1999 Synopsis -- Farm Chapter

PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD

 SYNOPSIS OF REPRESENTATIVE CASES

 FARM DECISIONS

PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD

Section 16-190 of the Property Tax Code

(35 ILCS 200/16-190, Illinois Compiled Statutes)

Official Rules - Section 1910.76

Printed by Authority of the State of Illinois

 www.state.il.us/agency/ptab 

The subject property consists of a 1.13 acre lot located in Champaign County, Illinois. 

The appellant contends the 1.13 acre tract should have an agricultural assessment. In support of this contention, the appellant provided pictures of the subject tract and a brief memorandum citing several statutes regarding the classification and assessment of farmland. The appellant explained that approximately .13 of an acre is used to raise pine trees and the remaining 1.00 acre consists of wooded forest. The appellant further stated the trees were planted with the intention of selling them as mature pine trees to be replanted. The trees were not planted to be sold as Christmas trees. Therefore, the appellant requested a reduction in the subject property’s total assessment.

The board of review submitted its "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" wherein the subject property’s total assessment of $3,310 was disclosed. The board of review offered pictures of the subject area and a narrative explanation of its assessment. It argued the appellant is not utilizing the land in a manner consistent with the Property Tax Code’s definition of a farm. For example, the board of review claimed the appellant has not demonstrated that the alleged “tree crop” has been cultivated or cared for as a traditional crop for harvest. Moreover, the board of review noted the 1.0 acre of forest has never been used for an agricultural purpose. Based on the evidence contained in the record, the board of review requested confirmation of the subject property’s total assessment.

After hearing the testimony and considering the evidence, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal. The Property Tax Appeal Board further finds the appellant failed to demonstrate the subject property should have an agricultural assessment.

Section 1-60 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/1-60) defines "farm" in part as:

any property used solely for the growing and harvesting of crops; for the feeding, breeding and management of livestock; for dairying or for any other agricultural or horticultural use or combination thereof; including, but not limited to hay, grain, fruit, truck or vegetable crops, floriculture, mushroom growing, plant or tree nurseries, orchards, forestry, sod farming and greenhouses; the keeping, raising and feeding of livestock or poultry, including dairying, poultry, swine, sheep, beef cattle, ponies or horses, fur farming, bees, fish and wildlife farming...

Here, the appellant provided documentation and testimony that approximately 45 pine trees were planted in 1996 on .13 of an acre. The appellant also indicated that none of the trees have been harvested or sold. The Property Tax Appeal Board finds it is clear that the 1.00 acre section of the subject tract, which was described as wooded and overgrown by the appellant, does not qualify for an agricultural assessment. In addition, the Board finds the appellant has failed to demonstrate the .13 acre portion of the subject property which is used to grow the pine trees meets the definition of farmland as contained in the above referenced section of the Property Tax Code.

Therefore, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds the subject property’s assessment as established by the board of review is correct and no reduction is warranted.

The subject property consists of a 28.6 acre orchard located in Winnebago County.  The property is improved with a 24 x 40 pole barn constructed in 1994 with half the building used for housing equipment and the other half used as cold storage.  Also located on the subject is a 28 x 80 stick frame barn constructed in 1996 which is used for the sale of apples, cider, and other orchard items along with processing cider.  A third building on the subject property consists of a 24 x 90 metal pole building built in 1985.  The appellant contends unequal treatment in the assessment process as the basis of the appeal.

The appellant argued the subject buildings were assessed based on costs while other orchard and farm buildings were assessed at their contributory value to the farms.  The appellant submitted assessment data and descriptions on two orchards, a farm and a six acre farmette.  The appellant testified one comparable is Edwards Orchard which is the largest orchard in Winnebago County and one of the largest orchards in northern Illinois.  It is located 3.5 miles from the subject.

This property included completely refurbished buildings and new buildings that are several times the size of the subject buildings.  The comparable contains a significantly larger parking lot, a fully equipped kitchen, public bathrooms, and a loft for antiques and crafts located over the sales area.  The cold storage area of this property is six times that of the subject property.  Color photographs of this property were submitted indicating complete refurbishment of the large barn and a newer large attached metal building.  The appellant indicated the dimensions for the addition were 100 x 50.  The assessment for these buildings is $11,272 while the assessment for the subject buildings is $20,000.

The second orchard comparable, Valley Orchard, has a 1,620 square foot metal pole building with a concrete floor and a 432 square foot frame sales building.  The pole building contains a walk-in cooler, a cider press area, an apple grading area and storage.  The appellant indicated this orchard is the second largest orchard in the county in terms of number of trees and gross sales.  He indicated this orchard has 4,500 apple trees which is twice the number of trees on the subject property.  The building assessment for this property is $2,484.

The farm comparable submitted by the appellant is owned by the township assessor.  The color photographs indicate the buildings are old and not in the same condition as those found on the orchards.  The assessment of these buildings was $2,450.

The fourth comparable is a six acre farmette which includes a three bedroom dwelling, a large barn, a loafing shed and a paved feedlot.  The appellant indicated the assessments for the dwelling and buildings were not divided by the assessor and the total improvement assessment, including the dwelling, was $22,015.

The appellant also submitted an estimate to construct a building similar to the 24 x 90 pole building located on the subject property.  The estimate was prepared by the same builder that constructed the subject building.  The proposal was dated July 16, 1998.  The estimated cost new for the building was $13,564.

The appellant also presented a general summary limited appraisal of the subject property with an effective date of May 4, 1998.  The board of review requested little weight be given the appraisal and the appellant agreed to withdraw the report at the hearing.  Therefore, no weight will be given the appellant’s appraisal report.

The board of review submitted "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" wherein the subject's final assessment was disclosed.  The board of review did not submit any equity comparables for this appeal.  The Owen Township Assessor submitted information and testified at the hearing.  He argued the subject’s 28 x 80 frame building is three years old and was constructed for the sole purpose of selling products from the orchard.  This building is assessed as a commercial building.  The remaining subject buildings are assessed as farm buildings.

The assessor argued all the buildings on the Edwards Orchard submitted by the appellant are old with the barn used for retail selling being 80 years old.  The interior has been made for sales, with a snack bar, donut maker and “other necessary personal property needed for sales of food.”  The other buildings on this property were listed as average farm buildings.  The board argued these buildings are not new or renovated as indicated by the appellant.  Black and white photocopies of this property were included which were of poor quality.  Neither the assessor nor the board of review knew how these buildings were assessed.  The board was ordered to submit assessment information on this property after the hearing.  The assessment information indicated the buildings on this orchard, including the sales building, were assessed as farm buildings.

