1999 Synopsis -- Residential Chapter

PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD

SYNOPSIS OF REPRESENTATIVE CASES

 RESIDENTIAL DECISIONS 

 PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD

Section 16-190 of the Property Tax Code

(35 ILCS 200/16-190, Illinois Compiled Statutes)

Official Rules - Section 1910.76

Printed by Authority of the State of Illinois

www.state.il.us/agency/ptab

 RESIDENTIAL CHAPTER

Table of Contents

The subject property consists of 7,020 square foot, three story, masonry structure containing six single family condominium units.  Each condominium unit contains two bedrooms and one and one-half baths.  The appellant argued unequal treatment in the assessment process as the basis of the appeal.

The appellant’s evidence indicated an age of 13 years for the subject property, while the property characteristic printout provided by the board of review indicated the age of the improvement to be three years.  In lieu of contradictory evidence, the age of the improvement, for purposes of appeal, is three years.

In support of his argument the appellant submitted a grid detailing assessment data and descriptions of four properties.  Sale information was also provided for the subject and the four comparables.  In addition, photographs of the subject and the four comparables were offered.  Further, a letter from the building commissioner of the City of Oak Forest stating that the subject should be classified for tax purposes as an apartment building not as condominium units was included in the evidence.  The properties suggested as comparable were similar to the subject in some respects.  They were six unit multi-family, three story, masonry buildings ranging in age from 19 to 21 years and located within one block of the subject.  The properties contained 6,106 square feet and had improvement assessments ranging from $27,240 to $28,845, or from $4.47 to $4.95 per square foot of living area.  The comparables had land assessments ranging from $1,359 to $1,699.  The appellant testified that in 1992 he purchased the subject to use as rental property for investment purposes and that it is part of a condominium association consisting of nine buildings.  He testified that the four properties suggested as comparable are six unit apartment buildings.  On the basis of this analysis, the appellant requested a total assessment for the subject of $30,544.  Of the requested amount, $28,845, or $4.11 per square foot of living area, was to be attributed to the subject’s improvement and $1,699 to the land.

The board of review submitted "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" wherein the subject's final total assessment of $38,599 was presented, of which $6,496 was allocated to the land and $32,103, or $4.57 per square foot of living area, was allocated to the improvement.  The board submitted documentation presented at the county level hearing and assessment data on four properties suggested as comparable to the subject.  The board’s witness testified that the comparables were in the same condominium complex, were the same age and were attributed the same percentage of ownership as the subject.  The properties had improvement assessments of $32,103 and $34,299 and land assessments of $6,496 each.  Sale information on three of the suggested comparables was also provided.  A grid containing sale information on three other properties in the same condominium complex as the subject was also included.  As a result of this analysis, the board of review requested confirmation of the subject's assessment.

After reviewing the record and considering the evidence, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal.

Taxpayers who object to an assessment on the basis of lack of uniformity bear the burden of proving the disparity of assessment valuations by clear and convincing evidence.  Kankakee County Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 131 Ill. 2d 1, 544 N.E.2d 762 (1989).  The evidence must demonstrate a consistent pattern of assessment inequities within the assessment jurisdiction.  Proof of assessment inequity should include assessment data and jurisdictional similarities of the suggested comparables to the subject property. Property Tax Appeal Board Rule 1910.65(b).  Mathematical equality in the assessment process is not required.  A practical uniformity, rather than an absolute one is the test.  Apex Motor Fuel Co. v. Barrett, 20 Ill. 2d 395, 169 N.E.2d 769 (1960).  Having considered the evidence and testimony presented, the Board concludes that the appellant has failed to meet this burden and no reduction is warranted.

In this appeal, a total of eight properties were submitted for comparison by the parties.  The Board places no weight on the letter from the City of Oak Forest because the assessor, not a taxing body, determines a property’s classification for taxing purposes.  Further, the Board accords little weight to the appellant’s comparables.  The properties are from 16 to 18 years older and over 900 square feet smaller than the subject.  In addition, the appellant testified that the comparables are buildings of rental apartments, not buildings containing condominium units that are being rented.  Therefore, the Board finds they are not comparable.  The board of review’s witness testified, and its evidence supports, that the four buildings it submitted as comparable are part of the same condominium complex and are the same age as the subject.  The board’s witness further testified that its comparables are all assessed utilizing the same percent of ownership of 11.11% as the subject.  The total assessments of the board’s comparables are $38,599 and $40,795.  The subject’s total assessment of $38,559 is at the low end of the range.  Therefore, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that the subject’s assessment as established by the board of review is correct and no reduction is warranted.

The subject property consists of a one story, frame dwelling containing 2,283 square feet of living area, constructed in 1982.  The dwelling has a partial, unfinished basement and central air conditioning.  The subject’s one acre site is also improved with a detached garage containing 672 square feet.  The subject property is located in Metropolis, Massac County, Illinois. 

The appellant and his attorney appeared before the Property Tax Appeal Board and claimed unequal treatment in the assessment process and overvaluation as the bases of the appeal.  The appellant’s attorney also presented a legal brief with respect to the timeliness of the publication of an equalization factor.  To support the valuation and equity issues, the appellant submitted a grid analysis detailing four suggested comparable properties.  Three of the comparables were one story dwellings like the subject and comparable one was a split-level style dwelling.  A picture of comparable one was submitted at the hearing and marked Appellant’s Exhibit One.  The appellant had their ages listed as ranging from 5 to 14 years.  At the hearing the appellant described each of these properties.  According to the appellant all of the comparables have finished basements.  Comparable four has an attached garage and a detached garage.  The sizes of these properties were not listed on the analysis.

The board of review used two of these properties as comparables and listed their sizes as 1,326 and 1,479 square feet.  At the hearing officer’s request, the board of review submitted the property record cards on the appellant’s other two comparables subsequent to the hearing.  Comparable one was a split-level dwelling and contains a total of 2,240 square feet of living area.  Comparable four contains 1,368 square feet of living area.  These properties had improvement assessments ranging from $30,058 to $34,863 or from $13.42 to $26.20 per square foot.  The subject improvement was assessed at $39,132 or $17.14 per square foot.  The appellant listed sales prices for three of these properties.  He indicated they sold for prices ranging from $90,000 to $118,000.  However, the dates of the sales were not disclosed.  The appellant explained the subject has a cow pasture to the east and a hog lot nearby.  There are no curbs, gutters or sidewalks.  Based on this data, the appellant requested a reduction in the subject’s assessment to $27,856 or $12.20 per square foot.

