, the board of review argued this is an older brick constructed dwelling dissimilar to the subject. It is not a frame dwelling as detailed on the appellants’ appeal petition. Property record cards indicate this comparable was originally assessed in 1963, indicating this comparable is approximately 36 years old as of the assessment date in question. In addition, the board noted this comparable is superior to the subject in terms of finished basement area and an extra half bathroom. It sold in 1993 for $83,500 or $62.59 per square foot of living area including land in comparison to the subject’s 1994 selling price of $65.63 per square foot. The board argued that given this comparables superior amenities and earlier sale date, the negative effect of age is well demonstrated from the market, as evidenced by its lower per square sale price. 

With regard to comparables three and four submitted by the appellant, the board of review argued they are not similar to the subject and should be accorded little weight. Comparable number three is larger in size, older in age, and a two-story style dwelling dissimilar to the subject. Comparable number four is considerably older than the subject. 

The board of review also argued the sales ratio argument offered by the appellant is not supported. The board of review supplied three sales omitted from the appellants’ analysis. These properties were built between 1900 and 1997 and sold in 1999 for prices ranging from $48,000 to $145,000. Using their 1998 total assessments, the properties had sales ratios ranging from 35.54% to 38.94%. He testified that using the prior year's assessments, which is the accepted method for determining sales ratios, the median level of assessments in the Village of Ohio was calculated to be 26.47% using all arm’s-length sales. The board of review also pointed out that by excluding the three sales from the analysis for years 1996, 1997, and 1998 is an error. The properties that sold for $6,000; $7,000; $20,000; and the one property located in a different subdivision were deemed by the Department of Revenue as arm's-length transactions and should be included in the sales ratio studies. The board's witness also argued these dwellings are much older in age than the subject, which is a further indication of the negative effect that age has in the marketplace. The board of review noted these properties had sales ratios ranging from 56.20% to 74.83%, far above the subject’s assessment to value ratio. 

In support of the subject’s assessment, the board of review offered a spreadsheet detailing sales and assessment data on   four suggested comparables it considered most similar to the subject. They consist of one-story style dwellings of frame construction containing from 1,168 to 1,456 square feet of living area built between 1990 and 1996. All the comparables are located in the subject’s market area and contain similar amenities. They have improvement assessments ranging from $28,920 to $37,310 or from $21.61 to $27.12 per square foot of living area. The board of review argued the subject’s per square foot improvement assessment of $23.14 falls within the range established by the most similar comparables and demonstrate the subject property is equitably assessed. The comparables also sold between September 1996 and September 1998 for sale prices ranging from $86,250 to $107,000 or from $72.12 to $82.19 per square foot of living area including land. The board of review argued the subject’s estimated market value, as reflected by its assessment, of $80.15 per square foot of living area including land falls within the range established by its comparable sales. 

With regard to Walsh, the board of review argued this case does not apply to the subject appeal. The board argued that in Walsh, the court found that the subject property was removed from the mass appraisal system and was assessed according to its recent sale price. The court concluded the removal of one property or a group of properties from a mass appraisal system was in violation of the constitutional requirements of both equity in the assessment methodology and equality in the tax burden. The board of review reiterated that assessed values in Bureau County are determined using a depreciated cost approach to value in the mass appraisal system utilizing the Illinois Real Property Appraisal Manual. Assessments may further be adjusted or revised based upon market conditions or equity data as necessary. The witness argued Bureau County Assessors do not "chase" sales as was done in the Walsh decision to arrive at final assessments. Finally, the board of review argued the subject’s assessment, as well as the assessments of every other residential property in Ohio Township or the Village of Ohio, has not changed since the last quadrennial assessment period except through application of annual equalization factors to all non-farm properties. The board of review also argued the three-year median level of assessments in Bureau County as determined by the Illinois Department of Revenue sales ratio study is 33.18%, well above the subject’s assessment to sales ratio. In addition, evidence indicated the three year medial level of assessments for the subject’s township was 33.63% in 1996, 33.55% in 1997, and 33.25% in 1998, significantly greater than the appellants' calculations. Based on this evidence, the board of review requested confirmation of the subject property’s assessment. 

Under cross-examination, the board reiterated that assessments in the Bureau County are derived using a depreciated cost approach during initial construction. He testified assessed values are not determined by actual costs or by chasing sales. No depreciation was applied to the subject due to its relatively new age. The witness testified depreciation factors would be applied to the subject as it ages or as its condition changes. No depreciation factor was deemed necessary for the subject in the new quadrennial year, that being January 1, 1999. He testified there are properties that are deteriorating physically over time resulting in a loss of value and some properties have a loss in value due to external influences. The witness testified the market or comparable sales are most reflective of the subject’s fair market value. He also argued that if the subject were assessed at its most recent sale price it would result in an inequitable assessment in comparison to similar properties. He testified most dwellings in the Village of Ohio that sell for $100,000 or more are located in the subject’s subdivision, resulting in overall higher assessments. The assessor testified that since 1996, all sales in Ohio Township indicate sales ratios ranged from 14.96% to 74.83%. He testified there could be some that fall outside the market range, but overall the township is uniformly assessed within the statutory guidelines. 

In response to the board of review’s evidence and testimony, the appellants’ attorney argued the board’s evidence supports the appellants’ case in chief. He testified the Supervisor of Assessments supplied the sales information used in the appellants’ sales ratio analysis and any sales claimed to be omitted by the board of review were not provided to the appellants. He further argued that the board’s "addendum D" exemplifies the sales ratio inequity in the subject’s area, that being older homes are assessed at lower level of assessments in comparison to homes 10 years of age or newer. He noted the five properties built between 1883 and 1980 had sales ratios ranging from 14.24% to 35.54%, with only one property over the statutory level of assessments. In contrast, he argued both properties which were 10 years of age or newer had sales ratios of 37.37% and 38.94%. Thus, he argued that on average newer homes are assessed 15% higher in their level of assessment in comparison to older homes. The appellant argued the comparables presented by the board of review are all newer dwellings and carry higher assessments, which is the nature of the inequity issue. For example, he argued two homes which are five and 50 years old and each sold for $100,000, should each carry a $33,000 assessment. The appellants pointed out an older home in both parties’ evidence sold for $116,000 in 1999 and carried an assessment ratio of 26.47%. This property also sold for more than the subject property which was built in 1994. 

After hearing the testimony and considering the evidence, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal. The Property Tax Appeal Board further finds the appellant failed to support the contention of unequal treatment in the assessment process. The Illinois Supreme Court has held that taxpayers who object to an assessment on the basis of lack of uniformity bear the burden of proving the disparity of assessment valuations by clear and convincing evidence.  Kankakee County Board of Review v.  Property Tax Appeal Board, 131 Ill.2d 1 (1989).  The evidence must demonstrate a consistent pattern of assessment inequities within the assessment jurisdiction.  After an analysis of the assessment data, the Board finds the appellant has not overcome this burden. 

Both parties presented descriptions and assessment data on a total of eight suggested equity comparables. The Property Tax Appeal Board accords diminished weight to the suggested comparables submitted by the appellant. These comparables were built between 1956 and 1980 and are considerably older than the subject. In addition, two comparables are of brick construction and one comparable was a two story style dwelling, dissimilar to the subject. The Property Tax Appeal Board finds the equity comparables submitted by the board of review to be most similar to the subject in terms of age, size, style, construction, location, and amenities. They have improvement assessments ranging from $21.61 to $27.12 per square foot of living area. The Board finds the subject’s improvement assessment of $23.14 per square foot of living area falls within the range established by the most representative equity comparables. Thus, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds the appellant failed to demonstrate the subject dwelling was inequitably assessed by clear and convincing evidence. 

When an appeal is based on assessment inequity, the appellant has the burden of showing the subject property is inequitably assessed by clear and convincing evidence. Proof of an assessment inequity should consist of more than a simple showing of assessed values of the subject and comparables. There should also be a showing of physical, locational, and jurisdictional similarities, as well as of market value considerations. The Board finds many of the comparables deemed dissimilar would have wide variances of market values in comparison to the subject due to differences in age, size, and condition. As a result, the Board finds the appellants failed to show the subject’s improvements are inequitably assessed. 

The constitutional provision for uniformity of taxation and valuation does not require mathematical equality. The requirement is satisfied if the intent is evident to adjust the burden with a reasonable degree of uniformity and if such is the effect of the statute enacted by the General Assembly establishing the method of assessing real property in its general operation.  A practical uniformity, rather than an absolute one, is the test.  Apex Motor Fuel Co. v. Barrett, 20 Ill.2d 395 (1960).  Although the comparables presented by the appellants disclosed that properties located in the same area are not assessed at identical levels, all that the constitution requires is a practical uniformity which appears to exist on the basis of the evidence.  For the foregoing reasons, the Board finds that the appellants have not proven by clear and convincing evidence that the subject property is inequitably assessed. 

The appellants also argued the subject property is not uniformly assessed based on sales ratio analyses from 1996 through 1999. More specifically, they argued older homes are assessed at a lower percentage of market value when compared to residential properties constructed after 1990. The Property Tax Appeal Board finds it can give little credence to the appellants' argument. 

The courts have held that in determining whether to use a township or county sales ratio considerations of practicality dictate the use of the county ratio. People ex rel. Kohorst v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R. Co., 22 Ill.2d 104, 174 N.E.2d 182 (1961).  The courts look to the county as a whole in order to determine whether the property at issue is being assessed in accordance with the constitutional guaranty of equality and uniformity of taxation. Furthermore, the courts have held that "even if the studies show a disparity in the levels of assessment of residential property within the same township, we cannot find that the evidence shows that a township level of assessment, rather that a countywide level, is the proper one. In re App. of County Treasurer (Twin Manors), 175 Ill.App.3d 562, (1st Dist. 1988).  Thus, a review of case law indicates that the courts look at the "assessment level for the county as a whole" rather than a single township or selective sales in a given market area, as the appellants did in this instant appeal. The Property Tax Appeal Board finds the three year median level of assessments of Bureau County for 1999, as determined by the Illinois Department of Revenue, was 33.18%. Thus, under the standards set by the courts of this state, the appellants’ study cannot be said to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the subject property was assessed disproportionately higher than property throughout the county. 

Furthermore, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds the appellants’ sales ratio analyses to be flawed. First, the appellants only analyzed sales ratio data from the subject's village and township rather than performing a countywide sales ratio analysis as dictated by the aformentioned case law. Additionally, as noted by the board of review, the appellants were selective in collecting and analyzing the sales ratio data. The evidence and testimony indicate the appellants did not consider many sales in their analysis which have higher sales ratios. They chose only those which support their case in chief. The appellants' counsel indicated certain sales were anomalies and should not be considered in the analysis. The Board finds this argument to be without merit. There was no evidence submitted into the record indicating these sales were not of an arm’s-length nature. In conclusion, the Board finds the appellants' study is to be given little weight because it was not performed on a countywide basis, the sales selected were not random, and the appellant did not properly edit the data. In contrast, the Illinois Department of Revenue developed a countywide level of assessment utilizing all arms-length transactions in the entire county in determining Bureau County’s three year median level of assessments of 33.18%. The appellants further argued the Chief Assessment Officer did not provide all of the sales for a complete analysis.  The Board finds this argument to be without merit. The appellants have the burden to submit evidence in support of their inequity claim. 