The board also indicated in this information that if food or other merchandise is brought in and re-sold, the building becomes a retail outlet and is no longer considered a farm building.  However, the Edwards Orchard buildings were all assessed as farm buildings for 1998.  The board indicated the barn and cattle building on this property were changed to commercial status for 1999.  This change only increased the improvement assessment from $11,272 to $16,177.  It also appears from the property record card for this property that the 100 x 50 new addition to the barn is either treated as an old building or is not assessed because the remaining economic life for all buildings on the property was listed as 20 years, regardless of age or condition.

The assessor indicated the second orchard submitted by the appellant was located on Kilburn Avenue and is not a full time orchard.  No other information on this property was submitted.  He also indicated the six acre farmette submitted by the appellant was an orchard with a dirt floor machinery shed and a small wood floor sales building with old refrigerators.  The buildings on these properties were assessed as farm buildings.  The assessor also submitted information on his property which was also submitted by the appellant.  He indicated all the buildings are old and only used for the storage of junk.  These buildings were assessed as farm buildings.

The board of review also submitted a short income approach and a short, hand written cost approach for the subject.  However, this approach was not used for determining the assessments of any other orchards.  The board also submitted the cost calculator information used for the subject’s assessment.  The subject sales building was viewed as a class C low cost market with a base cost of $32.31 per square foot.  The base cost used in valuing the Valley Orchard pole buildings assessed as farm buildings was $4.60 per square foot.  The base cost used in valuing the Edwards Orchard frame and metal buildings assessed as farm buildings was $3.65 per square foot.

In rebuttal, the appellant indicated the board of review and assessor’s information contained many errors.  The appellant argued all the buildings on the Edwards Orchard property are not old as indicated by the assessor.  The sale barn has been completely renovated with new plumbing, wiring, concrete flooring, heating systems, roof, restrooms, walk-in coolers and a state certified kitchen.  Also a 100 x 50 addition with 16 foot overhead doors was recently added.  This building housed 200 people for a luncheon in the summer with plenty of additional room.  The donut maker referred to by the assessor in the building is a commercial grade donut maker which produces 100 dozen donuts per hour and sells for $19,000.  The appellant argued this building and addition are clearly commercial buildings much nicer than the subject buildings and are only assessed as old farm buildings.

The appellant also indicated one property referred to by the assessor as containing six acres, located in southwest Rockford, and containing a small sales building is actually in northwest Rockford just west of the subject.  This property is the farmette comparable submitted by the appellant and is not an orchard at all.  The assessor indicated the Valley Orchard property contains six acres when it actually contains twenty acres plus a ten acre easement.  The metal building has a concrete floor and not a gravel floor as indicated by the assessor.  He argued the floors must be concrete to comply with state and federal codes for the cider press.

The assessor also incorrectly stated the pole building on this property is used only for storage.  The building actually contains a cider making facility, an apple grading area, a walk-in cooler and a storage area.  The wood shed referred to by the assessor is actually the sales building.  The appellant also indicated the assessor was incorrect in stating this property was a small orchard.  The appellant argued it is the second largest in Winnebago County in terms of number of trees and gross sales.  This orchard also supplies local grocery chains with apples and other produce.

The appellant indicated one property referred to by the assessor as a small orchard was not previously submitted.  The appellant indicated this was a very small orchard but has been abandoned for several years.  Lastly, the appellant indicated the abbreviated income approach used by the assessor indicates four bushels per tree are picked from the subject’s dwarf apple trees.  The appellant indicated it is not uncommon for one or two bushels to be picked but never would there be four bushels from his eight year old dwarf trees.

After reviewing the record and considering the evidence, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal.  The Board further finds that a reduction in the assessment of the subject property is warranted based on the evidence contained in the record.  The Illinois Supreme Court has held that taxpayers who object to an assessment on the basis of lack of uniformity bear the burden of proving the disparity of assessment valuations by clear and convincing evidence.  Kankakee County Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 131 Ill.2d l (1989).  The evidence must demonstrate a consistent pattern of assessment inequities within the assessment jurisdiction.

In this appeal, there were a total of three comparable properties submitted by the parties.  The appellant submitted assessment information on two orchards and the board of review inadvertently submitted information on one orchard.  Although this orchard was abandoned several years ago, the board was still assuming it to be a working orchard.  All the buildings on these properties, including the sales buildings were assessed as farm buildings.  The two active orchards, which are the largest in the county, had farm building assessments calculated using base costs of $4.60 and $3.65 per square foot, prior to depreciation.  The subject sales building is assessed as a commercial building at $32.31 per square foot prior to depreciation.

Uniformity prohibits the taxation of one kind of property within the taxing district at one value while the same kind of property in the same district for taxation purposes is taxed at either a grossly less value or a grossly higher value.  Apex Motor Fuel Co. v. Barrett, 20 Ill.2d 395 (1960).  Abandonment of the method of assessment in only a few individual cases violates the uniformity clause of the Illinois Constitution.  Walsh v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 181 Ill.2d 228, 692 N.E.2d 260 (1998).  The Board finds assessing only one orchard sales building as a commercial building while continuing to assess other sales buildings as farm buildings destroys uniformity, produces unequal treatment and creates inequity in the assessment process.

Therefore, based on a review of the assessment comparables contained in the record, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that the appellant has supported the contention of unequal treatment in the assessment process and a reduction in the assessment of the subject property to the level of other similar properties is warranted.

The subject property consists of a swine confinement facility located in Cass Township.  The appellant claims a portion of the facility dedicated to pollution control is being improperly assessed by the assessor and board of review.

The appellant appeared before the Property Tax Appeal Board claiming the assessor and board of review improperly assessed the concrete pads utilized for the containment and confinement of manure and liquid waste run-off into a separating area.  He further contends that an assessment reduction was not granted for a concrete liquid waste holding tank 24’ long x 10’ wide x 10’ deep with a concrete lid.  According to the appellant, the improvements were constructed to meet Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA) guidelines for water pollution control.  The appellant further explained the values of these pollution control improvements were certified to the IEPA and were submitted by the IEPA to the Department of Revenue for a special pollution control assessment.  However, the appellant contends the IEPA erred in the description of the improvements when it considered only the concrete cubing in its description of the pollution control improvements and did not include the concrete pads utilized to channel the waste to the holding tanks.  Thus, the assessments placed on the concrete pads should be removed from the local assessment roll and included in the pollution control improvements assessed by the Department of Revenue.  As supporting documentation, a copy of the IEPA pollution control certification describing the waste control improvements was submitted along with a copy of the subject’s property record card. 