The appellant commented on the comparable properties submitted by the board of review.  The board’s comparables one and two were also the appellant’s comparables two and three.  He claimed these properties have full, finished basements.  He noted that the board of review’s comparable three has a larger lot, but the lot assessment was less than the subject property.  Comparable four has a finished walk-out basement.  Comparable five is newer and has a finished basement.  He stated he was not sure if the basement in comparable #6 was finished.  He testified that he had been inside the other comparable properties.  The appellant claimed that some of the information contained on the property record cards was inconsistent with respect to size.  The supervisor of assessments was present at the hearing and explained the inconsistencies.

With respect to the legal contention, the appellant’s attorney contends that under Section 12-10 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/12-10) it is necessary to publish equalization factors by December 31 of each year.  He stated the notice was published in March 1998.  Thus, he was of the opinion the change of assessment was improper and the equalization factor should be removed.  He stated this would result in a building assessment of $33,918 instead of $39,132.  Appellant’s Exhibit Two was submitted consisting of copies of Sections 9-210 and 12-10 of the Property Tax Code.

The board of review submitted "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" wherein the subject’s assessment totaling $43,009 was disclosed.  The subject’s assessment reflects a market value of $126,089 or $55.22 per square foot using the county’s three year median level of assessments for 1997 of 34.11%.  The board of review’s six suggested comparable properties were one story dwellings ranging in age from 4 to 19 years.  They ranged in size from 1,326 to 1,812 square feet and their improvement assessments ranged from $28,666 to $35,556 or from $17.13 to $26.30 per square foot.  Property record cards were submitted on the subject property and the comparable properties.  The supervisor of assessments explained the equalization process.  She stated the county-wide factor of 1.09 was published by December 31, 1997.  The county-wide factor was developed after the neighborhood factor of 1.25 was applied.  All properties with assessment changes other than the county-wide factor had an individual notice and the changes were published in the newspaper in March 1998.  She stated the board of review changed the neighborhood factor to 1.15.  The supervisor of assessments was give 15 days subsequent to the hearing to respond to the appellant’s attorney’s legal argument.  She responded by submitting copies of the Property Tax Code covering Sections 24-24 and 26-5.  Section 24-24 states:

An assessment completed beyond the time limits required by this Code shall be as legal and valid as if completed in the time required by law. 

Section 24-25 of the Property Tax Code states: 

All notices required by this Code shall be written or printed notices and shall be served personally upon the persons entitled to notice, or their agents or by sending the notice by mail to the person so entitled to notice, or to his or her agent, if the residence or business address of the person is known, or by reasonable effort can be ascertained.  If the address of a person cannot be ascertained, then the notice shall be sent to the address of the person who last paid the taxes upon the property in question.  A failure to give any notice required by this Code shall not impair or affect the validity of any assessment as finally made. 

Based on this data, the board of review requested confirmation of the subject property’s assessment. 

After hearing the testimony and reviewing the record, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal.  The Board further finds that the appellant has failed to support the contention of unequal treatment in the assessment process.  The Illinois Supreme Court has held that taxpayers who object to an assessment on the basis of lack of uniformity bear the burden of proving the disparity of assessment valuations by clear and convincing evidence.  Kankakee County Board of Review v.  Property Tax Appeal Board, 131 Ill.2d 1 (1989).  The evidence must demonstrate a consistent pattern of assessment inequities within the assessment jurisdiction.  After an analysis of the assessment data, the Board finds that the appellant has failed to overcome this burden. 

In all, the record contains assessment data on eight suggested comparable properties.  The appellant’s comparable one was a split-level style of dwelling.  Because the construction style of this property differs from the subject property, the Board placed little weight on this property in its equity analysis.  The remaining seven comparable properties were one story dwellings like the subject.  They had improvement assessments ranging from $17.13 to $26.30 per square foot.  Five of these properties were similar in age to the subject property.  These five properties had improvement assessments ranging from $17.13 to $26.30 per square foot.  The subject improvement was assessed within this range at $17.14 per square foot.  In fact, the subject property was assessed at the low end of the range established by these properties.  Thus, the Board finds that the subject’s assessment was equitable when compared with these properties since according to the appellant, these properties have finished basements, while the subject property does not have this additional amenity.  The Board also finds that the subject’s site assessment was also equitable.  Only one example of assessment inequity was noted by the appellant.  The Board has analyzed the site assessments applied to the eight comparable properties and finds the subject property was assessed well within the range established by these properties on a square foot basis.  Most of these properties were assessed the same as the subject at $.084 per square foot. 

The constitutional provision for uniformity of taxation and valuation does not require mathematical equality.  The requirement is satisfied if the intent is evident to adjust the burden with a reasonable degree of uniformity and if such is the effect of the statute enacted by the General Assembly establishing the method of assessing real property in its general operation.  A practical uniformity, rather than an absolute one, is the test.  Apex Motor Fuel Co. v. Barrett, 20 Ill.2d 395 (1960).  Although the comparables presented by the appellant disclosed that properties located in the same area are not assessed at identical levels, all that the constitution requires is a practical uniformity which appears to exist on the basis of the evidence.  For the foregoing reasons, the Board finds that the appellant has not proven by clear and convincing evidence that the subject property is inequitably assessed. 

The Board also finds that the record does not support the appellant’s overvaluation claim.  The appellant listed sales data for three of the suggested comparable properties.  However, he failed to disclose the date of sale for these transactions.  The property record card on the appellant’s comparable one indicated the sale occurred in August 1997.  The property record cards on the other two comparables had no indication of these sales.  As stated earlier, the appellant’s comparable one is of a different construction style than the subject and was not considered to be comparable.  Thus, the Board finds that no weight can be accorded the appellant’s overvaluation claim. 

The Board also places no weight on the appellant’s legal argument.  Section 26-5 of the Property Tax Code states:

An assessment completed beyond the time limits required by this Code shall be as legal and valid as if completed in the time required. 

Thus, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that because an assessment was alleged to be late does not invalidate the assessment.  Also, see People ex rel. Costello v. Lerner, 11 Ill.Dec. 368, 53 Ill.App.3d 245, 368 N.E.2d 976. 

Therefore based on the aforementioned factors, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that the subject's assessment as established by the board of review is correct and no reduction is warranted.

The subject property consists of a one and one half story, brick bungalow style dwelling that contains 2,030 square feet of living area.  The dwelling was constructed in 1907 and is situated on an 83 foot by 138 foot lot.  The subject’s detached garage is assessed under a separate parcel number.  Prior to 1997 the subject property had been used as a parsonage for the associate pastor.  Subsequently, the property has been leased to a member of the congregation. 