The appellants further argued the assessment practice in Bureau County is contrary to the holding in Walsh v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 181 Ill.2d. 228, 229 Ill.Dec. 487, (1998), that being newer residential properties are being assessed at a higher percentage of fair market value than older properties. In Walsh, the court found selecting one property or type of property for reassessment based on a recent sale price while assessing other properties on a different basis was improper. Not only are the assessments to be uniform among similarly situated properties, the basis of determining the assessments must also be uniform. 

The Board finds Walsh does not apply in the instant appeal and the evidence and testimony does not support such a contention. Evidence indicates assessments of all residential properties are determined using a depreciated cost approach derived from cost data detailed in the Illinois Real Property Appraisal Manual, not by simply adding equalization factors to estimate value. Subsequent changes in residential properties assessments were based upon application of equalization factors; adjustments based on overall market conditions; or adjusting for an assessment inequity. Therefore, the Board finds the subject property, unlike the subject in Walsh, was not removed from the mass appraisal system in Bureau County. Evidence indicates Bureau County assessment officials apply a uniform method of assessing residential properties for taxation purpose. The subject property sold in 1994 for $84,000 and had a sales ratio of 28.23% using its 1995 total assessment, well below the 1999 three year median level of assessments for Bureau County as determined by the Illinois Department of Revenue of 33.18%. Thus, unlike the Walsh case, the subject property was not removed from the uniform assessment methodology and assessed according to its most recent sale price. 

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds the appellants failed to support their contention of unequal treatment in the assessment process by clear and convincing evidence. The Board further finds the assessment placed on the subject property is supported by the sales and assessment data submitted in the record by the parties. Thus, the Board finds a reduction in the subject’s assessment is not warranted.

The subject property consists of three parcels improved with model homes.  The properties are located in Fairbury, Livingston County, Illinois. 

The appellant and his attorney appeared before the Property Tax Appeal Board claiming the subject property should receive the model home exemption under Section 10-25 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/10-25).  In the alternative, the appellant requested a zero assessment for the subject improvements based on the fact the construction of the properties was not substantially completed until August or September 1998. 

The appellant’s attorney contends that a conflict of law exists between Section 10-25 and Sections 9-160 and 9-180 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/9-160 and 9-180).  Sections 9-160 and 9-180 pertain to the proportionate value of new or added improvements.  He stated that under Section 10-25 the person liable for taxes on property eligible for assessment as provided in this Section must file an application with the chief county assessment officer on or before January 31 of each assessment year for which that assessment is desired.  In the instant case the subject model homes were barely under construction and not completed and ready for occupancy until August or September 1998.  He claimed that to contend that an application should have been filed for a house barely under construction is not practical.  Sections 9-160 and 9-180 of the Code allow the county assessment officer to assess properties on a proportionate basis, subsequent to the January 31 filing date for application of the model home exemption.  Because of the conflict, the appellant’s attorney argues that only the assessment for the subject land is applicable for the 1998 assessment year. 

The appellant testified that other properties that were completed at about the same time as the subject model homes were not assessed until the subsequent year.  Documentation supporting this assertion was not submitted.  The testimony disclosed that the subject properties had sold in the latter part of 1998.  The Hearing Officer requested the sales prices and the date of sale for each of the subject properties.  Subsequent to the hearing, the appellant’s attorney entered into the record the sales dates for the properties.  Docket No. 98-2271-R-1 sold November 11, 1998, Docket No. 98-2272-R-1 sold November 6, 1998, and Docket No. 98-2273-R-1 sold October 21, 1998.  The sales prices for the properties were not disclosed. 

The board of review submitted "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" wherein the subject’s assessments were disclosed.  The supervisor of assessments was present at the hearing and testified that the appellant failed to file an application for the model home exemption on or before January 31, 1998.  Thus, he claimed the subject model homes were not eligible for this exemption. 

With respect to 35 ILCS 200/9-160 and 180, he indicates this language provides the vehicle under which assessing officials assess property on a proportionate basis from the date when the improvement was substantially completed or initially occupied.  The Hearing Officer requested property record cards and an analysis of how the proportionate assessment for each of the model homes was calculated.  Subsequently, this evidence was received by the Property Tax Appeal Board.  For Docket No. 98-2271-R-1, the supervisor of assessments indicated the completion date in the assessor’s records was September 1, 1998.  The replacement cost new was estimated at $123,595 and the property was assessed for four months at a full value of $41,200 with an assessment of 1/3 or $13,733.  According to the official assessment records, the improvement was actually assessed at $13,729 for this property. 

For Docket No. 98-2272-R-1, the completion date in the assessor’s records was July 1, 1998.  The replacement cost new was estimated at $124,215 and the property was assessed for six months at a full value of $62,106 with an assessment at 1/3 or $20,702.  According to the official assessment records, the improvement was actually assessed at $20,697. 

For Docket No. 98-2273-R-1, the completion date in the assessor’s records was September 1, 1998.  The replacement cost new was estimated at $129,352 and the property was assessed for four months at a full value of $43,116 with an assessment at 1/3 or $14,372.  According to the official assessment records, the improvement was actually assessed at $15,017. 

The supervisor of assessments testified the assessment policy for the county is to assess property on a proportionate basis from the date when the improvement was substantially completed or initially occupied.  He stated that new legislation was passed to allow applications for the model home exemptions to be filed up to December 31 of the year for which the assessment is desired.  He explained the new legislation will be effective January 1, 2000. 

After hearing the testimony and reviewing the record, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal.  The appellant claimed the subject property was entitled to the model home exemption under Section 10-25 of the Property Tax Code.  He also claimed the model homes should not have been assessed since they were not substantially completed until August or September 1998. 

The Board finds the subject properties are not entitled to the model home exemption.  Section 10-25 of the Property Tax Code states in part: 

. . . The person liable for taxes on property eligible for assessment as provided in this Section shall file a verified application with the chief county assessment officer on or before January 31 of each assessment year for which that assessment is desired.  Failure to make a timely filing in any assessment year constitutes a waiver of the right to benefit for that assessment year. 

The testimony and evidence disclosed the appellant did not file an application with the chief county assessment officer on or before January 31, 1998.  Therefore, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds this Section does not apply for the current appeal. 

The Board also finds that the subject model homes should have partial assessments for the 1998 assessment year pursuant to Sections 9-160 and 9-180 of the Property Tax Code. 

Section 9-160 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/9-160) provides: 

On or before June 1 in each year other than the general assessment year *** the assessor shall list and assess all property which becomes taxable and which is not upon the general assessment, and also make and return a list of all new or added buildings, structures or other improvements of any kind, the value of which had not been previously added to or included in the valuation of the property on which such improvements have been made, specifying the property on which each of the improvements has been made, the kind of improvement and the value which, in his or her opinion, has been added to the property by the improvements.  The assessment shall also include or exclude, on a proportionate basis in accordance with the provisions of Section 9-180, all new or added buildings, structures or other improvements, the value of which was not included in the valuation of the property for that year, and all improvements which were destroyed or removed. 

Section 9-180 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/9-180) provides: 

The owner of property on January 1 also shall be liable, on a proportionate basis, for the increased taxes occasioned by the construction of new or added buildings, structures or other improvements on the property from the date when the improvement was substantially completed or initially occupied or initially used, to December 31 of that year. 

Here, Section 9-160 requires the assessor to record any new improvements and to determine the value they have added to the property.  By its terms, Section 9-180, applies only after a building has been substantially completed or initially occupied.  Reading these two sections together, Section 9-160 clearly requires the assessor to value any substantially completed improvements to the extent that they add value to the property.  Section 9-180 then defines the time when the improvement can be fully assessed.  Thus, the Board finds that a building assessment for the subject properties is appropriate. 

The appellant testified the properties were substantially completed in August or September of 1998.  The assessor’s records indicate completion dates of September 1, 1998, for two of the properties and a completion date of July 1, 1998, for the remaining property. 

Based on the evidence and testimony presented, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds the subject model homes should have assessments based on completion dates of September 1, 1998, for Docket Nos. 98-2271-R-1 and 98-2273-R-1 and on a completion date of August 1, 1998, for Docket No. 98-2272-R-1.  The market value as assigned to the subject parcels by the board of review was not contested by the appellant.  Therefore, the Board finds the values as estimated by the board of review for the subject parcels to be appropriate.  Using the same formula as applied by the supervisor of assessments for computing partial assessments, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that assessment reductions are appropriate for the subject parcels based on the completion dates as stated above.

The subject property consists of a residential dwelling located in Logan County, Illinois. 

The appellant claimed the subject property’s total assessment is not reflective of its true market value. In support of this contention, the appellant submitted evidence regarding the  subject lot’s February 1998 purchase price of $28,000 and the subject improvement’s construction cost of approximately $129,000 as of July 1998. Based on the evidence contained in the record, the appellant requested a reduction in the subject property’s total assessment.

The board of review did not submit its "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" nor any evidence in support of its assessed valuation of the subject property. 

After reviewing the record and considering the evidence, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal.  The appellant in this appeal submitted evidence in support of the contention that the subject property was not accurately assessed.  The board of review did not submit any evidence in support of its assessment of the subject property as required by Section 1910.40(a) of the Official Rules of the Property Tax Appeal Board. The subject property has an estimated value, as reflected by its assessment, of $175,850. The subject’s recent purchase price of $157,000 for both the subject lot and improvement is substantially lower than the board of review’s assessment. 

Therefore, the Board finds the information submitted by the appellant is the best and only evidence contained in the record and supports a reduction in the assessed valuation of the subject property.

The subject property consists of a tri-level style dwelling of frame construction containing 2,296 square feet of living area. Amenities include a fireplace, an attached two-car garage, and central air conditioning. The subject improvement is approximately 23 years old.

The appellant claimed both unequal treatment in the assessment process and overvaluation as the bases of the appeal. In support of these arguments, the appellant submitted a spreadsheet detailing three suggested comparable properties and a one-page market value opinion from a senior lender of a local bank.  The appellant’s spreadsheet contained three, tri-level style dwellings of frame or brick and frame construction which range in size from 1,920 to 2,426 square feet of living area. These properties are located in the same subdivision, range in age from 13 to 17 years old comparables and have similar amenities. These properties were sold between June 1991 and June 1997 for prices ranging from $68,200 to $100,000 or from $31.05 to $42.71 per square foot including land. The appellant’s comparables also have per square foot improvement assessments ranging from $10.87 to $13.49. 