The board of review submitted the “Board of Review Notes on Appeals” form disclosing the final assessment of the subject property.  In addition, a copy of the IEPA certification describing the improvements entitled to preferential tax treatment for water pollution control at the subject facility was submitted for review.  The board of review pointed out that the description does not include the concrete pads but specifically states “ a concrete curb located on the south side of the outside concrete pads in front of building B & C”.  It makes no mention of the concrete pads but only the curbing.  Thus the board of review based its decision to assess the concrete pads on these instructions and did not remove the assessments of the pads.  However, in an effort to clarify who is to assess the concrete pads, the board of review contacted the IEPA and was informed that the EPA did not certify the concrete pads for exemption to the Department of Revenue.  Thus the board contends the assessment of the concrete pads is supported.  With respect to the assessment of the 10’ x 24’ x 10’ concrete holding tank, the board contends that it is included in the description of the pollution control improvements to be removed from the local assessment roll and assessed by the Department of Revenue. 

In closing, the board of review requested that a correction be made in the subject buildings’ assessments to reflect more depreciation.  In its review of the total assessment of the subject property, the board of review determined the confinement buildings were not given the standard yearly 5% depreciation reduction applied to confinement facilities for 1997 and 1998.  In an effort to maintain equal treatment, the board of review requests the Property Tax Appeal Board adjust the buildings’ assessments accordingly. 

After hearing the testimony and reviewing the record, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal.  The Board further finds that the evidence contained in the record supports the board of review’s assessment of the concrete pads.  The improvements certified as pollution control improvements by the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency pursuant to guidelines set forth in the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/11-5 et seq.) were removed from the local assessment roll and assessed by the Department of Revenue.  The Board finds the concrete pads at issue were not included in the description of the pollution control improvements as certified by the IEPA.  The IEPA’s description of the pollution control improvements made no mention of concrete pads but only concrete curbing.  Furthermore, the Board finds the 10’ x 24’ x 10’ concrete holding tank is included in the IEPA’s description of the pollution control improvements that were to be removed from the local assessment roll.  Based thereon, the Board finds the board of review has complied with the removal of the assessments of the improvements described and certified by the IEPA as being utilized for pollution control. 

Finally, the Board finds that the board of review’s request for an adjustment in the assessments of the confinement buildings located on the subject property to maintain equity with similar facilities throughout the county is warranted. 

The subject property consists of a 5 acre parcel improved with a residential dwelling located in Dekalb County, Illinois. The subject property also contains an outdoor horse arena, an indoor horse arena and barn, a pasture area and a horse walker area.

The appellant contends that 4.5 acres of the subject parcel should be classified as agricultural. The appellant did not appeal the assessments for the dwelling, farm improvements or the residential portion of the subject land. In support of her argument, the appellant offered a letter explaining her contention, pictures of the subject areas, and property record cards and pictures detailing six suggested comparable properties. The appellant claimed that since 1994, 4.5 acres of the subject property has been used for the raising, training, and selling of show horses. During the hearing, the appellant acknowledged that all but 1/2 acre, which is used as a homesite and yard, is used for the above described commercial operation. Based on the evidence contained in the record, the appellant requested an agricultural assessment on 4.5 acres of the subject parcel.

The board of review submitted its "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" wherein the subject property’s total assessment of $42,002 was disclosed. The board of review noted Section 1-60 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/1-60) provides that a “farm” does not include property which is primarily used for residential purposes even though some farm products may be grown or farm animals bred or fed on the property incidental to its primary use. The board of review claimed the primary use of the subject property was for residential purposes and the horse operation was incidental to this residential use. In further support of its assessment, the board of review offered evidence of 14 suggested comparable properties to establish that other similar properties were also being assessed and classified as residential. Based on this evidence, the board of review requested a confirmation of the subject property’s residential assessment.

After hearing the testimony and considering the evidence, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal. The Board further finds that 4.5 acres of the subject property are entitled to an agricultural classification and assessment. Section 1-60 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/1-60) defines "farm" in part as;

any property used solely for the growing and harvesting of crops; for the feeding, breeding and management of livestock; for dairying or for any other agricultural or horticultural use or combination thereof; including, but not limited to hay, grain, fruit, truck or vegetable crops, floriculture, mushroom growing, plant or tree nurseries, orchards, forestry, sod farming and greenhouses; the keeping, raising and feeding (emphasis added) of livestock or poultry, including dairying, poultry, swine, sheep, beef cattle, ponies or horses, (emphasis added) fur farming, bees, fish and wildlife farming...

Here, the appellant provided documentation showing that the majority of the subject property was being used for the keeping, raising and feeding of show horses since 1994. In order to qualify for an agricultural assessment, the land must be used as a farm at least two years preceding the date of assessment. (35 ILCS 200/10-110). Again, the appellant provided adequate information to establish the 4.5 acres of the subject property have been utilized for agricultural purposes for the two years previous to the appeal. The board of review did not dispute the appellant’s use of the property as a farm, but merely argued the primary use of the subject property was residential and the breeding, training, and selling of the horses is incidental to this residential use. Based on the testimony provided by the appellant and the evidence contained in the record, the Board finds the primary use of the subject parcel is for an agricultural purpose - the breeding, training, and selling of show horses.

In conclusion, the Board finds the appellant sufficiently established the 4.5 acre area of the subject property should be classified as agricultural. Therefore, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds the subject property’s assessment as established by the board of review is incorrect and a reduction is warranted. The Board hereby orders the Dekalb County Board of Review to compute the revised assessment for the subject in accordance with the dictates of this decision and submit the assessment to the Property Tax Appeal Board within 15 days of the date of this decision.

The subject property consists of an 80 acre parcel of land located in Winnebago County, Illinois.

The appellant contends that 39 acres of the subject parcel are tillable farmland while the remaining 41 acres should be classified as wasteland. In support of this contention, the appellant provided a narrative explanation, pictures of the subject property, an aerial photograph, a soil survey map, and an appraisal analysis of the subject property. The appellant argued all of this evidence demonstrates that the above mentioned 41 acre area of the subject property cannot be farmed and should receive a wasteland assessment. Therefore, the appellant requested a reduction in the subject property’s total assessment.

The board of review did not submit its "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" nor any evidence in support of its assessed valuation of the subject property.

After reviewing the record and considering the evidence, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal.  The appellant in this appeal submitted evidence in support of the contention that the subject property was not accurately assessed.  The board of review did not submit any evidence in support of its assessment of the subject property as required by Section 1910.40(a) of the Official Rules of the Property Tax Appeal Board.  The Board has examined the information submitted by the appellant and finds that it supports a reduction in the assessed valuation of the subject property.