The appellant’s petition indicates a claim of overvaluation and unequal treatment in the assessment process as the bases of the appeal.  In support of these contentions, sales data, assessment data and descriptions were submitted on four suggested comparable properties.  The comparable properties were of the same construction style and design as the subject and were located within two miles of the subject property.  They ranged in date of construction from 1912 to 1928 and in size from 1,489 to 2,235 square feet.  The properties sold for prices ranging from $88,000 to $193,000 or from $50.52 to $89.78 per square foot.  Based on this information, the appellant’s representative was of the opinion that a value of $60 per square foot would be appropriate for the subject property.  This relates to a market value of $121,800. 

These same four properties had improvement assessments ranging from $22,100 to $42,540 or from $12.69 to $22.30 per square foot.  The subject improvement was assessed at $42,690 or $21.03 per square foot. 

A copy of the subject lease was also submitted and indicated a 1997 gross income for the subject property of $13,800.  From this data, the appellant’s representative employed the income approach to value to further derive an estimate of value for the subject property.   A vacancy and collection loss of 5% and expenses of 10% of the effective gross income were deducted from the subject’s gross income to produce a net income of $11,799.  Capitalizing the subject’s net income by an estimated rate of 11.20% results in an indicated value by the income approach of $105,348.  The appellant’s representative was of the opinion the subject’s assessment should be reduced to reflect the value derived by the income approach, and as a result requested an assessment of $35,112.  The appellant’s representative was of the opinion the value by the income approach is the true market value of the property due to the problems associated with the physical layout of the subject property.  Photographs of the subject property were submitted depicting the location of the garage, which was assessed on a separate parcel, and the adjoining parking lot in relationship to the subject dwelling.  The appellant claims that church attendees often park in front of the garage, obstructing the use of the property by the lessee.  The appellant’s representative claimed that if the subject dwelling were leased to a non-member of the congregation, the leased rental amount could be reduced. 

The board of review submitted "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" wherein the subject’s assessment totaling $61,330 was disclosed.  The subject’s assessment reflects a market value of $184,174 or $90.72 per square foot using the county’s three year median level of assessments for 1997 of 33.30%.  In addition, the board of review submitted grid analyses detailing the appellant’s four suggested comparable properties and four additional suggested comparable properties.  The board of review indicated in its evidence that two of the appellant’s comparables were located in a different market neighborhood than the subject, identified as neighborhood code 83.  The subject property and the other two comparables were located in neighborhood code 81. 

The board of review’s four comparables consisted of brick dwellings that were constructed from 1926 to 1928.  Three were one and one half story bungalows and one was a one story dwelling.  They ranged in size from 1,608 to 2,235 square feet, they sold for prices ranging from $164,000 to $219,900 or from $86.35 to $114.35 per square foot and the transactions occurred in 1995, 1996 and 1997.  Three of the comparables were located in neighborhood code 81 and one was located in neighborhood code 83.  Both the appellant and the board of review used the comparable located at 94 South Grace Avenue.  These same four comparables had improvement assessments ranging from $23.82 to $38.21 per square foot.  Based on this data, the board of review requested confirmation of the subject property’s assessment. 

After considering the evidence and reviewing the record, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal.  The Board further finds that a reduction in the subject property’s assessment is supported by the data contained in the record.  The Board finds that the sales data submitted by the parties are the best indicators of the subject’s market value.  The Property Tax Appeal Board placed little weight on the income analysis submitted by the appellant in establishing the market value of the subject property.  In the appellant’s income analysis the subject’s actual income was utilized.  There was no showing that the actual income and rents received were the subject’s economic rent.  Economic rent is defined as the rent that is justified for the property on the basis of a careful study of comparable properties in the area. International Association of Assessing Officers, Property Assessment Valuation, (1977).  Moreover, there was no showing that the 11.20% capitalization rate was market related. 

The appellant’s evidence discussed the subject’s physical layout and its limitations.  However, a reduction in the market value of the subject based on the physical layout was not quantified by the data contained in the record. 

The courts have stated that where there is credible evidence of comparable sales these sales are to be given significant weight as evidence of market value.  In Chrysler Corporation v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 69 Ill.App.3d 207 (1979), the court held that significant reliance should not be placed on the cost approach especially when there is market data available.  In Willow Hill Grain, Inc. v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 187 Ill.App.3d 9, the court held that of the three primary methods of evaluating property for purpose of real estate taxes, the preferred method is the sales comparison approach.  Thus, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that the best evidence of value is the market data provided by the parties.  In all, market data was submitted on seven suggested comparable properties.  The properties had sales prices ranging from $50.52 to $114.35 per square foot.  These properties all had varying degrees of similarity with the subject property.  The board of review argued that properties located in neighborhood code 83 should not have been used.  However, it chose one of its comparables from this neighborhood.  The properties most similar in size to the subject had sales prices of $86.35 and $114.35 per square foot.  The property that sold for $114.35 per square foot was a one story dwelling with many more amenities than enjoyed by the subject property.  Both parties utilized the comparable that sold for $86.35 per square foot.  This property was similar in construction style, age, size and location with the subject property.  However, this property had central air conditioning and a detached garage.  As noted before, the subject’s detached garage is not included in the assessment of the subject parcel.  The subject property was valued at $90.72 per square foot by the board of review and is above the value reflected in the sales prices of the most similar properties.  The Board has analyzed the sales data of the seven suggested comparable properties.  Consideration was given for the differences in amenities between these properties and the subject property.  Based on this analysis, the Board finds that a market value of $162,400 or $80.00 per square foot is appropriate for the subject property and was well supported by the comparable data.  This results in an assessment totaling $54,080 and an improvement assessment of $35,440 or $17.46 per square foot.  The improvement assessment was also well supported by the assessment data provided in the record on the seven suggested comparable properties.

The subject property consists of one side of a one story, frame and brick duplex condominium, constructed in 1997.  Amenities include a fireplace, central air conditioning and an attached two car garage.  The subject property is located at 1625 Woodmore, Springfield, Illinois.

The appellants appeared before the Property Tax Appeal Board and claimed the subject improvement should have not been assessed for the 1997 assessment year since construction of the building was not completed until May 1997.  Testimony disclosed that as of January 1, 1997, 65% of the building was complete.  The appellants claimed that when they filed the appeal with the Property Tax Appeal Board they assumed they were filing an appeal for both sides of the duplex condominium.  They asked the Property Tax Appeal Board to review the assessments for both units.  The appellants submitted the closing statement dated May 3, 1996, showing a purchase price for the land of $33,000.  They also submitted a work release contract dated May 2, 1996, showing an estimate of the construction costs of the duplex to be $160,000.  On the petition the appellants wrote the following:

“The attached land purchase and construction contract were for a duplex condominium, so the numbers used on this appeal are one-half of those numbers as 1625 Woodmore is one-half of that project.”