The appellant also offered a market value opinion from a local bank lender. He estimated a value of $90,000 for the subject property as of December 15, 1999. The banker stated that his opinion was based on similar properties within the immediate area of the subject property. The banker, however, failed to provide any supporting documentation for his market value opinion. Based on the evidence contained in the record, the appellant requested a reduction in the subject property’s total assessment.

The board of review submitted its "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" wherein the subject property’s total assessment of $32,930 was disclosed. The subject property has an estimated value, as reflected by its assessment, of $98,800 or $43.03 per square foot of living area including land. In support of its assessment, the board of review provided two spreadsheets detailing seven sales comparables and three equity comparables. 

The sales comparables consist of tri-level style dwellings ranging in size from 1,470 to 1,848 square feet of living area. The properties, which are between 25 and 39 years old, were sold between June 1999 and October 1999 for prices ranging from $71,000 to $93,000 or from $48.30 to $51.08 per square foot of living area including land. The board of review’s equity comparables consist of tri-level style dwellings ranging in size from 2,016 to 2,340 square feet of living area. These properties are between 21 and 39 years old and have improvement assessments ranging from $26,660 to $32,530 or from $11.69 to $14.18 per square foot of living area. The board of review claimed the subject property’s market value falls within the range of the comparable sales and argued the subject property’s per square foot improvement assessment also falls within the range established by the equity comparables. Based on the evidence contained in the record, the board of review requested confirmation of the subject property’s total assessment. 

After reviewing the record and considering the evidence, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal. The Property Tax Appeal Board further finds the appellant failed to prove either overvaluation or unequal treatment in the assessment process and no reduction is warranted. One of the appellant’s arguments was based on unequal treatment in the assessment process. The Illinois Supreme Court has held that taxpayers who object to an assessment on the basis of lack of uniformity bear the burden of proving the disparity of assessment valuations by clear and convincing evidence. Kankakee County Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 131 Ill.2d 1 (1989). The evidence must demonstrate a consistent pattern of assessment inequities within the assessment jurisdiction. After an analysis of the assessment data, the Board finds that the appellant has failed to meet this burden. 

In support of his unequal treatment contention the appellant submitted evidence of three, tri-level style dwellings of frame or brick and frame construction. These properties have per square foot improvement assessments ranging from $10.87 to $13.49. The subject property has an improvement assessment of $28,180 or $12.27 per square foot, which falls well within the range established by the appellant’s own comparable properties. Furthermore, the subject’s per square foot improvement assessment falls within the range established by the board of review’s seven equity comparables. In fact, the subject’s per square foot improvement assessment is lower than the per square foot improvement assessments of seven of the ten comparable properties contained in the record. Thus, the Board finds the appellant failed to establish unequal treatment in the assessment process. 

The Board notes that the constitutional provision for uniformity of taxation and valuation does not require mathematical equality. The requirement is satisfied if the intent is evident to adjust the burden with a reasonable degree of uniformity and if such is the effect of the statute enacted by the General Assembly establishing the method of assessing real property in its general operation. A practical uniformity, rather than an absolute one, is the test. Apex Motor Fuel Co. v. Barrett, 20 Ill.2d 395 (1960). Although the comparables presented by the appellants disclosed that properties located in the same area are not assessed at identical levels, all that the constitution requires is a practical uniformity that appears to exist on the basis of the evidence. 

The appellant also claimed the subject property’s market value was not accurately reflected by its assessment. The appellant’s comparable properties were sold between June 1991 and June 1997 for prices ranging from $68,200 to $100,000 or from $31.05 to $42.71 per square foot including land. The board of review also offered evidence of comparable sales. The board of review’s comparables were sold between June 1999 and October 1999 for prices ranging from $71,000 to $93,000 or from $48.30 to $51.08 per square foot of living area including land. The subject property has an estimated value, as reflected by its assessment, of $98,800 or $43.03 per square foot of living area including land. The Board finds that two of the appellant’s comparable sales are dated and are not representative of the subject’s 1999 market value. The Board further finds the subject’s estimated value falls below three of the four remaining sales comparables contained in the record. In addition, the Board accords no weight to the bank lender’s opinion of value for the subject property. The opinion was void of any supporting documentation and failed to follow proper appraisal methodology. Thus, the Board finds the appellant also failed to establish overvaluation. 

Therefore, the Board finds the subject property’s assessment as established by the board of review is correct and no reduction is warranted.

The subject property consists of a two-story dryvit single-family dwelling constructed in 1997 with 5,431 square feet of living area.

The appellant appeared by counsel before the Property Tax Appeal Board arguing both overvaluation and unequal treatment in the assessment process and the bases of the appeal.  For the overvaluation argument, the appellant submitted construction costs and an affidavit from the general contractor evidencing total costs of the improvements in 1997 of $492,000.  The appellant also indicated at the time the subject land was purchased, a one story, 2,166 square foot single family dwelling was located on the property.  The Real Estate Transfer Declaration was submitted indicating the appellant purchased the subject in August 1995 for $420,000 that included this older dwelling.  The construction costs include the costs to demolish the older dwelling.

At the time of purchase in 1995, the subject’s assessment was $52,153 for the land and $81,402 for the improvement for a total assessment of $133,555.  The appellant argued because a dwelling was included in the sale, the subject’s land value did not constitute the total $420,000 sale price.  Since the subject’s land assessment at the time of sale was 39% of the total assessment, the appellant argued the land value for 1998 should be 39% of the 1995 sale price or $163,800.  Adding this $163,800 for the land to the $492,000 construction costs of the improvement resulted in total costs for the subject of $655,800.

For the equity argument, the appellant presented three properties located near the subject.  These properties are two story dwellings of brick, frame or dryvit construction.  The properties were constructed from 1990 to 1997 and contain from 4,112 to 5,130 square feet of living area.  Most amenities were similar to the subject, however, the subject has a finished basement.  These properties had improvement assessments ranging from $156,131 to $230,377 or from $37.91 to $44.91 per square foot.  Based on this evidence, the appellant requested a reduction in the assessment of the subject property.

The board of review submitted "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" wherein the subject's final assessment of $361,843 was disclosed.  The assessment reflects an estimated value of $1,089,560 using the three year median level of assessments for 1998 for Lake County of 33.21%.  The board indicated the subject’s land sale was in 1995, included a dwelling, and is not indicative of land values for 1998.  The board also argued the construction costs for the new subject dwelling do not include architect fees or costs for landscaping that is illustrated in photographs.

Assessment data and descriptions on three properties were presented.  The properties are two story brick or dryvit construction and had amenities similar to the subject, however the subject had a finished basement that the other properties did not possess.  The properties ranged in size from 3,837 to 5,123 square feet of living area and had improvement assessments ranging from $218,581 to $322,331 or from $56.96 to $62.91 per square foot of living area.  However, the appellant provided information that the board of review stipulated to reductions for 1998 for two of the board’s three comparables.  The corrected range of improvement assessments for the board’s comparables was $43.12 to $62.91 per square foot.  The subject’s improvement assessment was $305,808 or $56.31 per square foot of living area.

After reviewing the record and considering the evidence, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal.  The Board further finds that the appellant has failed to support the contention of unequal treatment in the assessment process.  The Illinois Supreme Court has held that taxpayers who object to an assessment on the basis of lack of uniformity bear the burden of proving the disparity of assessment valuations by clear and convincing evidence.  Kankakee County Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 131 Ill.2d 1 (1989).

The evidence must demonstrate a consistent pattern of assessment inequities within the assessment jurisdiction.  After an analysis of the assessment data, the Board finds that the appellant has failed to overcome this burden.  The per square foot assessment of the suggested comparable improvements submitted by the parties support the board of review's assessment of the subject's improvements.  The comparables submitted for comparison suggest that the subject's assessment is within the range at $56.31 per square foot of living area.  Although the subject is at the higher end of the range of improvement assessments, the Board finds the subject is larger than all the comparables; is newer than four of the six comparables; has more bathrooms than five of the six comparables; and is the only property listed as having a finished basement.

The constitutional provision for uniformity of taxation and valuation does not require mathematical equality.  The requirement is satisfied if the intent is evident to adjust the burden with a reasonable degree of uniformity and if such is the effect of the statute enacted by the General Assembly establishing the method of assessing real property in its general operation.  A practical uniformity, rather than an absolute one, is the test.  Apex Motor Fuel Co. v. Barrett, 20 Ill.2d 395 (1960).  Although the comparables presented by the appellant disclosed that properties located in the same area are not assessed at identical levels, all that the constitution requires is a practical uniformity which appears to exist on the basis of the evidence.

The Board also finds the appellant has not supported the overvaluation claim by a preponderance of the evidence.  The subject land was purchased in 1995 and included an older dwelling.  The appellant argued the subject’s land value for 1998 should be found by apportioning the land and building assessments the same as they were in 1995.  The Board finds the 1995 assessment is not indicative of the value of the property in 1998.  The Board finds the appellant’s assessment method in no way gives any factual indication of the land value for the subject for 1998.

The appellant also presented construction costs for the new subject dwelling totaling $492,000.  However, the appellant agreed these costs lacked any architect fees and new landscaping costs.  The appellant’s attorney also did not know if the finished basement was included in the submitted costs.  The Board notes no land sales analysis or expert report or testimony were presented.  The Board therefore finds the costs submitted are incomplete and insufficient to determine a value for the subject improvement.

For the foregoing reasons, the Board finds that the appellant has not proven by clear and convincing evidence that the subject property is inequitably assessed.  The Board also finds the appellant has not proven the subject was overvalued by a preponderance of the evidence.  Therefore, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that the subject's assessment as established by the board of review is correct and no reduction is warranted.

The subject property consists of a residential dwelling located in Madison County, Illinois. 

The appellant claimed the subject property’s total assessment is not reflective of its true market value. In support of the overvaluation contention, the appellant submitted evidence of the recent purchase price of $73,000 for the subject property on December 13, 1999. Based on this evidence, the appellant requested a reduction in the subject property’s total assessment. The evidence further revealed that the appellant did not file a complaint with the board of review but filed an appeal directly to the Property Tax Appeal Board following receipt of the notice of an equalization factor.

The board of review submitted its “Board of Review - Notes on Appeals,” wherein the subject property’s total assessment of $26,640 was disclosed. The board of review also offered to remove the equalization factor that was applied to the subject’s 1999 assessment. No other evidence was provided by the board of review in support of its assessment. 

After reviewing the record and considering the evidence, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal. Based upon the evidence submitted, the Board finds that a reduction in the subject's assessment is supported.  However, the record indicates that the appellant did not file a complaint with the board of review but appealed the assessment directly to the Property Tax Appeal Board based on notice of an equalization factor.  Since the appeal was filed after notification of an equalization factor, the amount of relief that the Property Tax Appeal Board can grant is limited pursuant to section 16-180 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/16-180).  This section provides in pertinent part: 

"where no complaint has been made to the board of review of the county where the property is located and the appeal is based solely on the effect of an equalization factor assigned to all property or to a class of property by the board of review, the Property Tax Appeal Board may not grant a reduction in the assessment greater than the amount that was added as the result of the equalization factor." 