In conclusion, the Board finds the appellant sufficiently established that 41 acres of the subject parcel cannot be farmed and should be classified as wasteland. Therefore, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds the subject property’s assessment as established by the board of review is incorrect and a reduction is warranted. The Board hereby orders the Winnebago County Board of Review to compute the revised assessment for the subject in accordance with the dictates of this decision and submit the assessment to the Property Tax Appeal Board within 15 days of the date of this decision.

The subject properties consist of three separate parcels which were originally part of one larger tract. Because of the similarity of the appellants’ arguments, a consolidated hearing was conducted and the appellants’ attorney presented their cases in one hearing while also focusing on each individual parcel’s unique characteristics.

The appellants’ attorney claimed that all three properties qualify for agricultural assessments. Prior to their individual sales in early 1997, the three parcels were part of a larger farming operation and had agricultural assessments. In support of their contentions, the appellants submitted maps of the subject parcels, property record cards detailing the subject parcels, copies of the board of review’s final decisions, wildlife habitat proposals, property record cards for other surrounding properties, and a legal memorandum outlining their collective arguments. The appellants’ attorney, who is also part owner of one of the properties, discussed each parcel separately and claimed each one qualified for an agricultural assessment.

98-132-F-1 (Nichols)

This parcel consists of a 58.13 acre tract. The attorney noted that currently 21.8 acres are receiving an agricultural assessment due to use as pasture land. The appellant requested that the remaining acreage also be assigned an agricultural assessment. The appellant’s attorney further stated that some pine trees were planted on the subject site, however, she did not know the actual number of trees located on the site. In addition, she explained the 36.33 acre area which is not used as pasture land is mostly wooded and should be classified as timber land. Lastly, she responded during cross-examination that the owner of the subject parcel is considering constructing a residential dwelling on the site some time in the future.

98-133-F-1 (Clark)

This parcel consists of a 22.59 acre tract. The appellants’ attorney explained that during the 1998 assessment year this parcel had one acre planted with corn, 1/2 an acre contained pumpkins and gords, while another two acres could have been used as tillable ground. She also stated that approximately 19.5 acres were covered with timber and had a creek running through the acreage. The appellant offered a Wildlife Habitat Management Plan from the State of Illinois Department of Natural Resources - Division of Wildlife Resources dated January 26, 1998. This plan is to be used to develop the subject parcel and create an  environment or habitat which is conducive for local wildlife. Pursuant to this plan, the owners of this parcel have planted native Illinois bushes and trees, including cranberry and cherry bushes, as well as hardwood and apple trees. The appellant has also built several brush piles to protect wildlife.

98-134-F-1 (Schell)

The appellants’ attorney acknowledged that she was a part owner of this 38.55 acre tract. This parcel contains a one acre homesite and a residential dwelling. She stated the majority of the land is currently being prepared in such a manner to attract wildlife. For example, brush piles were being created, and trees and crops were planted solely for the attraction and benefit of the wildlife. The subject parcel was planted with 2 1/2 acres of corn, 1/2 an acre of clover, 1/2 an acre in alternative crops such as fruit trees and vegetables during the 1998 assessment year. Other evidence included a Report of Acreage - Farm Summary from the Illinois Department of Revenue wherein the appellant indicated that in 1997 and 1998, two acres of the subject property were planted with corn. As stated in the previous paragraph, the appellant also offered a Wildlife Habitat Management Plan from the State of Illinois Department of Natural Resources - Division of Wildlife Resources dated January 26, 1998. This plan is to be used to develop the subject parcel and create an  environment or habitat which is conducive for local wildlife.

Legal Argument

The appellants also provided a legal memorandum in support of their position. The memorandum is applicable to all three subject parcels. The appellants claimed they are entitled to an agricultural assessment based on Section 1-60 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/1-60). It was claimed, that since the subject parcels were originally part of a larger farm operation and are still utilized for agricultural purposes, these parcels fall within the definition of a farm as defined in the above mentioned statute. In addition, the appellants argued the board of review erroneously classified the subject parcels as recreational land. This classification is not part of the four recognized statutory classifications outlined by Section 10-125 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/10-125). The appellants claimed the board of review has no authority to add a new classification of farmland which is not recognized by Illinois Statute.

In further support of their legal argument, the appellants cited a previous Property Tax Appeal Board decision which was addressed by an Illinois Appellate Court on administrative review. In McLean County Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 222 Ill.Dec. 701 (4th Dist. 1997), the court found that the managing of the subject property as a wildlife and land conservation area, such as the planting, cultivation and growth of hardwood trees and native prairie grasses, amounted to activity that qualified the subject parcel for an agricultural assessment. The appellants claimed the facts in that case are similar to the subject parcels and the Property Tax Appeal Board should apply the same rationale.

Lastly, the appellants offered property record cards for other similar parcels located in the immediate area which, unlike the subject parcels, have agricultural assessments. More specifically, the appellants’ attorney cited three parcels (the Azbell and Owens properties) which had small cropland areas and larger wooded areas which were receiving an agricultural assessment. The appellants argued these parcels have similar uses, but have the benefit of the agricultural assessment while the subject parcels are assessed at the higher recreational rate. Based on the evidence contained in the record, the appellants requested reductions in the subject parcels’ total assessments.

Board of Review’s Evidence

The board of review submitted its "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" wherein the subject properties’ total assessments were disclosed. In support of its assessments, the board of review provided a legal memorandum, Illinois Department of Revenue Guidelines contained in the Illinois Department of Revenue Appraisal Manual, property record cards and a review of the past assessment practices in Fulton County, Illinois.

In its legal memorandum, the board of review addressed the appellants’ assertion that the board of review had created a new farmland classification through its assessment of the subject parcels as recreational land. The board of review argued it could legitimately assess rural property, which does not qualify for an agricultural assessment, as recreational land. By classifying the subject parcels as recreational, the board of review did not establish a new class of farmland, but merely established a vehicle to be used for assessing rural property which is not used for either residential or agricultural purposes.

The board of review then argued that all three parcels fail to meet the definition and requirements set forth in Section 1-60 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/1-60). The board of review explained that the appellants’ activity or creation of a wildlife habitat does not meet the guidelines established in the above mentioned statute and definition of farming activity. Furthermore, the board of review claimed that none of the appellants have a forestry management plan accepted by the Illinois Department of Natural Resources which would qualify their parcels for a farmland assessment pursuant to Section 10-150 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/10-150).