The board of review submitted "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" wherein the subject’s assessment totaling $39,809 was disclosed.  The subject’s assessment reflects a market value of $123,095 using the county’s three year median level of assessments for 1997 of 32.34%.  The supervisor of assessments was present at the hearing and submitted data showing that the subject property prior to division was assessed under parcel number 21-02.0-404-008.  Subsequently the parcel number was changed to 21-02.0-404-041 and 21-02.0-404-042.  The assessment notice for the subject property was sent to the appellants and the assessment notice for the other side of the duplex, parcel number 21-02.0-404-042, was sent to the new owners on March 9, 1998.  A party wall agreement dated May 20, 1997, was also submitted.  The supervisor of assessments testified that the subject property was assessed at 100% complete but that Capitol Township does do pro-rata assessments based on completion.

After hearing the testimony and reviewing the record, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal.  The Board further finds that it has jurisdiction over only the subject parcel, 21-02.0-404-041.  The appellants claimed they had intended to appeal the assessment for both sides of the duplex.  The Board finds this argument to be unpersuasive.  The appellants stated on their petition,

“The attached land purchase and construction contract were for a duplex condominium, so the numbers used on this appeal are one-half of those numbers as 1625 Woodmore is one-half of that project.”

This statement indicates the appellants were aware of the fact they were filing an appeal for only one side of the condominium duplex.

The appellants also claimed the duplex should not have been valued at all since it was not complete until May 1997.  Section 9-160 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/9-160) provides:

“On or before June 1 in each year other than the general assessment year ... the assessor shall list and assess all property which becomes taxable and which is not upon the general assessment, and also make and return a list of all new or added buildings, structures or other improvements of any kind, the value of which had not been previously added to or included in the valuation of the property on which such improvements have been made, specifying the property on which each of the improvements has been made, the kind of improvement and the value which, in his or her opinion, has been added to the property by the improvements.  The assessment shall also include or exclude, on a proportionate basis in accordance with the provisions of Section 9-180, all new or added buildings, structures or other improvements, the value of which was not included in the valuation of the property for that year, and all improvements which were destroyed or removed.”

Section 9-180 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/9-180) provides:

“The owner of property on January 1 also shall be liable, on a proportionate basis, for the increased taxes occasioned by the construction of new or added buildings, structures or other improvements on the property from the date when the improvement was substantially completed or initially occupied or initially used, to December 31 of that year.”

Here, section 9-160 requires the assessor to record any new improvements and to determine the value they have added to the property.  By its terms, section 9-180, applies only after a building has been substantially completed or initially occupied.  Reading these two sections together, section 9-160 clearly requires the assessor to value any substantially completed improvements to the extent that they add value to the property.  Section 9-180 then defines the time when the improvement can be fully assessed.  Thus, the Board finds that a building assessment for the subject property is appropriate.

The Board finds the only evidence of the market value of the subject improvement was the $160,000 construction costs evidenced by a copy of the work release contract.  Thus, the Board finds that the subject portion of the building had a market value of $80,000 at 100% complete.  The testimony disclosed the subject improvement was 65% complete as of the January 1, 1997, assessment date.  Therefore, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds the subject improvement should be valued at 65% of $80,000 or $52,000.  This is consistent with the policies of the Capitol Township Assessor as stated by the supervisor of assessments.  Since market value of the subject improvement has been established, the county’s three year median level of assessments for 1997 of 32.34% shall be applied.

The subject property consists of a part two story and part one story style dwelling of frame construction containing 3,230 square feet of living area. The subject improvement is located on a 15,000 square foot lot with approximately 147 feet of water front area.

The appellants claimed unequal treatment in the assessment of the subject lot as the basis of the appeal. The appellants did not challenge the assessment assigned to the subject improvement. In support of their unequal treatment argument, the appellants submitted a spreadsheet detailing three suggested comparable properties. The three comparable lots contained between 51 and 213 feet of water front area and had assessments ranging from $22,695 to $32,420. The appellant further claimed the subject property’s land assessment should be lower than a neighboring lot which has considerably more water frontage. Based on the evidence contained in the record, the appellants requested a reduction in the subject property’s land assessment.

The board of review submitted its "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" wherein the subject property’s total assessment of $104,970 was disclosed. The subject lot has an assessment of $32,420 or $2.13 per square foot of land area. The board of review also offered a spreadsheet detailing five suggested comparables and a map of the subject property’s surrounding area. The map depicted the locations of both the appellants’ comparable properties and the board of review’s comparable properties. During the hearing, the board of review explained that the township assessor valued all of the lots which contained over 75 feet of water front area at $100,000. The lots which contained less than 75 feet of water front area were valued at approximately $73,000.

The board of review noted the township assessor’s application of this method of assessment is illustrated by the fact that four of the comparable lots have over 75 feet of water front area and also have assessments reflecting market values of $100,000 or more. Three of the comparable lots, which have 175, 213, and 114 feet of water front area, have identical assessments as the subject lot. The only lots submitted by either party which have lower assessments than the subject lot have less than 75 feet of water front area. Based on this evidence, the board of review requested confirmation of the subject property’s land assessment.

After reviewing the record and considering the evidence, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal. The Property Tax Appeal Board further finds that no reduction is warranted. The appellants’ argument was based on unequal treatment in the assessment of the subject lot. The Illinois Supreme Court has held that taxpayers who object to an assessment on the basis of lack of uniformity bear the burden of proving the disparity of assessment valuations by clear and convincing evidence. Kankakee County Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 131 Ill.2d 1 (1989). The evidence must demonstrate a consistent pattern of assessment inequities within the assessment jurisdiction. After an analysis of the assessment data, the Board finds that the appellants have failed to meet this burden.

In support of their argument, the appellants submitted a spreadsheet detailing three suggested comparable properties. The three comparable lots contained between 51 and 213 feet of water front area and had assessments ranging from $22,695 to $32,420. The subject lot has an assessment of $32,420 or $2.13 per square foot of land area. The board of review also offered a spreadsheet detailing five suggested comparables and a map of the subject property’s surrounding area. Three of the comparable lots, which have 175, 213, and 114 feet of water front area, have identical assessments as the subject lot. The only lots submitted by either party which have lower assessments than the subject lot have less than 75 feet of water front area.