The Board has interpreted this provision to mean that where a taxpayer has not filed a complaint with the board of review, but files an appeal directly to the Property Tax Appeal Board after notice of application of an equalization factor, the Board cannot grant a reduction of assessment greater than the amount of increase caused by the equalization factor.  Based on a review of the evidence contained in the record, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds a reduction in the assessment of the subject property is supported.  However, the reduction is limited to the increase in the assessment caused by the application of the equalization factor.

The subject property is improved with an 81 year old, former grain company complex that was converted into multi-family, loft dwellings.  The improvements consist of three buildings which abut each other and contain 60 condominium units. The front building is a four-story structure, while the two back buildings are three-story structures with garden units on the lower level.   The appellants’ attorney raised two issues at hearing:  first, unequal treatment in the assessment process of the improvement, and second, a 34% excessive increase in assessment from 1997 to 1998 as the bases of this appeal. 

In support, the appellants’ attorney submitted a brief describing the appellants’ position as well as Exhibits A through D in support of their assertions. 

The attorney’s brief indicates that the subject’s condominiums sold from January to March of 1995.  The appellants’ assert that at the time of purchase, they were unaware of serious and on-going defects in the condition and construction of the subject.  The brief indicates that the appellants’ original purchase prices would not have been paid had they been aware of the defects within the subject.  The defects asserted by the appellants are as follows:  poor electrical system, water accumulation and flooding, leakage around fireplaces and brick walls when it rains, and crumbling and peeling masonry that has required extensive tuckpointing. 

In support of the aforementioned defects, the appellants submitted Exhibit A which is a copy of portions of an engineering report as well as copies of photographs of the subject property.  The engineering report indicates that its purpose was to review and evaluate the common property and that the report was not intended to investigate the cause and extent of underlying conditions.  The project manager indicated that the report was completed after an inspection of the subject and the report’s findings address various areas of the subject. 

The report indicates that there is deterioration and evidence of prior repair efforts as to the subject’s exterior walls.  Specifically, throughout the courtyard walls, areas of deterioration including spalling brick, displaced masonry, cracked masonry, and weathered mortar joints were observed.  However, the report continues by indicating that many of the problems can be addressed through conventional tuckpointing and masonry reconstruction repairs.  As to the subject’s windows, the report indicates that they are in good condition as well as the sealant.  As to the entry doors, curtain wall, and the courtyard, the report also finds that these are in good condition; however, the doors could be refinished. 

As to the roof membrane system, the report indicates that the engineers observed areas of deterioration which can or will impact the long-term performance of the roof.  However, the report estimates that the existing roof system under ideal conditions would have a useful life of approximately 15 additional years.  Moreover, the report was critical of the conversion drawings indicating that there was no abundance of construction details or standards; but that the work performed appeared to be consistent with residential redevelopment.  Lastly, the report suggested some repair programs and provided a table of values reflecting the suggested repair programs and related costs from the years 1997 through 2011. 

Appellants’ Exhibit B consisted of copies of completed surveys circulated to the unit owners inquiring about any present or recent problems within their units.  Exhibit C was correspondence from the president of the condo association elaborating on the tuckpointing costs as well as providing details regarding an August, 1998, flood which damaged several units.  The correspondence admits that the opinions expressed by various experts were contradictory and inconclusive regarding the subject’s defects.  The president states her belief that the subject is booby-trapped with major structural flaws. 

Appellants’ Exhibit D is a listing of 13 units that were damaged in an August, 1998, flood.  The data indicates that eight of the 13 units were originally purchased in 1995 and had not been resold.  The original sales occurred between March 1, 1995 and August 17, 1995 for prices ranging from $111,177 to $206,940.  The units range in percentage of ownership from 1.4147 to 2.5601 percent.  The data also indicates that five of the units sold thereafter from April 1, 1996 through June 25, 1998 for prices that ranged from $140,000 to $183,500.  The data also indicates that three of the five resold units increased in market value, while the other two units decreased in value.  However, the data was silent as to whether any of the 13 units had resold after the flood. 

At hearing, appellants’ attorney asserted that the poor workmanship in the subject’s construction has caused the unit owners to incur frequent and expensive repair work.  In addition, he asserted that the subject’s management company reviewed the 13 units with flood damage to determine whether similar damage would occur in the future.  Appellants’ attorney stated that the management company determined that the units would be susceptible to similar water damage in the future that would impair their market value; however, counsel failed to submit any documentation to support the later assertion. 

Moreover, the appellants’ attorney contended that the August, 1998, flood has impaired the market value of the subject’s units for the January 1, 1998 assessment date.  He argued that the loss in market value due to the flooding cannot be quantified due to the defective cloud overshadowing the subject property.  He also stated that the subject’s aggregate assessment should be held at the 1997 total amount of $615,392. 

Finally, appellants’ attorney asserted that in consideration of the defects apparent in the subject that a 34% increase in the aggregate assessment was excessive.  Thereby, based upon this evidence, the appellants requested a reduction in the improvement assessment of each of the 60 condominium units to equal an aggregate assessment of $615,000. 

The board of review submitted "Board of Review-Notes on Appeal" wherein the subject's total assessment of $810,912 was presented.  The board also submitted an analysis of the subject’s condominiums conducted by the director of the condominium division of the Cook County Assessor’s Office.  This analysis describes the subject property and initially disputes an appellants’ exhibit that was submitted for consideration at the board of review’s hearing, but that was not submitted for consideration by the Property Tax Appeal Board. 

Thereafter, the analysis speaks to appellants’ Exhibit D which presents data regarding 13 units that allegedly suffered flood damage.  The analysis indicates that five of the units resold and that three of the units appreciated in market value.  The analysis also asserts that there was no data submitted to support the appellants’ assertion that there was serious flood damage to these units; thereby, impairing the units’ market value.  In addition, the analysis indicates that a sales ratio study was undertaken for the subject property for the years 1995 through 1998.  An overview of the findings indicated that:  in 1998 there were 12 unit sales for a median sales price of $152,500 with a median ratio of 8.2%; in 1997 there were six unit sales with a median sales price of $138,000 and a median ratio of 9.2%; in 1996 there were four unit sales with a median sales price of $169,200 and a median ratio of 10.3%; and in 1995 there were 16 unit sales with a median sales price of $125,200 and a median ratio of 10%.  Moreover, the board of review submitted data on the sales to support the aforementioned findings. 

In addition, the board of review asserts that even though Appellants’ Exhibit A includes a graph depicting suggested repairs and costs, the appellants have not undertaken actual repairs on the subject property. 

Finally, the analysis indicates that a site inspection of the subject had been undertaken on October 20, 1999 by a field agent of the Assessor’s office.  At hearing, the board of review’s first witness was the director of the condominium unit division within the Assessor’s office.  He testified regarding the perameters and the results of that field inspection.

The director testified regarding the data accumulated in determining the sales ratio studies for the subject as well as to various points within the agent’s report without objection from the appellants’ attorney.  The field agent had indicated that a unit owner provided an interior tour of the subject property as well as an interior review of that owner’s unit, while pointing out some of the work completed on the subject.  Thereafter, the field agent also conducted an exterior inspection of the subject.  In summary, the director stated that the agent’s report indicated no major structural problems visible with the exception of certain problems and conditions that could prove to be an inconvenience to the unit owners.

Upon examination, he stated that it was not his job to determine whether the subject’s building was sound or unsafe, merely to determine the market value of the subject property.  To that end, the witness testified that the sales in the subject property appear to appreciate in value for the 1998 assessment year at issue.

The board of review’s second witness was an assessment analyst for the board of review.  She testified regarding the Assessor’s printouts of sales at the subject’s location.  In reviewing the resales in the subject property, she testified that there were 11 resales of units in the subject and that seven sales appreciated in market value.  She stated that these 11 sales occurred from January, 1995, through September, 1998.  She also testified that she did not consider the subject’s 1998 flood because it was after the assessment date of January 1, 1998.  As a result of this analysis, the board of review requested confirmation of the subject's assessment.

In rebuttal, the appellants’ attorney could not confirm that any actual repairs as enumerated in Appellants’ Exhibit A had been actually undertaken to remedy the subject’s alleged defective condition.  Moreover, at the date of this hearing, he stated that no legal action had been undertaken by the appellants against the subject’s developer.

After hearing the testimony and considering the evidence, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal.

Appellants who object to an assessment on the basis of lack of uniformity bear the burden of proving the disparity of assessment valuations by clear and convincing evidence.  Kankakee County Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 131 Ill. 2d 1, 544 N.E.2d 762 (1989).  The evidence must demonstrate a consistent pattern of assessment inequities within the assessment jurisdiction.  Proof of assessment inequity should include assessment data and documentation establishing the physical, locational and jurisdictional similarities of the suggested comparables to the subject property.  Property Tax Appeal Board Rule 1910.65(b).  Mathematical equality in the assessment process is not required.  A practical uniformity, rather than an absolute one is the test.  Apex Motor Fuel Co. v. Barrett, 20 Ill. 2d 395, 169 N.E.2d 769 (1960). 

Having considered the evidence and testimony presented, the Board concludes that the appellants have failed to meet this burden and that a reduction is not warranted.

The Board does not diminish the inconvenience and expense incurred by the owners in addressing the subject’s flaws.  However, the Board finds that the appellants’ attorney has failed to provide substantive evidence to support its assertion that the subject property’s market value has diminished due to the defects apparent in the subject property. 

The appellants did provide portions of an engineering report indicating that several areas of the subject’s structure are in good condition.  The appellants’ own engineer summarily indicates that many of the problems found in the subject property can be addressed through conventional tuckpointing and masonry reconstruction repairs.  The appellants’ report reflects that the development work performed appeared to be consistent with residential redevelopment.  Moreover, the record is devoid of any substantive evidence detailing any actual repairs incurred by the appellants to remedy the defects. 

Appellants’ attorney appears to assert a "de facto" argument that the subject property is overvalued.  When overvaluation is claimed the appellant has the burden of proving the value of the property by a preponderance of the evidence.  Property Tax Appeal Board Rule 1910.63(e). 

The Board finds that the appellants have failed to meet this burden.  The parties both submitted sales data for the subject’s units.  The board of review submitted data and testimony that there were 11 resales of units in the subject and that seven sales appreciated in market value.  The appellants submitted resale data regarding 13 units that suffered flood damage.  This data indicated that five of the units resold and that three of the units appreciated in market value.  Therefore, the Board finds that the parties’ data does not support a diminution in market value. 

As to the appellants’ percentage argument, the appellants’ attorney asserted that a 34% increase in aggregate assessment from the 1997 assessment year to the 1998 assessment year in lieu of the subject’s structural defects was excessive.  The Property Tax Appeal Board finds that the sales data submitted by the parties support the subject’s current assessments.  Therefore, the Board finds this argument unpersuasive. 