In regard to the appellants’ equity comparables, the board of review noted there were distinct differences between the use of the comparable properties when compared to the subject parcels. The board of review argued these properties could be distinguished from the subject parcels because the comparables have substantially more acreage used as cropland and pasture than the subject parcels. For example, one of the parcels, which contains 44.97 total acres, uses 15 acres as cropland, 22 acres are in pasture, and only 8.5 acres are classified as other farmland or wasteland. A second comparable, which is owned by the same individual as the previous comparable, is an 80 acre tract which has 38.3 acres of cropland, 3.7 acres of pasture, and 38 acres of other farmland and wasteland. A third comparable is a 40 acre parcel with 22 acres devoted to cropland, 22 acres used as pasture, and 4 acres attributed to wasteland. The board of review claimed the comparables’ ratios of cropland and pasture to other farmland are significantly different than the subject parcels.

The board of review also submitted selected guidelines and definitions contained in the Illinois Real Property Appraisal Manual which address the issues of wildlife farming and idle land. According to these guidelines, the board of review claimed the appellants’ mere actions of establishing a wildlife habitat does not qualify as the, “keeping, raising and feeding,” requirement of Section 1-60 of the Property Tax Code. Moreover, the board of review argued the appellants’ idle land also fails to meet the manual’s  criteria or definition of idle land which may qualify for a farmland assessment. The manual outlines several circumstances which must be examined: whether the idle land is part of a farm; whether it is managed; whether it could be cropped without additional improvements; and whether it is larger or smaller than the farmed portion of the parcel or tract. Based on this criteria, the board of review argued the appellants’ use of the subject parcels does not qualify for farmland or agricultural assessments. Therefore, based on the evidence contained in the record, the board of review requested confirmation of the subject properties’ total assessments.

PTAB Analysis

After hearing the testimony and reviewing the record, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal. The Board further finds that the Nichols property, (98-132-F-1), is entitled to an agricultural assessment for the remaining acreage which is not subject to the existing pasture classification. The Board, however, finds the other two parcels do not qualify for  agricultural assessments.

The appellants made three primary arguments in support of their appeals. The appellants claimed the board of review erroneously created a new classification of farmland when it classified the areas of the subject parcels as recreational land. The second argument expounded by the appellants was that the board of review was inequitably assessing the subject parcels. The appellants claimed that adjacent or neighboring properties, which had similar terrain and amounts of cropland acreage, were given agricultural assessments for their wasteland or timber areas, whereas the subject parcels were denied this type of agricultural classification and assessment. The third contention made by the appellants was that the subject parcels qualify for agricultural assessments based on the definition of farmland established in Section 1-60 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/1-60).

The Property Tax Appeal Board finds the appellants’ argument concerning the board of review’s new classification of farmland is without merit. The appellants claimed the board of review erroneously classified the subject properties as recreational land because the farmland statutes contained within the Property Tax Code do not recognize such a classification. As correctly noted in its response, the board of review can legitimately assess rural property, which does not qualify for an agricultural assessment, as recreational land. By classifying the subject parcels as recreational, the board of review did not establish a new class of farmland, but merely established a vehicle to be used for assessing rural property, which is not used for either residential or agricultural purposes. Thus, the Board finds the board of review’s classification of the subject properties as recreational land was not in violation of the Property Tax Code.

The appellants also claimed unequal treatment in the assessment process as a basis of the appeals. The appellants’ attorney cited three parcels which have similar uses, but have the benefit of the agricultural assessment while the subject parcels are assessed at the higher recreational rate. In regard to the appellants’ equity comparables, the board of review noted there were distinct differences between the uses of the comparable properties when compared to the subject parcels. For example, the board of review claimed the comparables’ ratios of cropland and pasture to other farmland are significantly different than the subject parcels.

The Board finds the comparables offered by the appellant can be sufficiently distinguished from two of the subject parcels (Clark and Schell). The comparable properties have significantly more area dedicated to cropland and pasture when compared to these two subject parcels. For example, these properties have between 52% and 90% of their acreage in cropland and pasture areas, whereas two of the subject parcels only have between .08% and .09% in cropland and pasture land. Thus, based on the evidence contained in the record, the Board finds the appellants failed to establish unequal treatment in the assessment process for these two parcels.

The Board does find that unequal treatment in the assessment process has been demonstrated for the Nichols property. This property has a similar ratio of pasture land or cropland to wasteland or timber areas when compared to the appellants’ comparable properties. The subject parcel contains 37.5% pasture and the remaining area is dedicated to wasteland or timber areas, while the comparables have similar ratios ranging from 52% to 90%. Based on the comparable properties contained in the record, the Board finds the appellant established unequal treatment in the assessment process for the Nichols property.

The last argument set forth by the appellants was that certain areas of the subject parcels should be classified as wasteland or timber, which would then qualify them for agricultural assessments. The Board finds the controlling statute is Section 1-60 of the Property Tax Code, (35 ILCS 200/1-60), which defines "farm" in part as:

any property used solely for the growing and harvesting of crops; for the feeding, breeding and management of livestock; for dairying or for any other agricultural or horticultural use or combination thereof; including, but not limited to hay, grain, fruit, truck or vegetable crops, floriculture, mushroom growing, plant or tree nurseries, orchards, forestry, sod farming and greenhouses; the keeping, raising and feeding of livestock or poultry, including dairying, poultry, swine, sheep, beef cattle, ponies or horses, fur farming, bees, fish and wildlife farming...

In order to qualify for an agricultural assessment, the subject area must also be used as a farm at least two years preceding the date of assessment. (35 ILCS 200/10-110).

Using these statutes, the Property Tax Appeal Board will, in the below paragraphs, address each individual parcel and examine the facts which are unique to each appellant’s request for an agricultural assessment.

98-132-F-1 (Nichols)

This parcel consists of a 58.13 acre tract. The attorney noted that currently 21.8 acres are receiving an agricultural assessment due to use as pasture land. The appellant requested that the remaining acreage also be assigned an agricultural assessment. The appellant’s attorney further stated that some pine trees were planted on the subject site, however, she did not know the actual number of tress located on the site. In addition, she explained the 36.33 acre area is mostly wooded and should be classified as timber land. The Property Tax Appeal Board finds the appellant sufficiently established that the acreage, which is not being utilized as pasture land, should receive an agricultural assessment. As determined in the Board’s previous analysis concerning the appellants’ equity argument, the subject parcel qualifies for an agricultural assessment for the remaining acreage which is not part or subject to the pasture classification. Lastly, the Board finds this area should be classified as other farmland for purposes of assessment.