The Property Tax Appeal Board finds the subject property’s land assessment is equitable when compared to the assessments of other properties in the area which have a shoreline. As previously stated, the board of review explained that the township assessor valued all of the lots which contained over 75 feet of water front area at $100,000. The lots which contained less than 75 feet of water front area were valued at approximately $73,000. The Board finds the comparables offered by both parties demonstrate that the township assessor consistently applied this theory of assessment throughout the subject property’s surrounding area. Thus, the appellants failed to establish unequal treatment in the subject property’s land assessment.

The Board notes that the constitutional provision for uniformity of taxation and valuation does not require mathematical equality. The requirement is satisfied if the intent is evident to adjust the burden with a reasonable degree of uniformity and if such is the effect of the statute enacted by the General Assembly establishing the method of assessing real property in its general operation. A practical uniformity, rather than an absolute one, is the test. Apex Motor Fuel Co. v. Barrett, 20 Ill.2d 395 (1960). Although the comparables presented by the appellants disclosed that properties located in the same area are not assessed at identical levels, all that the constitution requires is a practical uniformity which appears to exist on the basis of the evidence.

Therefore, the Board finds the subject property’s assessment as established by the board of review is correct and no reduction is warranted.

The subject property consists of a one story dwelling of frame construction containing 2,136 square feet of living area. Amenities include an attached two car garage, a fireplace, central air conditioning, a boat dock and a pole barn. The subject dwelling is approximately two years old.

The appellant claimed overvaluation as the basis of the appeal. In support of his contention, the appellant submitted evidence indicating the subject dwelling was constructed in 1996 for approximately $113,609. The appellant also noted the subject lot and lot improvements had a market value of $23,220. During the hearing, the appellant indicated he did all of the electrical work, as well as some of the painting. He did not, however, provide a cost estimate for the labor or equipment involved in his painting work or electrical installation. The appellant also noted the construction cost estimate did not include the values for the boat dock or pole barn.

Lastly, the appellant provided a written response to the comparables offered by the board of review. For example, the appellant claimed the board of review’s comparables were not representative of the subject property because of either their size, style of construction, or amount of acreage. The appellant further argued the board of review made several errors on the subject’s property record card. These errors included the wrong number of bedrooms and amount of finished living area, as well as a misclassification of the style of construction. Based on this evidence, the appellant requested a reduction in the subject property’s total assessment.

The board of review submitted its “Board of Review - Notes on Appeals,” wherein the subject property’s total assessment of $52,650 was disclosed. The subject property has an estimated value, as reflected by its assessment and Peoria County’s 1998 three year median level of assessments of 33.27%, of $158,250 or $73.40 per square foot of living area including land. The board of review indicated the subject property’s 1998 replacement cost was $138,680 and its lot value was $23,220 which amounts to a total value of $161,900. In regard to the subject’s property record card, the board of review commented that the errors claimed by the appellant do not have an impact on the subject property’s cost estimate and overall valuation.

The board of review also provided evidence of three suggested comparable sales. These properties consist of two, one story style dwellings and one, one and one half story style dwelling which range in size from 1,640 to 2,050 square feet of living area. The board of review’s comparables were sold between June 1998, and October 1998, for prices ranging from $152,900 to $210,000 or from $74.59 to $128.05 per square foot including land. Based on the evidence contained in the record, the board of review requested confirmation of the subject property’s total assessment.

After hearing the testimony and considering the evidence, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal. The Property Tax Appeal Board finds the appellant sufficiently established overvaluation.

In support of his overvaluation contention, the appellant submitted evidence indicating the subject dwelling was constructed in 1996 for approximately $113,609. The appellant also noted the subject lot and lot improvements had a value of $23,220. In support of its assessment, the board of review provided evidence of three suggested comparable sales. These properties were sold between June 1998, and October 1998, for prices ranging from $152,900 to $210,000 or from $74.59 to $128.05 per square foot including land.

The Property Tax Appeal Board finds the appellant’s construction cost documentation is the most reliable foundation for the subject property’s 1998 market value. The Board, however, finds that these estimations should be increased to account for the appellant’s electrical installation, painting, and for the costs of the pole barn and boat dock.  The Board further finds that one the board of review’s comparable sales is not representative of the subject property, while the remaining comparables established the upper end of the range for the subject property’s market value. Moreover, the Board finds the board of review made several errors on the subject’s property record card. These errors included the wrong number of bathrooms and the listing of a finished recreation room in the basement. After making adjustments to the appellant’s construction cost information and land purchase price, the Board finds the appellant sufficiently established overvaluation.

Therefore, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds the subject property’s assessment as established by the board of review is incorrect and a reduction is warranted.

The subject property consists of a part one story and part two story style single family dwelling of frame and stucco construction containing 6,970 square feet of living area. The dwelling was built in 1991 and amenities include a 750 square foot attached garage, central air conditioning, a full finished basement, a porch, and a fireplace.

The appellant appeared before the Property Tax Appeal Board through his attorney claiming overvaluation. The appellant contends the county erroneously assessed personal property contained in the dwelling as real estate. In support of this argument, the appellant presented testimony, a sales contract, a list of the reported personal property items depicting their cost new, a closing statement regarding the purchase of the subject, and photographs of some of the reported personal property.

The evidence indicates the appellant purchased the subject in June 1998 for $1,050,000. The appellant argued the sale price includes a $16,884 credit for defects to the subject. The credit was used to repair the dwelling’s stucco exterior, air conditioning, plumbing, cabinets, and intercom system. As a result, the appellant argued the actual purchase price for the subject was $1,033,116 after deducting for these repairs.

The appellant also argued the purchase price included personal property items which are not subject to ad valorem taxation. These items include, but are not limited to a security system, a sub-zero freezer, a refrigerator, a range and ventilation hood, two dishwashers, a water conditioner, a computer, an entertainment music system, hand crafted library cabinets, light fixtures (chandeliers), a washer and dryer, office furniture, and an outdoor grill. These items cost new approximately $171,215 in 1998. The appellant testified the security system, intercom, and speakers for the stereo system are hard wired into the dwelling. The appellant testified the library wall units are not attached to the floors or walls, are easily removed, and will be taken with him if the subject was ever sold. He also stated he does not intend to remove or take the security system and intercom if he were to sell the subject property. Based on this evidence, the appellant argued the subject’s assessment should equate to a market value of $861,900.

The appellant also noted the closing statement and Real Estate Transfer Declaration do not identify the personal property or their values. However, the appellant argued the Real Estate Transfer Declaration is not always the most reliable manner in which to determine the value of the subject. He argued it is custom for attorneys at the time of closing not to adjust the contract price for personal property. He contends the lending institution will not proceed with the loan because of the disruption of the loan to value ratio after deducting the values for personal property. No evidence of this claim was presented.