On the basis of the evidence submitted by the parties, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that the evidence has not demonstrated that the subject is assessed in excess of that which equity dictates.  Therefore, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that a reduction in the subject's assessment is not warranted.

The subject property consists of a two story, frame, single family dwelling containing 2,020 square feet of living area.  The dwelling was constructed in 1999 with a full, unfinished basement a fireplace, central air conditioning and an attached, two-car garage.

The appellant appeared before the Property Tax Appeal Board and claimed the subject improvement should have not been assessed for the 1999 assessment year since the occupancy permit was not issued until December 1999.  The appellant also contends that both the lot and the improvement were overvalued.  The appellant stated the dwelling was not occupied by him until February 2000.  However, he stated construction of the dwelling commenced in the fall of 1997 and that on January 1, 1999, the property was approximately 85% complete.  Later in the hearing he stated that he was not sure of the percent of completion the property was in on the assessment date in question.  He stated that he was the general contractor and carpenter during the construction of the subject property and that the property was listed for most of the 1998 calendar year at a price of $174,900.  However, he stated he received no offers. 

With respect to the overvaluation contention, the appellant submitted a gird analysis detailing three suggested comparable properties.  Two were located in the same subdivision as the subject property and one was located within three blocks from the subject in an adjoining subdivision.  These properties were similar to the subject in construction and amenities.  They were constructed between 1991 and 1998 and ranged in size from 2,232 to 2,564 square feet.  They sold for prices ranging from $159,610 to $178,000 or from $66.81 to $74.60 per square foot and the transactions occurred from October 1997 to October 1999.  The subject property was assessed at 85% complete.  At full completion the subject property had an assessment reflecting a market value of approximately $173,700 or $86.00 per square foot.  The appellant noted the subject site had an assessment of $12,218, the same as the two comparables located in the same subdivision.  The appellant submitted data evidencing the March 1996 sale price of $32,000 for the subject property.  He also submitted a copy of the listing prices for the 61 lots in the subject's subdivision.  The appellant noted that the subject lot had the lowest listing price than any of the other 60 lots in the subdivision; yet, it is assessed at the same rate.  To document his appeal, the appellant submitted photographs of the subject property and the three suggested comparable properties. 

The board of review submitted "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" wherein the subject's assessment totaling $50,931 was disclosed.  This was after the subject improvement's assessment was debased at 85% complete.  The assessment prior to the debasement was $57,763.  This reflects a market value of $173,723 or $86.00 per square foot using the county's three-year median level of assessments for 1999 of 33.25%.  The board of review submitted data showing the subject site is assessed the same as the other lots in the subdivision at $12,218.  A board of review member was present and explained that it is the policy of the board of review to assess partially constructed properties at the percent of completion on January 1 of each year. 

After hearing the testimony and reviewing the record, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal.  The appellant claimed the subject dwelling should not have been assessed since the occupancy permit was not issued until December 1999.  Section 9-160 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/9-160) provides: 

On or before June 1 in each year other than the general assessment year *** the assessor shall list and assess all property which becomes taxable and which is not upon the general assessment, and also make and return a list of all new or added buildings, structures or other improvements of any kind, the value of which had not been previously added to or included in the valuation of the property on which such improvements have been made, specifying the property on which each of the improvements has been made, the kind of improvement and the value which, in his or her opinion, has been added to the property by the improvements.  The assessment shall also include or exclude, on a proportionate basis in accordance with the provisions of Section 9-180, all new or added buildings, structures or other improvements, the value of which was not included in the valuation of the property for that year, and all improvements which were destroyed or removed. 

Section 9-180 of the Property Tax Code (35ILCS 200/9-180) provides: 

The owner of property on January 1 also shall be liable, on a proportionate basis, for the increased taxes occasioned by the construction of new or added buildings, structures or other improvements on the property from the date when the improvement was substantially completed or initially occupied or initially used, to December 31 of that year. 

Here, section 9-160 requires the assessor to record any new improvements and to determine the value they have added to the property.  By its terms, section 9-180, applies only after a building has been substantially completed or initially occupied.  Reading these two sections together, section 9-160 clearly requires the assessor to value any substantially completed improvements to the extent that they add value to the property.  Section 9-180 then defines the time when the improvement can be fully assessed.  Thus, the Board finds that a building assessment for the subject property is appropriate.  The testimony disclosed the subject improvement was approximately 85% complete on the January 1 assessment date.  Thus, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that the board of review correctly assessed the subject improvement at 85% complete. 

The appellant claimed the subject property was overvalued and submitted market data on three suggested comparable properties.  The board of review failed to refute this evidence by submitting comparable sales data on its own.  The comparable properties submitted by the appellant were similar to the subject property in most respects.  These properties sold for prices ranging from $66.81 to $74.60 per square foot.  The subject property's assessment, at full completion, reflects a market value of $86.00 per square foot and is above the range established by the comparable properties.  Two of the comparable properties were located in the same subdivision.  The lots were larger and were listed for sale at a higher rate than the subject by the developer.  The appellant requested an assessment totaling $49,349.  This reflects a market value of $148,418 or $73.47 per square foot using the county's three-year median level of assessments for 1999 of 33.25%.  The Board finds that the appellant's assessment request was well within the range established by the three suggested comparable properties.  Thus, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that a reduction in the subject's assessment is warranted.  The Property Tax Appeal Board finds that the site assessment should be set at the appellant's request of $10,666.  This reflects the 1996 sale price of $32,000.  The Board notes this is the only evidence of the subject's lot value contained in the record.  Although the board of review had applied assessments in the subject's subdivision on a site value basis, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that the evidence demonstrates this method of valuation is not supported.  The listing prices of the 61 lots located in the subject's subdivision differed as evidenced by the appellant's data.  The subject site was the smallest lot in the subdivision and as a result had the lowest listing price.  Thus, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds the lot should be assessed at $10,666.  This results in an improvement assessment of $38,683 at full completion.  At 85% complete, the improvement would be assessed at $32,880.

The subject property consists of a two story frame structure containing 672 square feet built in 1920 and a 500 square foot single story structure built in 1950.  Virtually no other descriptive information was submitted for these properties.

The appellant’s managing director submitted a brief arguing the subject properties should have no value and a $0 assessment.  He argued property is to be assessed according to its fair cash value under Section 1-50 of the Property Tax Code but that the word "cash" is not a defined within the Illinois Compiled Statutes.  He argued it is therefore impossible for the State of Illinois and the Sangamon County Board of Review to correctly value property until the word "cash" is properly defined. 

The appellant submitted a letter he wrote to the Illinois Attorney General’s Office, dated October 1, 1998, requesting a definition of the word "cash."  The Attorney General’s Office responded in a letter, dated October 14, 1998.  The letter stated the Attorney General is only authorized to advise State officers and State’s Attorneys and that it could not officially advise the appellant.  However, the letter stated that it is clear that "cash" in the term "fair cash value" is not distinct but is part of the term and that the term is defined in Section 1-50 of the Code. 

The appellant further attempted to prove the word "cash" in "fair cash value" has an unclear meaning and in any event, cash is not a proper monetary medium in the United States.  He cited several older federal statutes that he indicated have not been repealed which mandate gold and silver as the only tender for the payment of debts.  Other later statutes removed gold and silver from circulation.  The appellant argued Federal Reserve Notes, checks and money orders are not gold or silver and therefore are not allowed by the U.S. Constitution as legal tender.  Since he cannot be obligated to pay real property taxes using an improper medium of payment, he claimed the subject property should have no value and no assessment. 

The appellant did not submit any evidence of value for the subject property using any monetary medium. 

The record in this appeal also contains "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" wherein the subject's final assessment was disclosed.  The board of review argued that the appellant provided no evidence of the fair market value for the subject property. 

In rebuttal, the appellant claimed he submitted evidence of value in that the subject has no value.  He also claimed the burden is on the board of review and the Property Tax Appeal Board to show how any value other than $0 can be found for the subject. 

After reviewing the record and considering the evidence, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal.  The Board further finds the appellant has failed to prove the subject is overvalued.  The Board further finds the appellant has not provided sufficient evidence to make a finding of value for the subject property. 

The appellant argued property is to be assessed according to its fair cash value and that the word "cash" is not defined in the Property Tax Code.  Section 1-50 of the Code defines fair cash value as follows: 

The amount for which a property can be sold in the due course of business and trade, not under duress, between a willing buyer and a willing seller.  (35 ILCS 200/1-50)

The Board finds the phrase "fair cash value" is clearly defined in the Code without the need to dissect each word within the phrase. 

The appellant argued the subject should have a $0 assessment and is therefore exempt from taxation because the State of Illinois has no authority to assess property using U.S. currency (cash), as a monetary medium.  Therefore, the subject has no value and should have a $0 assessment. 

Section 1910.10(f) of the Official Rules of the Property Tax Appeal Board states as follows: 

The Property Tax Appeal Board is without jurisdiction to determine the tax rate, the amount of a tax bill, or the exemption of real property from taxation.  (emphasis added) 

The Board, therefore, finds it is without jurisdiction to grant an exemption from ad valorem taxation. 

The appellant also argued his brief is evidence of value for the subject and that the value should be $0.  Section 16-180 of the Property Tax Code states in pertinent part: 

The Property Tax Appeal Board shall establish by rules an informal procedure for the determination of the correct assessment of property which is the subject of an appeal...(35 ILCS 200/16-180) 

Section 16-185 of the Property Tax Code states in pertinent part: 

The Board shall make a decision in each appeal or case appealed to it, and the decision shall be based upon equity and the weight of the evidence and not upon constructive fraud...(35 ILCS 200/16-185) 

Section 1910.65 of the Official Rules of the Property Tax Appeal Board states that the Board generally considers appeals regarding correct valuation under the contentions of unequal treatment in the assessment process and overvaluation.  (1910.65(a) through (c)).  Section 1910.65(d) states the appellant may appeal an assessment based upon a contention of law and submit a brief in support of the position. 

Section 1910.10(b) of the Board’s Official Rules state as follows: 

The Property Tax Appeal Board shall determine the correct assessment prior to equalization of any parcel of real property which is the subject of an appeal, based upon the facts, evidence, exhibits and briefs submitted to or elicited by the Board... 

The Board finds the appellant’s appeal brief argues a proper medium of value for ad valorem taxation purposes and does not address the proper assessment of the subject property.  The Board also finds the appellant has not met his burden of going forward which requires substantive, documentary evidence or legal argument challenging the correctness of the assessment of the subject property.  The Board further finds the appellant has not supplied any evidence in the record by which the Property Tax Appeal Board could derive a correct assessment for the subject property.  Therefore, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds the appellant has not met his burden of going forward and that subsequently, the record does not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject property is overvalued.  The Board finds no reduction in the assessment of the subject property is warranted.