98-133-F-1 (Clark)

This parcel consists of a 22.59 acre tract. The appellants’ attorney explained that during the 1998 assessment year this parcel had one acre planted with corn, 1/2 an acre contained pumpkins and gords, while another two acres could have been used as tillable ground. She also stated that approximately 19.5 acres were covered with timber and had a creek running through the acreage. The appellant offered a Wildlife Habitat Management Plan from the State of Illinois’ Department of Natural Resources - Division of Wildlife Resources dated January 26, 1998. Even though the owners of this parcel have planted bushes and trees, and have built several brush piles to protect wildlife, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds this activity does meet the definition of farmland as established in Section 1-60 of the Property Tax Code. With respect to the 1-2 acres of cropland, the Board finds the appellant’s activity also fails to meet the requirements established in Section 1-60 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/1-60).

In addition, the Board finds the appellant’s creation of a wildlife habitat on the remaining acreage also fails to meet the guidelines established in the above mentioned statute and definition of farming activity. Furthermore, as argued by the board of review, the appellant failed to produce any evidence showing that a forestry management plan had been filed and accepted by the Illinois Department of Natural Resources which would qualify the subject parcel for a farmland assessment pursuant to Section 10-150 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/10-150). In conclusion, the Board finds the appellant failed to prove the subject parcel should receive an agricultural assessment and, therefore, the board of review’s assessment of this subject parcel is correct.

98-134-F-1 (Schell)

The appellants’ attorney acknowledged that she was a part owner of this 38.55 acre tract. This parcel contains a one acre homesite and a residential dwelling. She stated the majority of the land is currently being prepared in such a manner to attract wildlife. For example, brush piles were being created, and trees and crops were planted solely for the attraction and benefit of the wildlife. The subject parcel was planted with 2 1/2 acres of corn, 1/2 an acre of clover, 1/2 an acre in alternative crops such as fruit trees and vegetables during the 1998 assessment year. Other evidence included a Report of Acreage - Farm Summary from the Illinois Department of Revenue wherein the appellant indicated that in 1997 and 1998, two acres of the subject property were planted with corn. The appellant also presented a Wildlife Habitat Management Plan from the State of Illinois Department of Natural Resources - Division of Wildlife Resources, dated January 26, 1998.

The Property Tax Appeal Board finds the appellant’s activity on the subject parcel does not meet the requirements established in Section 1-60 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/1-60). Moreover, the appellant failed to provide documentation showing the subject acreage, which contains the crops, was used as cropland for the two previous years prior to the assessment year as prescribed by Section 10-110 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/10-110).  In regard to the remaining acreage, the Board also finds the appellant’s creation of a wildlife habitat also fails to meet the definition of farming activity. Again, as argued by the board of review, the appellant failed to produce any evidence showing that a forestry management plan had been filed and accepted by the Illinois Department of Natural Resources which would qualify the subject parcel for a farmland assessment pursuant to Section 10-150 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/10-150). In conclusion, the Board finds the appellant failed to prove the subject parcel should receive an agricultural assessment and, therefore, the board of review’s assessment of the subject parcel is correct.

Therefore, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds the assessments for the Schell and Clark properties as established by the board of review are correct and no reductions are warranted. The Board, however, finds that approximately 36.33 acres, the acreage which is not part of the existing pasture classification, of the Nichols property should receive an agricultural assessment, (other farmland), to be determined by the board of review. The Board hereby orders the Fulton County Board of Review to compute the revised assessment for the Nichols property in accordance with the dictates of this decision and submit the assessment to the Property Tax Appeal Board within 15 days of the date of this decision.

The subject property consists of an unimproved 3.36 acre parcel located in Riverton, Illinois.

The appellant appeared before the Property Tax Appeal Board contesting the residential classification and resulting assessment assigned to the subject property by the board of review.  The appellant contends the subject property should be classified and assessed as farmland.  The appellant stated that in 1995 and 1996 the subject property was assessed as farmland and the classification was changed for the 1997 assessment year.  He stated that approximately 3/4 of an acre has been used for the grazing of cattle and the remainder of the acreage is used for the growing and the baling of hay.  He claimed the subject parcel has been used for this purpose since he purchased the property in 1987.  He stated that 12 to 15 head of cattle roam freely on part of the subject property and on four to five other contiguous parcels.  The cattle is owned by another party and the appellant receives no compensation for allowing the cattle to graze on the subject property except for some beef now and then.  He stated that hay was baled and cut twice in 1995 and once in 1996.  Hay was also baled in 1997.  The appellant submitted signed affidavits where three people and the appellant attested to either the cutting and raking of hay or the observance of farming activities on the subject property in 1997.  The board of review noted the affidavits were not notarized.  The appellant also submitted assessment data on four properties.  These properties all contained approximately five acres and were located in the subject’s immediate area.  These properties had farmland assessments ranging from $1,051 to $2,175 or from $210 to $431.55 per acre.  The subject property was assessed at $11,200 or $3,333.33 per acre.  The appellant submitted photographs of these four properties and contends that none of these properties are being farmed.  Based on this data the appellant requested a farmland assessment for the subject property.

The board of review submitted "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" wherein the subject’s assessment totaling $11,200 was disclosed.  The board of review submitted a copy of the zoning ordinance of the Village of Riverton wherein it was declared unlawful to keep livestock within the village limits.  The board of review was of the opinion the appellant did not clearly show the subject was being farmed in 1995 and 1996 and as a result requested confirmation of the subject property’s assessment.

In rebuttal, the appellant submitted a zoning map for 1996 showing the subject was zoned agriculture at that time.  He also submitted the Village of Riverton Land Use Map taken from the comprehensive plan for Riverton, Illinois for the years 1997 through 2020.  The subject was classified as undeveloped lots.  He stated that the Village of Riverton made him tear down a fence, prevented him from building a barn and prevented him for increasing the size of the cattle herd.  However, he maintained the subject property was still being used for grazing of from 12 to 15 cattle and to grow and bale hay.

After hearing the testimony and reviewing the record, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal. The Board finds that the subject property is entitled to a farmland classification and assessment.  Section 1-60 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/1-60) defines "farm" in part as "any property used solely for the growing and harvesting of crops; for the feeding, breeding and management of livestock; for dairying or for any other agricultural or horticultural use or combination thereof; including, but not limited to hay, grain, fruit, truck or vegetable crops, floriculture, mushroom growing, plant or tree nurseries, orchards, forestry, sod farming and greenhouses; the keeping, raising and feeding of livestock or poultry, including dairying, poultry, swine, sheep, beef cattle, ponies or horses, fur farming, bees, fish and wildlife farming..."  To qualify for an agricultural assessment, the land must be farmed at least two years preceding the date of assessment. (35 ILCS 200/10-110).  Testimony revealed that the subject property has been used as a farm since 1987.  Thus, the testimony presented by the appellant indicated that the subject has been used for agricultural purposes for two years preceding the assessment date.  Therefore, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that the subject property is entitled to a farmland classification and hereby orders the Sangamon County Board of Review to compute a farmland assessment for the subject parcel.  The agricultural assessment is to be certified to the Board within 15 days of the date of this decision.