Under cross-examination, the appellant testified the reported personal property items are valued as if new. He testified the original owners bought these items new in 1991. He indicated he called or received estimates of value from businesses on the cost new of these items. The appellant did not depreciate these items, however, a letter submitted indicated they have a conservative life expectancy between 15 and 20 years.

The board of review presented its "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" wherein the subject property’s final assessment of $350,000 was disclosed. The subject’s assessment equates to an estimated market value of $1,053,900 or $151.21 per square foot of living area including land using Lake County’s 1998 three year median level of assessments of 33.21%.

The board’s representative presented the subject’s Real Estate Transfer Declaration and the closing statement offered by the appellant. The board of review argued these documents do not identify any personal property or their suggested values. Furthermore, the board of review argued the appellant did not offer a bill of sale itemizing the reported personal property. Finally, the board of review argued that even though the items claimed to be personal property are not new, the appellant is requesting the Board to deduct their cost new value from the subject’s recent sale price. The board of review argued the cost new values are not supported, nor was there any supported calculations to estimate their depreciated value. Based on this evidence, the board of review contends the appellant’s estimation of value for the items claimed as personal property are unsupported.

In support of the subject’s assessed valuation, the board of review offered three comparable sales located in the subject’s area. They consist of part one story and part two story style dwellings of stucco, frame, or brick and frame construction. They contain between 4,677 and 6,724 square feet of living area and were built between 1983 and 1997. They have similar amenities when compared to the subject property. They sold between April  1993 and September 1997 for prices ranging from $1,113,382 to $2,350,000 or $238.05 to $373.02 per square foot of living area including land. The board of review argued the subject has an estimated market value of $151.21 per square foot of living area including land, as reflected by its assessment, which falls below the range established by the sales comparables. Based on this evidence, the board of review requested confirmation of the subject property’s assessment.

In rebuttal, the appellant reiterated the use of the Real Estate Transfer Declaration to determine the subject’s value is incorrect. He argued it is common practice for attorneys during a closing not to deduct personal property values from the sales contract price. He argued these values are not included in the Real Estate Transfer Declaration so as to not disrupt the loan to value ratio of the lending institution. He argued that establishing an inaccurate value for the subject’s real estate, by not deducting the personal property value, would result in higher taxes for the remainder of the tax cycle.

After hearing the testimony and considering the evidence, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal. The Board further finds a reduction in the subject property’s assessment is warranted based on the subject’s sale price. However, the Board finds the appellant failed to support his claim regarding the deduction for the personal property.

The appellant argued the subject’s assessment is not reflective of its market value based on the contention that the board of review included the value of personal property in its assessment. However, the board of review offered testimony and evidence refuting the appellant’s personal property claim. Upon a review of the evidence, the Board finds the appellant’s contention of personal property is not supported. First, the Board finds the appellant failed to establish a depreciated value for the disputed personal property. The appellant testified these items were originally purchased by the previous owner in 1991. The appellant submitted no evidence to document the depreciated value of the items claimed to be personal property. The cost new of the items in 1998 is not representative of the pre-owned property transferred in the sale of the subject. The appellant submitted a letter indicating the disputed items have an expected life span from 15 to 20 years. However, their is no evidence in the record to support this claim.

The Property Tax Appeal Board further finds the Real Estate Transfer Declaration nor the closing statement identified or allocated any value to account for personal property. The appellant argued this is common practice by attorney’s for loan security. The Board accords this argument little weight. The Real Estate Transfer Declaration is designed to allocate a value for personal property items. Furthermore, the Board finds the sales contract details some personal property. However, the sales contract indicates by bill of sale (emphasis added) these items will be transferred. Again, the appellant did not submit the bill of sale detailing each item and its depreciated value at the time of sale. Thus, the Board finds the alleged values of the claimed  personal property is not supported by substantive documentation. As a result, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds the appellant failed to substantiate a reduction in value for the items  claimed to be personal property.

Notwithstanding the lack of values for the disputed personal property, the Board finds many of the items the appellant contends are personal property are real property. These items include, but are not limited to the intercom, security, and telephone systems. Evidence and testimony revealed these amenities are hard wired and permanently affixed to the dwelling. In addition, the Board finds the $16,884 credit to repair defects is not considered personal property. Testimony revealed the appellant used this credit for repairs to the subject dwelling for items such as cabinets, the stucco exterior, and air conditioning.

The board of review submitted three sales in support of the subject’s valuation. The Board accords one comparable less weight because it is considerably older in age than the subject. In addition, this comparable sold in 1993 which the Board finds dated and not indicative of the market as of the January 1, 1998 assessment date. The two remaining sales are found to be most similar to the subject in terms of age, size, style, construction, and amenities. These properties sold for prices of $238.05 and $373.02 per square foot of living area including land. The Board finds the sales presented by the board of review fully support the subject’s recent sale price. Therefore, the Board finds the best evidence of the subject’s value is its recorded sale price of $1,050,000 in 1998. Since fair market value has been established, the 1998 three year median level of assessments for Lake County of 33.21% shall apply.

The subject property consists of a one story style dwelling of brick construction containing approximately 928 square feet of living area. Amenities include a fireplace and a three car garage.

The appellants claimed both overvaluation and unequal treatment in the assessment process as the bases of the appeal. In support of these arguments, the appellants submitted a spreadsheet detailing three suggested comparable properties. Based on this evidence, the appellants requested a reduction in the subject's total assessment.

The board of review submitted its “Board of Review - Notes on Appeals,” wherein the subject property’s total assessment of $45,370 was disclosed. In support of its assessment, the board of review offered a spreadsheet detailing three suggested comparable properties. Based on this evidence, the board of review requested confirmation of the subject property’s assessment.

After reviewing the record and considering the evidence, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it does not have jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal. There are three traditional ways for an appellant to file a petition with the Property Tax Appeal Board. These methods of appeal are located in Sections 12-50 and 16-185 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/12-50 and 35 ILCS 200/16-185).

Section 12-50 of the Property Tax Code provides that petitions for appeal shall be filed with the Property Tax Appeal Board within 30 days after the notice of a final board of review decision is mailed to the appealing party or agent. A final decision may take two distinct forms. A final decision may be generated from a board of review appeal and subsequent decision or from a notice that an equalization factor has been applied to the taxpayer’s property by the board of review. Thus, based on the aforementioned statute, a party can file a petition with the Property Tax Appeal Board within 30 days after the notice of a final decision stemming from a board of review appeal or from an equalization factor.