The subject property consists of a 1.42-acre site improved with a dwelling, a detached two-car garage and a 52 foot by 72 foot machine shed, constructed in 1977.  The dwelling is a 109-year old, one and two story, frame structure that contains 1,472 square feet of ground floor area.  The subject dwelling has a total living area of 2,496 square feet.  A sunroom and patio were added to the dwelling in 1996.  The subject property is located on a blacktop road, approximately four and one-half miles from Princeton, Illinois.  The appellant contends overvaluation as the basis of the appeal.

In support of the overvaluation contention, the appellant submitted a market analysis prepared by a licensed real estate broker.  The analysis consisted of a description of the subject property and descriptions of two sales properties.  The first comparable was located in Kewanee, Illinois, and consisted of a 2,300 square foot, split level dwelling with an attached, two car garage; a detached, two car garage; and a 24 foot by 40 foot pole building.  The improvements were situated on a five-acre tract.  The ages of the improvements were not disclosed.  This property sold on November 15, 1999, for $120,000.

Comparable two was a 4.9-acre tract improved with a 1,560 square foot, two story dwelling; a 30 foot by 50 foot steel building; and a 20 foot by 40 foot building located in Neponset, Illinois.  The ages of the improvements were not disclosed.  This property sold for $89,900 on April 30, 1999.  In consideration of this data and in consideration of the objectionable odor that is present from the neighboring hog confinement systems, the broker estimated a market value of $90,000 for the subject property as of February 14, 2000.

The board of review submitted "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" wherein the subject’s assessment totaling $37,980 was disclosed.  The subject’s assessment reflects a market value of $114,467 or $45.86 per square foot of living area.  The board of review indicated that it agrees with the appellant as to the undesirable nature of hog farm odors, but was of the opinion there was no evidence to substantiate a market value reduction based on this claim.  The board noted the appellant’s appraiser cited the negative effect of hog farm aromas, but showed no data to substantiate the effect on the subject’s market value.

In support of the subject’s assessment, the board of review submitted descriptions, sales data and assessment data on four suggested comparable properties in relative proximity to large-scale hog farming operations.  The properties consisted of multi-story, frame dwellings that were from one to 142 years of age.  The dwellings ranged in size from 1,188 to 2,079 square feet.  Two had two-car attached garages.  Additional improvements included a machine shed for comparable three and a grain bin and sheds for comparable four.  These properties sold for prices ranging from $43,000 to $164,000 or from $33.39 to $78.88 per square foot and the transactions occurred from 1998 to 2000.  The board of review noted that comparables one and two, which sold for $71.84 and $78.88 per square foot, were superior to the subject property.  Comparables three and four, which sold for $33.39 and $58.92 per square foot, were inferior to the subject property.

Assessment data was submitted on the same four properties.  Comparables one and two had improvement assessments of $31,770 and $48,790 or $18.26 and $23.47 per square foot.  Comparables three and four had improvement assessments of $11,096 and $11,310 or $8.61 and $9.52 per square foot.  The subject improvements were assessed at $35,280 or $14.13 per square foot.  Based on this data, the board of review requested confirmation of the subject property’s assessment.

In rebuttal, the appellant submitted a newspaper article reporting assessment reductions of up to 30 percent that were granted by the Dewitt County, Illinois, Board of review for properties located near a large hog farm.

After considering the evidence and reviewing the record, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal.  The Board further finds that a reduction in the subject’s assessment based on overvaluation is not supported by the data contained in the record.  The record contains sales data and descriptions on six suggested comparable properties submitted by both parties.  The properties recently sold for prices ranging from $33.39 to $78.88 per square foot.  The subject property’s assessment reflects a market value of $45.86 per square foot and is at the lower end of the range established by the six comparable properties.  Four of these properties were located proximate to large hog facilities.  The two properties considered inferior to the subject property sold for $33.39 and $58.92 per square foot.  The subject’s assessment indicated a market value that falls between the sale prices of these two properties.

Although the appellant claimed overvaluation because of the proximate location of a mega-hog farm, there was no empirical data submitted demonstrating an adverse impact on the value of the subject property.  As stated above, market value was submitted on four properties with similar locations to hog farms as the subject.  These sales indicated the subject property was not overvalued.

In addition, the appellant submitted a newspaper article reporting assessment reductions of up to 30 percent that were granted by the Dewitt County, Illinois, Board of review for properties located near a large hog farm.  The Board finds that little weight can be accorded the assessment data provided in the record by the appellant since the assessment data relates to properties which are located in a different county and jurisdiction than the subject property.  As stated by the appellate court in the case of Cherry Bowl, Inc., v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 100 Ill.App.3d. 326 (2nd Dist. 1981) the assessment practices of other assessors are not relevant to whether the assessor was correct in the instant case.

As stated above, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds the subject property was not overvalued based on the relevant market data contained in the record.  Therefore, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds the subject’s assessment as established by the board of review is correct and no reduction is warranted.

The subject property consists of a one-story style single family dwelling of frame and masonry construction containing 2,090 square feet of living area built in 1993.  Amenities include an attached garage containing 600 square feet, a full-unfinished basement, and central air conditioning.

The appellant appeared before the Property Tax Appeal Board claiming overvaluation as the basis of the appeal.  In support of this argument, a limited appraisal report and testimony was presented.  First, the appellant testified that a large sewage treatment plant was recently constructed within 500 feet from the subject dwelling.  He opined the close proximity of the sewage treatment plant decreases the subject’s value.  The appellant testified that prior and during construction of the sewage treatment plant, the subject property was listed for sale on the open market for $170,000.  A letter from a real estate agent was submitted indicating that during a showing at the subject, a perspective buyer would not even tour the interior of the dwelling due to the proximity of the sewage treatment plant.  The appellant testified he did not receive any offers to purchase the subject property while it was listed for sale.  As a result, the appellant thought the value of the subject property had decreased and employed an appraiser to estimate the subject’s market value.

A state licensed appraiser, who holds an Independent Fee Appraiser designation, performed a limited appraisal on the subject property.  The appraiser indicated the subject property has a market value of $135,360 due to a 20% loss in value caused by external obsolescence, that being the sewage treatment plant. Five suggested comparable sales were detailed in the appraisal submitted by the appellant.  The comparables consist of one-story style dwellings of frame and masonry construction ranging in size from 1,680 to 2,778 square feet of living area.  Amenities were similar to the subject in most respects.  The comparables range in age from four to 25 years.  They sold between May 1999 and October 1999 for prices ranging from $142,000 to $195,000 or from $70.19 to $94.18 per square foot of living area including land. None of the comparables are located near the sewage treatment plant similar to the subject.  Thus, they do not suffer from the same external obsolescence factor.  Based on these sales and considering the location of the sewage treatment plant, the appraiser estimated the subject property had a value of $135,360 as of December 20, 1999.  Based on this evidence, the appellant requested a reduction in the subject’s assessment.

The board of review presented its "Board of Review Notes on Appeal", however, no assessment information was disclosed.  The appellant submitted the board of review’s decision regarding the subject property.  It revealed the subject’s final assessment was reduced to $53,070 by the board of review.  The subject’s final assessment reflects an estimated market value of $159,946 or $76.53 per square foot of living area including land using Bureau County’s 1999 three-year median level of assessments of 33.18%. In support of the subject property’s assessment, the board of review offered testimony and the same comparables detailed by the appellant’s appraiser.  First, the board of review’s representative agreed the subject’s market value has decreased due to the close proximity of the sewage treatment facility. Additionally, the board of review accepted the appellant’s appraiser’s opinion of a 20% loss in value caused by the sewage treatment plant.

However, the board of review argued the reduction granted to the subject at the local board of review hearing reflects the 20% loss in value.  In support of this claim, the board of review adjusted, mostly upward, the comparables submitted by the appellant for differences in comparison to the subject for items such as the type of construction, age, and amenities based on cost data.  In addition, the board of review performed a 20% downward locational adjustment to the comparables due to the subject’s inferior location.  The adjustments resulted in adjusted sale prices ranging from $125,300 to $208,780 or from $71.73 to $81.50 per square foot of living area including land. The board of review argued the subject’s estimated market value of $159,946 or $76.53 per square foot of living area including land is supported by the adjusted comparable sales.  Based on this evidence, the board of review requested confirmation of the subject’s assessment.

After hearing the testimony and reviewing the record, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal.  The Board further finds a reduction in the subject property’s assessment is warranted.

The appellant contends the subject property is overvalued.  The appellant presented a limited appraisal report and the subject’s expired listing price.  The board of review presented the same comparables detailed by the appellant’s appraiser and performed adjustments for differences in comparison to the subject.  The Board finds these large upward adjustments to be suspect.  The adjustments were based upon cost data with no consideration for depreciation.  Moreover, the adjustments were not derived from the market.  The Board understands the premise behind the adjustments, however, the mere submittal of pages from the Illinois Real Property Appraisal Manual fails to support the large upward adjustments.  The Board further finds that after accepting a 20% loss in value due to the subject’s location, the board of review defies its own logic and makes a minimal 5.9% downward adjustment to the subject at the local board of review hearing, far less than the agreed upon 20% loss in value.  After considering logical adjustments due to the subject’s inferior location, the Board finds a reduction in the subject’s assessment is warranted.  Both parties agreed the subject would have a loss in value by approximately 20%.  Thus, the Board finds an addition 14.1% downward adjustment is warranted to account for the 20% loss in value as agreed to by the parties.

The Board further finds the subject’s listing price prior to construction of the sewage treatment plant is probative in this case.  The appellant listed the subject property for sale on the open market for $170,000 and received no offers.  Documentation submitted by the appellant revealed the difficulty in attempting to have perspective buyers even inspect the subject property. Considering the loss in value of 20% to the subject, which is not in dispute, the Board finds the 20% loss in value should be applied to the subject’s estimated market value prior to any local board of review reductions, as reflected by its assessment using Bureau County’s 1999 three year median level of assessments 33.18%, or $169,982.  The assessed value is similar to the listing price indicated by the appellant prior to construction of the sewage treatment plant of $170,000.  The reduction results in a market value of $135,360, a similar value established by the appraiser’s professional opinion.

In conclusion, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds the appellant has demonstrated the subject property is overvalued by a preponderance of the evidence.  As a result, the Board finds the subject’s assessment as established by the board of review is incorrect and a reduction is warranted.

The subject property consists of a one-story style dwelling of frame construction containing 1,152 square feet of living area. The subject dwelling is approximately 57 years old.

The appellant claimed the subject property's total assessment is not reflective of its true market value. In support of this contention, the appellant provided evidence of the August 1998 sale of the subject property for $17,001. The appellant stated that he purchased the subject through a sheriff's auction sale. His son previously owned the subject. He also noted that his bid was the only bid submitted due to the subject's poor condition. The appellant further stated that new vinyl siding, a wood deck, and central air-conditioning were added to the subject property in 1999. Based on the evidence contained in the record, the appellant requested a reduction in the subject property’s total assessment.