The subject property consists of two separate, although contiguous farmland parcels totaling 165 acres situated in the Northwest Quarter of Section 21 in New Boston Township.  Both parcels are improved with a residence and outbuildings, however, those assessments are not contested. 

The appellant appeared before the Property Tax Appeal Board claiming the board of review failed to consider enough debasement for flooding in the calculation of the subjects’ farmland assessments.  He does not disagree with the classification of the land, the soil types found on the parcels or the productivity index assigned to each soil type.  He explained his primary concern is with the assessment of his property in comparison to the amount of crop losses from flooding of the Edwards River.  In support of his argument, the appellant presented ASCS aerial maps of the subject parcels detailing the areas affected by the overflow.  The appellant explained that most of the farm is affected by flooding but approximately 15 acres of the subject parcels suffer from flooding every year.  Because of the flooding, the tillable acreage remains wet and muddy which results in further damage and crop losses.  The appellant testified that documentation of crop yields and losses for the subject parcels are not available because most of the crop is fed to livestock.  Based on this information, the appellant requests a review of the flooding debasement methodologies employed by the board of review. 

The board of review presented its “Notes on Appeals” wherein the subject properties’ final 1998 assessments were disclosed.  The board noted the subject parcels were assessed in accordance with farmland assessment provisions found in the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/10-110, et seq.) and following farmland assessment guidelines promulgated by the Department of Revenue using the most recent soil survey maps available.  With respect to acres of land affected by flooding on the subject parcels, the board explained that a flooding debasement was already taken into consideration in developing the productivity indices of the soil types found on the subject parcels.  To document equity in the assessment methodology, copies of property record cards for the subject parcels disclosing the valuation calculations along with soil maps of the subject parcels were submitted for review. 

After hearing the testimony and reviewing the record, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal.  From the facts and evidence contained in the record, the Board finds the subject parcels are equitably assessed with similar farmland parcels throughout the county.  The farmland assessment law requires that farmland be assessed in accordance with agricultural assessment provisions found in the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/10-110, et seq.).  Thus, farmland assessments are based on guidelines promulgated by the Department of Revenue and according to soil productivity indices using the University of Illinois Cooperative Extension Service Circular 1156 “Soil Productivity in Illinois”. 

In this appeal, the board of review established it had followed those guidelines in assessing the subject parcel and that it applied the same assessment procedures equitably to farmland similar to the subject parcels throughout the county.  The appellant did not present any evidence to refute the soil types found on the subject tracts nor was there any documented evidence to show the assessment methodology and adjustments employed by the board of review for the subject properties was inequitable or improper.  Moreover, the appellant failed to provide any substantive documentation in support of the loss in yield claimed due to excessive flooding.  Based thereon, the Property Tax Appeal Board  finds the appellant has failed to provide a factual basis to support a further reduction in the assessed valuations of the subject parcels over and above the debasement already allowed for the areas affected by flooding. 

The subject property consists of a 94.47 acre farm.  The farm has a three acre homesite, one acre of which is a quarry.  The appellant claims the quarry is both overvalued and inequitably assessed.  The appellant had claimed a 27 ton scale located on the subject property was overvalued.  At the hearing, he testified he was no longer contesting the value of the scales. 

The appellant testified he agreed the one acre quarry was commercial property.  He stated the assessment reflects a value of $6,500.  He stated the board of review had income information from the subject quarry and assessed it according to this income. 

The appellant also argued other quarries in the county are not assessed according to income and therefore, a smaller quarry can be assessed as much as a quarry with a large amount of production.  The appellant also indicated only three active quarries in the county out of approximately twenty active quarries were changed from agricultural assessments to commercial assessments for 1998.  He presented property record cards indicating other farms with quarries in Jo Daviess County were valued as farmland and the quarries were not listed or assessed. 

The board of review submitted "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" wherein the subject's final assessment was disclosed.  In addition, the board submitted the assessed values of quarries in surrounding counties.  The values ranged from $800 to $6,500 per acre for an active quarry.  The property adjoining the subject had a quarry assessment of $25,000 per acre.  The subject was also given a $25,000 per acre quarry assessment which was lowered by the board of review because of its smaller income. 

The board indicated quarries in the county were granted operational licenses starting in 1997.  As the assessors brought in assessment information on the quarries in the county, quarry assessments were placed on the properties.  The board indicated only four of the active quarries, including the subject property, received commercial assessments in 1998.  The remaining active quarries received only farmland assessments.  The board of review did not know how many quarries were not assessed for 1998. 

After reviewing the record and considering the evidence, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal.  The Board further finds that a reduction in the assessment of the subject property is warranted based on the evidence contained in the record.  The Illinois Supreme Court has held that taxpayers who object to an assessment on the basis of lack of uniformity bear the burden of proving the disparity of assessment valuations by clear and convincing evidence.  Kankakee County Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 131 Ill.2d l (1989).  The evidence must demonstrate a consistent pattern of assessment inequities within the assessment jurisdiction. 

In this appeal, there were approximately twenty active quarries in the county.  Of that number, only four quarries received commercial assessments.  The remaining quarries continued to receive agricultural assessments.  Uniformity prohibits the taxation of one kind of property within the taxing district at one value while the same kind of property in the same district for taxation purposes is taxed at either a grossly less value or a grossly higher value.  Apex Motor Fuel Co. v. Barrett, 20 Ill.2d 395 (1960).  Abandonment of the method of assessment in only a few individual cases violates the uniformity clause of the Illinois Constitution.  Walsh v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 181 Ill.2d 228, 692 N.E.2d 260 (1998).  The Board finds assessing only a small number of quarries as commercial property while continuing to assess other quarries as agricultural property destroys uniformity, produces unequal treatment and creates inequity in the assessment process. 

Therefore, based on this analysis of the record, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that the appellant has supported the contention of unequal treatment in the assessment process and a reduction in the assessment of the subject property is warranted. The subject quarry is entitled to a farmland assessment for the 1998 assessment year.  The Property Tax Appeal Board hereby orders the Jo Daviess County Board of Review to compute a farmland assessment for the subject quarry.  The agricultural assessment is to be certified to the Board within 15 days of the date of this decision. 

The subject property consists of a 195 acre parcel located in Fulton County, Illinois. 