The Property Tax Appeal Board finds the record is absent of any evidence indicating the appellants filed their appeal following a final decision from the DuPage County Board of Review. In addition, there is no documentation showing the appellants filed the appeal after the notification of an equalization factor. Thus, the Board finds the appellants did not file their appeal in accordance with Section 12-50 of the Property Tax Code and jurisdiction cannot be granted based on this statute.

After an analysis of the record, it appears the appellants attempted to file their appeal based on Section 16-185 of the Property Tax Code. Section 16-185 is the third method for the filing of an appeal before the Property Tax Appeal Board. This section provides in part:

If the Property Tax Appeal Board renders a decision lowering the assessment (emphasis added) of a particular parcel after the deadline for filing complaints with the board of review or board of appeals or after adjournment of the session of the board of review or board of appeals at which assessments for the subsequent year are being considered, the taxpayer may, within 30 days after the date of written notice of the Property Tax Appeal Board’s decision, appeal the assessment for the subsequent year directly to the Property Tax Appeal Board.

Here, the evidence reveals the Property Tax Appeal issued a final decision dated May 27, 1998, concerning the subject property and its 1996 assessment. The appellants then filed an appeal with the Property Tax Appeal Board within 30 days of the date of this decision. The Property Tax Appeal Board finds the aforementioned statute does not grant jurisdiction to the Board for the appellants’ 1997 assessment year filing because the Board’s previous year’s decision was an increase in assessment and not a reduction as required by Section 16-185 of the Property Tax Code.

In conclusion, the appellants failed to either file a petition within 30 days of a board of review final decision or equalization factor as required by Section 12-50 of the Property Tax Code. Even though the appellants filed their appeal within 30 days of a previous year’s Property Tax Appeal Board decision after the deadline for filing complaints with the board of review, the Board finds that it does not have jurisdiction because the previous year’s decision was an increase in assessment and not a reduction in assessment. Therefore, the Board finds it does not have jurisdiction over the appeal.

The subject property consists of a one story style dwelling of brick construction containing 1,472 square feet of living area. Amenities include central air conditioning and a detached garage. The subject dwelling is approximately 27 years old.

The appellant claimed overvaluation as the basis of the appeal. In support of his contention, the appellant submitted evidence indicating the subject property was purchased for $80,000 in May 1997. The appellant indicated he discovered the subject dwelling was for sale through a bank as part of an estate. The subject property was not advertised for sale on the open market. The appellant also stated it was hard to find comparables which could be used that are representative of the subject property’s market value. Based on this evidence, the appellant requested a reduction in the subject property’s total assessment.

The board of review submitted its “Board of Review - Notes on Appeals,” wherein the subject property’s total assessment of $38,360 was disclosed. The subject property has an estimated value, as reflected by its assessment and Fulton County’s 1998 three year median level of assessments of 33.77%, of $113,592. In support of its assessment, the board of review offered evidence of approximately 37 equity comparables. The board of review provided detailed descriptions of these properties as well as their improvement assessment information. The board of review, however, failed to submit any market value or sales information regarding these properties. The board of review also argued the recent purchase price of the subject property was not indicative of its true market value because it was not an arm’s length transaction. Furthermore, it claimed that executor’s deeds are not generally recognized as arm’s length transactions. Based on the evidence contained in the record, the board of review requested confirmation of the subject property’s total assessment.

After hearing the testimony and considering the evidence, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal. The Property Tax Appeal Board finds the appellant sufficiently established overvaluation.

In support of his overvaluation contention, the appellant submitted evidence indicating the subject property was purchased for $80,000 in May 1998. The Property Tax Appeal Board finds the evidence of the subject property’s sale is the best and only market value evidence contained in the record. The subject property’s market value, as reflected by its assessment, of $113,592 is substantially higher than the subject property’s recent sale price. The board of review failed to address the appellant’s market value evidence when it submitted equity comparables. In addition, the board of review failed to offer any market value evidence showing the sale of the subject property was not indicative of its true market value. The Property Tax Appeal Board finds the board of review’s contention that the sale price should automatically be discounted because it was transferred through an executor’s deed is without merit. Based on the evidence contained in the record, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds the appellant sufficiently established overvaluation.

Therefore, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds the subject property’s assessment as established by the board of review is incorrect and a reduction is warranted. Since market value has been established, Fulton County’s 1998 three year median level of assessments of 33.77% shall apply.

The subject property consists of a part one and part two story, brick and frame dwelling containing 4,452 square feet of living area situated on a one acre homesite.  The dwelling, when originally constructed in 1950, was a one story ranch with a garage attached to a one story breezeway.  In 1994 and 1995 the breezeway was converted into living area and a second story addition was placed over a good portion of the dwelling.  The subject dwelling, the one acre homesite and an additional 6.5 acres were purchased by the appellant in February 1994 for $450,000.  The additional 6.5 acres are assessed separately under a different parcel number and are not part of the instant appeal.

The appellant appeared before the Property Tax Appeal Board claiming the subject’s market value was not accurately reflected in its assessed valuation.  The appellant was in agreement with the assessment assigned to the subject’s one acre homesite of $20,440 which relates to a market value of approximately $60,000 per acre.  He stated that a price per acre of $60,000 is supported by the subject’s February 1994 sale price of $450,000 or $60,000 per acre for the 7.5 acres.  He attributed little to no value to the subject residence at the time of purchase.  He stated the subject dwelling was purchased in “as is” condition and that subsequently he has spent $225,000 in renovation and construction costs.  A list of repairs and additions to the house was submitted and marked as Appellant’s Exhibit One.  The appellant was of the opinion that an improvement assessment of $58,810 would be appropriate for the subject property.  He stated the township assessor assessed the new addition at $33,810 and that $25,000 should be assessed to the original portion of the dwelling.  The $25,000 was developed by multiplying a price per acre of $50,000 by the 7.5 acres and subtracting the difference from the February 1994 sale price of $450,000.

The appellant also claims the subject property suffers from external obsolescence due to the increased traffic caused by the opening of a new high school and other factors. 

The appellant called the deputy township assessor as a witness to explain his assessment procedures.  The appellant questioned why the subject’s assessment and resulting market value changed from 1996 to 1997 and why the assessor uses different comparables in his comparison grid analyses from year to year.  The deputy assessor stated that the comparables used in the grid analyses change from year to year because of new sales and updating the analyses.  He stated that he uses sales that have occurred within three years of the date of assessment.  The assessor’s evidence disclosed the subject’s assessment changed from 1996 to 1997 due to the fact that in 1996 it received a partial assessment for the new addition.  A full assessment was placed on the subject improvement for 1997, less the $10,000 home improvement exemption.  The subject’s land value was adjusted after a calculation error was discovered in the 1996 land assessment.