The board of review submitted its "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" wherein the subject property’s total assessment of $9,028 was disclosed. The subject property has an estimated value, as reflected by its assessment and Jo Daviess County's 1999 three-year median level of assessments of 33.37%, of $27,054. The board of review also offered the subject's property record card with the cost approach to value, evidence of one comparable sale, and the real estate transfer declaration concerning the subject property. The board of review initially claimed the subject's recent sale price was not a reliable indication of market value because the sale occurred through a sheriff's auction sale. Because the subject was sold in a foreclosure sale, the board of review argued that it was not an arm's length transaction. It was further noted that the subject's real estate transfer declaration indicated the sale was between relatives.

The board of review also provided evidence of a comparable sale located in the immediate area of the subject property. The comparable property, which is similar in terms of size, style of construction, location and age, was sold in August 1999 for $27,500. Based on this evidence, the board of review requested confirmation of the subject property’s total assessment.

After reviewing the record and considering the evidence, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal. The Property Tax Appeal Board further finds the appellant failed to prove overvaluation by a preponderance of the evidence and no reduction is warranted. The Board finds the subject property's August 1998 sale price of $17,001 was not a reliable indication of market value. As argued by the board of review, the Board finds the probative value of the subject property's sale price, as a representation of its market value, is questionable. The real estate transfer declaration indicated the sale was a transfer between relatives at an auction sale. The appellant testified that he purchased the property through an auction due to the bank's foreclosure on his son's loan. The appellant also testified that his bid was the only bid submitted by the public and was therefore accepted and the sale was finalized. Due to these circumstances, the Board finds the subject's sale price is not an accurate indication of its true market value.

The Board also finds the best evidence of value contained in the record is the cost approach to value contained on the property record card and the board of review's comparable sale. Both the cost approach and the comparable sale support the board of review's assessment of the subject property. In conclusion, the Board finds the appellant failed to establish a value that is different from the value estimated by the board of review. Therefore, the Board finds the subject property’s assessment as established by the board of review is correct and no reduction is warranted.

The subject property consists of a 6.43 acre tract improved with a one story, frame dwelling containing 1,080 square feet of living area with a full, unfinished basement.  The subject site is also improved with a commercial/industrial machine shop building built on a concrete slab, containing 3,186 square feet.  The subject dwelling was constructed in 1979 and the machine shop building was constructed in 1980 with an addition constructed in 1987.

The appellant appeared before the Property Tax Appeal Board and claimed overvaluation as the basis of the appeal.  The appellant explained that the subject residence and the machine shop building were situated on a .933 acre parcel.  The board of review combined this parcel with three contiguous parcels also owned by the appellant into a 6.43 acre tract.  He objected to the consolidation of the four parcels into one combined parcel by the board of review and claimed this was the board of review’s attempt to circumvent the zoning and marketability problems associated with the improved .933 acre parcel.  The appellant testified that two of the three parcels contiguous to the .933 acre parcel have been deeded to Vernon Sparks, the appellant’s father and the other contiguous parcel was deeded to Norma Sparks, the appellant’s mother.  The deeds were recorded on April 14, 1998, and June 23, 1998.  Kerry Miller, Board of Review Chairman, interjected and stated the split would be effective January 1, 1999.

The appellant claimed the .933 acre tract and the improvements situated thereon have a zero assessment.  The appellant had no opinion of value of the other tracts combined with this parcel.  The appellant’s zero assessment request was as a result of an eminent domain action filed by the Illinois Department of Transportation in 1987 where .065 of an acre was taken.  The appellant explained this put the remaining .933 acre tract out of compliance with the Madison County Zoning Ordinance which requires a distance of 100 feet between the water well and the lateral fields supporting the septic system.  The jury in the eminent domain proceeding believed the subject property had been virtually destroyed and awarded $700 for the acreage taken and $102,700 as damages to the remainder of the real estate appraised for $106,000 on May 4, 1984.  The appellant claimed that by virtue of the required inspections on the resale of the subject property and the inability of the property to pass inspection because of the non-conforming septic and well problems, the property is virtually unmarketable.  The appellant submitted an article which appeared in the Illinois Bar Journal in May of 1995 entitled “Liability for Sale of Defective Used Homes: Recent Developments” which states the law relative to the disclosures that are required to be made to potential buyers.

To support the zero assessment request, the appellant submitted an August 27, 1997, letter of opinion of value covering the .933 acre parcel, the house and the machine shop building.  The appraiser concluded that because the property is located in a federally designated flood zone; because the property is zoned agricultural; because the property has a very small land size; because the property has limited accessibility; and because the well and septic system problem is incurable, an informed purchaser would not buy this property.  Therefore, he concluded the property had no value.  The appraiser was not present at the hearing to testify to these conclusions.

The appellant presented a background history of the prior appeals filed on the .933 acre tract.  Under Docket No. 90-14-R-1, the appellant requested a zero assessment for the .933 acre tract and the improvements thereon.  The Property Tax Appeal Board found that the appellant failed to support a reduction in the subject’s assessment because there was no evidence submitted estimating the subject’s market value as of January 1, 1990.  The Board also confirmed the assessment because subsequent to the eminent domain proceeding, the appellant acquired an adjacent .88 acre parcel.  In that appeal the appellant’s attorney stated in his legal brief that the subject property would have value to an adjoining property owner who could rectify the water problem.  The appellant testified that the septic system could be located on this parcel.  Under the provisions of the Administrative Review Law, the appellant’s attorney appealed the Property Tax Appeal Board’s decision in the Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit of Madison County, Illinois, filed under 92-MR-494.  The Property Tax Appeal Board’s finding was reviewed and affirmed by the Court.  A further appeal was dropped by the appellant’s attorney.   The appellant filed once again with the Property Tax Appeal Board under Docket No. 93-1776-R-1 and requested a zero assessment.  In that appeal, the Property Tax Appeal Board found there was insufficient evidence to warrant a change from the decision in the 1990 appeal.  Although the appellant submitted a letter of opinion of value estimating a zero assessment for the subject property, the Property Tax Appeal Board found the report contained no valuation data supporting the opinion of value and accorded little weight to this document.  No valuation data was submitted by the board of review.  The appellant’s attorney again filed an appeal of the Board’s decision in the Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit, Madison County, Illinois, under 96-MR-200.  The Court entered an order on June 21, 1996, reversing the Property Tax Appeal Board’s decision with directions that the real property assessment for the year 1993 be reduced to zero.

Under cross-examination the appellant testified that he resides in the subject dwelling and operates a tool and die business in the pole building.  He stated that his business has been incorporated and that he receives $450 per month from the corporation based on rent for business use.  He stated that he is not contesting the assessment placed on the remaining five and one-half acres, although two-thirds of the property is subject to flooding.  He stated there are no crops grown on this acreage and that it has no use.  He had no opinion of value of the five and one-half acres.

The appellant was of the opinion the market value estimate for the subject property contained in the board of review’s appraisal report is flawed because it is based on the assemblage of 6.43 acres.

The board of review submitted "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" wherein the subject’s assessments totaling $20,370 for the 1997 assessment year and $35,010 for the 1998 assessment year were disclosed.  The subject’s assessments reflect market values of $61,170 and $105,325 respectively using the 1997 three year median level of assessments of 33.30% and the 1998 three year median level of assessments of 33.24%.

Representing the board of review was the assistant state’s attorney.  The appraisal report and the testimony of the preparer of the report were first presented.  The report contained the three approaches to value in estimating a market value for the subject property of $105,000 as of January 1, 1997, and included the 6.43 acres, the dwelling and machine shop building.  The appraiser testified that the subject property is located in a special flood hazard area and that the comparables used in the report were also located in flood areas.  The appraiser concluded the current use of the subject property for mixed commercial/residential use was the highest and best use of the property.

Under the cost approach, a site value of $25,700 or $4,000 per acre was estimated for the subject property based on 10 vacant site sales located proximate to the subject property.  The suggested comparable properties ranged in size from 2.0 to 6.6 acres, they ranged in sale price from $3,182 to $13,000 per acre and the transactions occurred from 1988 to 1998.  The depreciated reproduction cost new of the improvements was estimated at $74,900.  The depreciated value of the site improvement was estimated at $1,000 for an indicated value by the cost approach of $101,600, including land.

Under the sales comparison approach, three comparable sales properties were analyzed.  The first two comparables consisted of mixed commercial and residential use.  Comparable three was a strictly commercial property.  These properties sold for prices ranging from $100,000 to $245,000 and the transactions occurred from July 1994 to May 1996.  The sales prices were adjusted for date of sale, location, site/view, access, design, age/condition, warehouse/service/area, office, mobile home, residence area, basement and extras.  After adjustments, the sales prices ranged from $107,400 to $125,800.  The appraiser concluded an estimated value by the sales comparison approach of $110,000.  Comparables one and two were given the most weight in the analysis.

Under the income approach, an estimate of the subject’s economic rent was derived for the commercial building only from an analysis of market rentals for two commercial buildings.  Comparable rental one was a 4,800 square foot metal pole frame service building with 400 square feet of office space.  This property was built in 1980 and has an annual rent of $4.95 per square foot.  Comparable rental two consists of a 3,200 square foot multi-tenant warehouse with a rental of $2.85 per square foot.  From this data, the appraiser concluded an estimated rental of $2.50 per square foot for the subject property for a potential gross income of $7,965.  A vacancy and collection loss estimate of 5% was deducted for an effective gross income of $7,567.  The appraiser indicated there were no expenses to deduct to owner due to the triple net lease basis.  The appraiser capitalized the net operating income by a rate of 14% for a value of the commercial building of $56,893.  A value of the residence of $50,000 was taken from the cost approach and added for a value by the income approach of $106,900.

Under reconciliation and final estimate of value, the appraiser testified he placed most weight on the cost and sales comparison approaches to value for a final conclusion of value of $105,000 for the subject property as of January 1, 1997.

For the 1998 appeal, the appraiser prepared an appraisal update and concluded the subject’s market value remained unchanged at $105,000 as of January 1, 1998.

Under cross-examination, the appellant noted that the construction dates of the house and machine shop building were incorrect as reported by the appraiser.  The appraiser responded by testifying that regardless of the chronological age of the improvements, his opinion of the effective age of the subject improvements was 15 years and that it would not alter his opinion of value for the subject property.

The board of review’s “Addendum To Notes on Appeal” indicated that at the time of the 1993 appeal, the subject property consisted of .93 acres of land.  During the subsequent years, the appellant acquired additional acreage surrounding and contiguous with the original .93 acres.  As a result of this assemblage, as of January 1, 1997, the appellant had acquired an additional 5.50 acres of ground assessed on parcels 002 through 004.  For assessment year 1997, the board of review deleted parcels 002 through 004 and combined them to the subject parcel 001, creating a 6.43 acre tract with house and pole barn.  The board of review explains in the addendum that this action was undertaken after approval of the chief county assessment officer and the maps and plats division of the CCAO office pursuant to Section 9-45 of the Property Tax Code and with the additional approval of the chief of the civil division of the Madison County State’s Attorney Office.