The appellant contends the soil types identified by the board of review for the subject property are incorrect and should be based on a more recent and accurate soil map. In support of its contention, the appellant submitted a letter from a Resource Conservationist from the Fulton County Soil and Water Conservation District. The Resource Conservationist identified eight different soil types on 132.6 acres of the subject property. The letter stated that this information was based on data recently collected in the field by soil scientists from the Natural Resources Conservation Service. The maps used to identify the soil types were attached to the above mentioned letter. The Resource Conservationist further explained that the Fulton County’s Assessment Office had based its assessments on association mapping which was done in the 1930’s and 1940’s. 

During the hearing, the appellant claimed the board of review’s soil identifications were based on a 1971 soil association map. The appellant argued the most recent soil maps for the subject property should have been used as a basis for the subject property’s assessment. The appellant argued the most recent map and soil identifications would create a lower average productivity index for the subject parcel and would result in a lower total assessment. The appellant also explained, during cross-examination, that the new NRCS mapping was not completed and published for all of Fulton County, but was finished for the subject property’s township. 

The appellant then claimed the board of review is under an obligation to use the best or most updated soil map available. For example, the appellant cited the Illinois Real Property Appraisal Manual and stated it recommended the use of the most updated soil maps. Thus, based on the evidence contained in the record, the appellant requested the Property Tax Appeal Board reduce the subject property’s total assessment to properly reflect the types of soils contained on the subject property. 

The board of review submitted its "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" wherein the subject property’s total assessment of $35,540 was disclosed. In support of its assessment, the board of review provided the subject’s property record card, a narrative explaining the methodology utilized for assessing the subject property, and a gridsheet detailing the types of soils contained within Fulton County along with their corresponding productivity indexes and debasement factors. 

In regard to the appellant’s evidence and contention, the board of review argued it would be inequitable to use the new soil map for the subject property when the map had not been completed and implemented by the supervisor of assessment’s office for the entire county. The board of review continued by stating the existing map was the best map available at the time of assessment and is being used to uniformly assess all of the farmland in Fulton County. The board of review did not, however, offer any documentation refuting the results or conclusion of the more recent soil map and its soil identifications. Lastly, the board of review claimed the appellant failed to adequately explain how the productivity indices and debasement factors were calculated for the newly identified soil types. Based on the evidence contained in the record, the board of review requested confirmation of the subject property’s total assessment. 

After hearing the testimony and considering the evidence, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal. The Property Tax Appeal Board further finds that no reduction is warranted. The Board finds the use of the most recent soil survey maps by the appellant to recalculate the agricultural assessment of the subject property would result in the unequal treatment of farmland throughout the rest of the county. The Board finds that Fulton County must use the same basis for determining assessed valuations for like properties. Walsh v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 181 Ill.2d 228, 235; 692 N.E.2d 260 (1988). 

The Illinois property tax scheme is grounded in article IX, section 4, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, which provides in pertinent part that real estate taxes “shall be levied uniformly by valuation ascertained as the General Assembly shall provide by law.” Ill. Const. 1970 art. IX, Sec. 4(a). Uniformity requires equality in the burden of taxation. Kankakee County Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 131 Ill.2d 1, 20 (1989). This in turn, requires equality of taxation in proportion to the value of the property taxed. Apex Motor Fuel Co. v. Barrett, 20 Ill.2d 395, 401 (1960). Thus, taxing officials may not value the same kinds of properties within the same taxing boundary at different proportions of their true value. Kankakee County Board of Review, 131 Ill.2d at 20. The party objecting to an assessment on lack of uniformity grounds bears the burden of proving the disparity by clear and convincing evidence. Kankakee County Board of Review, 131 Ill.2d at 22. 

The Board finds the application of the appellant’s recalculated agricultural assessment based on a new soil map, which has neither been completed for the entire county nor has it been implemented by the board of review for any of the townships that have been fully mapped, would cause an inequity in the assessment of farmland. In Walsh, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a county, “...must use the same basis for determining assessed valuations for like properties.” Id. at 236. In the subject appeal, the appellant is seeking to use a soil map, which is not being applied to other farm parcels throughout the county, to reassess the subject parcel. As in the Walsh case, wherein the Illinois Supreme Court struck down the county’s use of a different methodology for assessing the appellant’s property, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds the use of the new soil map would be inappropriate. 

Therefore, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds the subject property’s assessment as established by the board of review is correct and no reduction is warranted. 

The appellant in this appeal submitted documentation to demonstrate that the subject property was improperly assessed.  The evidence further revealed that the appellant did not file a complaint with the board of review but filed an appeal directly to the Property Tax Appeal Board following receipt of the notice of a negative equalization factor. 

The board of review did not submit its "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" nor any evidence in support of its assessed valuation of the subject property. 

After reviewing the record and considering the evidence, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal.  The appellant in this appeal did not file a complaint from a decision of the board of review, but filed an appeal directly to the Property Tax Appeal Board within 30 days of the board of review’s assessment notice reducing the subject’s assessment based on a negative equalization factor of .9500. Section 16-180 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/16-180) provides in pertinent part: 

"where no complaint has been made to the board of review of the county where the property is located and the appeal is based solely on the effect of an equalization factor assigned to all property or to a class of property by the board of review, the Property Tax Appeal Board may not grant a reduction in the assessment greater than the amount that was added as the result of the equalization factor." 

Pursuant to the provisions contained in Section 16-180 of the Property Tax Code the Property Tax Appeal Board’s jurisdiction is limited to granting a reduction in an assessment only to the amount of increase caused by the equalization factor.  In this case, the subject property received a negative township equalization factor of .9500 which lowered the subject’s assessment from $17,851 to $16,959.  As a result, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it is without authority to grant a further reduction in the assessment of the subject property. 

FARM CHAPTER

Index

 SUBJECT MATTER

 Agricultural Assessment Equity – Apple Orchard

Agricultural Classification - Forest/Wooded Areas
(35 ILCS 200/1-60)

Agricultural Classification - Hay/Cattle Grazing
(35 ILCS 200/1-60, 35 ILCS 200/10-110)

Agricultural Classification - Recreational Land
(35 ILCS 200/1-60, 35 ILCS 200/10-125, 35 ILCS 200/10-150, 35 ILCS 200/10-110)

Assessment of Wasteland
(Official Rules of the Property Tax Appeal Board, 1910.40(a))

Classification and Land Use – Horse Arena, Training Facility
(35 ILCS 200/1-60, 35 ILCS 200/10-110)

Equitable Assessment of Quarries

Farm Building Classification

Flooding Debasement
(35 ILCS 200/10-110)

Hog Confinement - Pollution Control Assessment
(35 ILCS 200/11-5 et. seq.)

Negative Multiplier
(35 ILCS 200/16-180)

Primary Use of Land (Residential vs.Agricultural)

 Soil Maps - Equitable Application
(35 ILCS 200/10-110)