The testimony of Kerry Miller, Board of Review Chairman, was presented.  He cited Section 9-45 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/9-45) “Property index number system” and Section 9-120 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/9-120) “Combined listings” as the authority for consolidation of the contiguous parcels into one property index number for assessment purposes.  The property record cards were submitted showing the assessments of the subject property prior to consolidation and subsequent to consolidation.  Miller noted that parcel 001 had an assessment for an old house of $3,150 which was subsequently razed; and as a result was deleted from the tax rolls by the board of review.  Based on this data, the board of review requested an increase in the subject’s 1997 assessment and confirmation of the subject’s 1998 assessment.

In rebuttal, the appellant cited 35 ILCS 205/20 of the Revenue Act of 1939, now codified under Section 9-145 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/9-145) which states in part

Each tract or lot of real property shall be valued at 33 1/3% of its fair cash value.

Based on this language he objected to the consolidation of the four parcels into one parcel.

After hearing the testimony and reviewing the record, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal.  The crux of the appeal in this case is whether or not the board of review correctly combined the four contiguous properties owned by the appellant into one parcel for tax purposes.  The appellant claims by doing so, the board of review has circumvented the issue of marketability of the subject improvements and the .933 acre parcel.  The evidence disclosed that standing alone, the .933 acre parcel is in non-compliance with the current zoning laws governing the distance between the water well and the septic lateral fields.  The Board finds that pursuant to statute, it has no jurisdiction over the consolidation of parcels for tax purposes.  Section 16-180 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/16-180) states in part:

The Property Tax Appeal Board shall establish by rules an informal procedure for the determination of the correct assessment of property which is the subject of an appeal.

Section 1910.10(d) of the Official Rules of the Property Tax Appeal Board states:

The Property Tax Appeal Board shall consider appeals as hereinafter provided and revise the assessment of any particular parcel of real property when it finds such assessment to be in error.

In accordance with the statutes and rules, the Property Tax Appeal Board has jurisdiction only over the correct assessment of an appealed property.  However, a review of Section 9-120 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/9-120) indicates that combined listings are proper without the approval of the property owner.  This section states:

When a whole section, half section, quarter section or half-quarter section of property belongs to the same owner, it may, and shall, at the request of the owner or his or her agent, be listed as one tract, and when all lots in the same block belong to the same owner they may, and shall, at the request of the owner or his or her agent, be listed as a block.  When several adjoining lots in the same block belong to the same owner, they may, and shall, at the request of the owner or his or her agent, be included in one description.  However, this Section shall not apply to property on which delinquent or forfeited taxes are outstanding.  (Emphasis added)

In determining the correct assessment of the subject property, which is the subject of the appeal, the Property Tax Appeal Board has reviewed the valuation data contained in the record.  The Board placed little weight on the letter of opinion of value prepared by the appellant's appraiser covering the .933 acre parcel, the house and the machine shop building.  In the letter, based on several factors, the appraiser concluded the subject property had no value.  One of the factors enumerated in the opinion letter for the property having no value was based on the fact the subject property was located in a federally designated flood zone.  Testimony disclosed that the sales comparables used by the board of review's appraiser in his appraisal report were also located in flood zones.  Thus, the Board concludes that properties located in flood zones have marketability.  The appellant's appraiser also concludes the subject has no value because it is zoned agricultural, because it consists of a small land size and because there is limited accessibility to the property.  The Board finds that these factors do not result in the subject property having no marketability and as a result, no value.  Finally, the appraiser concludes that because the well and septic system problem is incurable, an informed purchaser would not buy this property.  The appraiser was not present at the hearing to testify to his conclusions.  Moreover, market data was not provided by the appraiser to support his market value findings.  The appellant's appraiser's opinion letter covered only the .933 acre tract and the improvements situated thereon.  The contiguous acreage also owned by the appellant was not considered by the appraiser.

The board of review submitted an appraisal report wherein the three traditional approaches to value were employed.  Using comparable sales data, the appraiser estimated a market value of $105,000 for the subject property as of January 1, 1997, and as of January 1, 1998.  The appraiser was present at the hearing to explain his appraisal procedures and adjustments.  The appraiser considered not only the .933 acre tract with the improvements, but also the remaining 5.5 acres owned by the appellant and contiguous to the .933 acre tract.  Thus, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that the value opined for the subject property by the board of review's appraiser is the best evidence of its market value contained in the record.

As of the January 1, 1997, assessment date and as of the January 1, 1998, assessment date, the appellant owned a total of 6.43 acres.  In the 1990 appeal, the appellant’s attorney stated in his legal brief that the subject property, containing .933 acres at that time, would have value to an adjoining property owner who could rectify the water problem.  In that appeal, the appellant testified that the septic system could be located on an adjacent .88 acre parcel.  Because of these facts, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that the appellant has not supported his assessment request of a zero assessment for the subject improvements and the .933 acre site.  The Property Tax Appeal Board finds that the subject property had a market value of $105,000 as of the January 1, 1997, and the January 1, 1998, assessment dates.  Since market value has been established, the county’s three year median level of assessments for 1997 of 33.30% and 1998 of 33.24% shall be applied.

The subject property consists of a modular home resting over a poured concrete basement foundation.  Two integral roofs covering an attached porch and carport were built into the structure after it was placed on the foundation.  Additional improvements consist of a pole barn.  The improvements are situated on a 20-acre parcel located in Ora Township, Jackson County, Illinois.  The appellant’s complaint is on the classification of his modular home as real estate.

The appellant appeared before the Property Tax Appeal Board claiming the township assessor and the Jackson County Board of Review incorrectly classified and assessed his home as real property.  In support of this argument, the appellant explained that the mobile home was purchased from a local dealer and transported to his lot by truck.  He explained that a “title” was issued by the Secretary of State for the dwelling and a sales tax was paid on the purchase price.  The appellant contends that even though the structure is resting on a permanent foundation, it can be removed and placed on another site.  Photographs of the structure resting in whole on the poured concrete basement foundation were submitted.

The appellant also submitted a similar property that was originally classified as real estate but change to a mobile home classification by the board of review.  According to the appellant, this property has the same type of foundation as the subject dwelling.  Thus, the appellant argued that a change in the subject’s classification to reflect a mobile home is warranted.

The board of review submitted its “Notes on Appeals” wherein the subject property’s final 1998 assessment of $21,971 was disclosed.  The board contends that because the home is “resting in whole on a permanent basement foundation” it looses its classification as a “mobile home” and becomes real property as defined by Section 1-130 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/1-130).  Photographs of the home and foundation were submitted to document the board’s finding.

With respect to the comparable property offered by the appellant, the board explained that it is a 1976 mobile home that is supported by adjustable jack posts and not resting on the perimeter foundation.

After hearing the testimony and considering the evidence, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal.  The Board further finds the appellant's dwelling falls under the definition of “real estate" because it is "resting in whole on a permanent foundation".  Section 1-130 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/1-130) defines real property as:

“The land itself, with all things contained therein, and also all buildings structures and improvements and other permanent fixtures thereon, including all oil, gas, coal, and other minerals in the land and the right to remove oil, gas and other minerals, excluding coal from the land, and all rights and privileges belonging or pertaining thereto, except where otherwise specified by this Code.  Included therein, is any vehicle or similar portable structure used or so constructed as to permit it sue as a dwelling place, if the structure is resting in whole on a permanent foundation.”

The Mobile Home Local Services Tax Act (35 ILCS 515/1 et seq.) defines a “mobile home” as:

“a factory assembled structure designed for permanent habitation and so constructed as to permit its transport on wheels, temporally or permanently attached to its frame, from the place of its construction to the location, or subsequent locations, and placement on a temporary foundation at which it is intended to be a permanent habitation and situated so as to permit the occupancy thereof as a dwelling place for one or more persons, provided that any such structure resting in whole on a permanent foundation, with wheels tongue and hitch removed at the time of registration provided for in Section 4 of this act, shall not be construed as a ‘mobile home’ but shall be assessed and taxed as real property defined by Section 1-130 of the Property Tax Code...."

The Illinois Manufactured Housing and the Mobile Home Safety Act, 430 ILCS 115(2)(1), defines " permanent foundation" as:

"a closed perimeter formation consisting of materials such as concrete, mortared concrete block, or mortared brick extending into the ground below the frost line which shall include, but not necessarily be limited to cellars, basements, or crawl spaces, but does not exclude the use of piers."

Upon reviewing the evidence contained in the record and based on the aforementioned statutes, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds the subject home should be assessed as real estate.

The appellant’s and board of review’s photographs reveal the home is resting on a permanent foundation.  Moreover, the roofs built into the existing roof of the home for the porch and patio further supports the appellant’s intent to make the home a permanent habitat.

In conclusion, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds the appellant’s home is resting in whole on a permanent foundation and fits the statutory definition of a “real estate".  Therefore, it should be assessed and taxed as real estate.  Thus, the Board finds the subject’s assessment as established by the board of review is correct and no reduction warranted. 

RESIDENTIAL CHAPTER

Index

SUBJECT MATTER

Arm's Length Nature of Transaction

Assessment Rollover Due to Previous Board of Review Action
(35 ILCS 200/16-80), (35 ILCS 200/16-160)

Condominium Association and Common Areas, Janitor's Use Of Unit as Residence
(35 ILCS 200/10-35(a)), (765 ILCS 605/2),
(763 ILCS 605/10(a))

Construction Costs – Not Adequately Documented

Developer’s Exemption
(35 ILCS 200/10-30)

Equalization Factor Appeal
(35 ILCS 200/16-180)

Equity Issue, Sales-to-Assessment Inequity in Neighborhood

Equity and Market Issues – Comparable Properties

Exemption Request – Definition of Cash
(35 ILCS 200/16-185), (35 ILCS 200/1-50),
(Official Rules of the Property Tax Appeal Board 1910.65(d) & 1910.10(b))

External Obsolescence – Sewage Plant

Market Value Contention – Due to Adjacent Hog Farm

Market Value Contention – Encumbrances on Property Use
(35 ILCS 200/15-45), (35 ILCS 200/18-40),
(35 ILCS 200/15-5), (20 ILCS 3440/2)

Market Value Contention – Maintenance and Repairs
(35 ILCS 200/10-20)

Model Home Exemption
(35 ILCS 200/10-25), (35 ILCS 200/9-160 & 9/185)

Modular Home Classification
(35 ILCS 200/1-130), (35 ILCS 515/1 et seq.),
(430 ILCS 115(2)(1))

Multi-Family, Loft Condominiums – Excessive Increase In Assessment

Occupancy Permit – Assessment of New Construction

Recent Sale Price – Best Evidence in Record

Zero Assessment Request Due to Alleged Zoning Problems
(35 ILCS 200/9-45), (35 ILCS 200/9-120),
(Official Rules of The Property Tax Appeal Board 1910.10(d))