The appellant was of the opinion the values calculated for the subject property and the comparables used by the board of review were fraudulent and cited In re Application of the County Treasurer and Ex Officio County Collector of Cook County, 131 Ill.2d 541, 137 Ill.Dec. 561 (1989).  The appellant was of the opinion that the subject’s sale price should be used in establishing the value of the subject property and requested relief in the subject property’s assessment.

The board of review submitted "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" wherein the subject’s assessment totaling $112,640 was disclosed.  The subject’s assessment without the homestead improvement exemption totaled $123,610 and reflected a market value of $371,201 or $83.37 per square foot using the county’s three year median level of assessments for 1997 of 33.30%.  In support of the subject property’s assessment the board of review submitted a grid analysis in which assessment data, market data and descriptions were detailed on nine suggested comparable properties and the subject property.  The comparables were either one and one half story dwellings or two story dwellings that ranged in size from 2,298 to 5,047 square feet.  The properties were constructed from 1870 to 1965.  Several of the older properties were renovated from 1983 to 1996.  The comparable dwellings are situated on sites ranging in size from .45 to 5.61 acres.  These properties had improvement assessments ranging from $79,110 to $134,970 or from $24.78 to $36.58 per square foot.  The subject property had an improvement assessment of $123,610 or $27.77 per square foot prior to the homestead improvement exemption.  These same nine properties sold for prices ranging from $230,000 to $490,000 or from $68.36 to $123.82 per square foot and the transactions occurred from April 1994 to July 1997.  The board’s evidence indicated that the property that sold for $68.36 per square foot was a foreclosure sale.  Based on this data, the board of review requested confirmation of the subject property’s assessment.

After hearing the testimony and reviewing the record, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal.  The Board further finds that the evidence does not support a reduction in the subject property’s assessment.  Initially, the Property Tax Appeal Board places no weight on the appellant’s fraudulent assessment issue.  Under the concept of a de novo review, the Property Tax Appeal Board does not presume the assessment established by the local board of review to be correct.  Western Illinois Power Cooperative, Inc. v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 29 Ill.App.3d 16, 331 N.E.2d 286 (1975).  Therefore, the burden of proof in Board proceedings is generally a simple preponderance of the evidence.  However, courts have ruled that when equity of assessments is at issue, the appealing party must establish the lack of uniformity by clear and convincing evidence.  Kankakee County Board of Review v.  Property Tax Appeal Board, 131 Ill.2d 1 (1989).  The Board has enunciated these separate burdens of proof in Rule 1910.63(e):

When market value is the basis of the appeal, the value of the subject property must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.  When unequal treatment in the assessment process is the basis of the appeal, the inequity of the assessments must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.

The Board’s rule 1910.65(a) states: 

The Property Tax Appeal Board generally considers appeals with respect to the correct valuation of property for assessment purposes based upon the following contentions:

1)  the subject is not accurately assessed when its assessment is compared to the assessments of other, similar properties in its neighborhood; and/or

2)  the market value of the subject property is not accurately reflected in its assessment.

In this appeal, the appellant claimed the market value of the subject property was not accurately reflected in its assessment.  The appellant maintained that the 1994 sale price of the subject property should be used in establishing its valuation for the January 1, 1997, assessment date.  The Board finds that the sale price is not relevant in establishing the subject’s 1997 assessed valuation for the following reasons:  1)  The sale occurred three years prior to the assessment date and is too far removed from the assessment date to provide an accurate indication of value.  2)  Since the date of purchase of the subject property at least $225,000 has been spent on the dwelling, including a second story addition.

The board of review has the subject dwelling and the one acre homesite valued at $371,201 or $83.37 per square foot prior to the homestead improvement exemption.  The Board finds that this valuation was well supported by the market data submitted by the board of review.  The board of review submitted nine suggested comparable sales.  These properties sold for prices ranging from $68.36 per square foot to $123.82 per square foot.  The evidence indicated the property that sold at the low end of the range was a foreclosure sale.  Eliminating this property from the analysis results in a range of sales prices from $92.34 to $123.82 per square foot.  The subject’s valuation of $83.37 per square foot is below this range.  A review of the assessments assigned to these properties revealed the subject’s improvement assessment was at the low end of the range established by these same properties. 

The appellant also claimed that the subject property suffers from external obsolescence which results in an overvaluation of the property.  However, market data or an appraisal establishing a market value different from that established by the board of review was not submitted into the record.  Thus, the record is lacking documentary evidence provided by the appellant to support the overvaluation contention.  As stated above, the subject’s assessment was well supported by the comparable data submitted by the board of review.  Therefore, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that the appellant did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject property was overvalued.  Thus, the Board finds that the subject’s assessment as established by the board of review is correct and no reduction is warranted.

The subject properties consist of 22 parcels located in McHenry County, Illinois.

The appellant appeared before the Property Tax Appeal Board through its attorney and claimed overvaluation as the basis of the appeal. The appellant claimed the board of review incorrectly assessed the subject parcels and should have granted them the preferential treatment or assessment allowed under Section 10-30 of the Property Tax Code. (35 ILCS 200/10-30). The appellant explained that the subject parcels were originally part of a 50 acre site which was platted in accordance with the Plat Act. The platting of the original 50 acre site also satisfied all of the requirements set forth in Section 10-30 of the Property Tax Code.

The subject parcels were subsequently part of a separate platting which was recorded with the county. The parcels were developed as a phase of a larger subdivision. This tract containing the subject parcels, which was platted and recorded, was less than 10 acres. The appellant argued the subject parcels should have received the preferential treatment under Section 10-30 of the Property Tax Code and should not be denied the preferential assessment because the subdivision was developed in phases which, taken individually, were less than 10 acres.

In support of this contention, the appellant provided a legal memorandum detailing its argument. The appellant’s memorandum cited Section 10-30 of the Property Tax Code and outlined the reasons why the subject parcels’ assessments should be calculated in accordance with the statute’s prescribed methodology. (35 ILCS 200/10-30). The appellant claimed the subject parcels meet the requirements established in Section 10-30 because of the following: (1) the subject parcels were platted and subdivided in accordance with the Plat Act; (2) the platting occurred after January 1, 1978; (3) at the time of the original platting, the subject parcels were part of a tract which contained over 10 acres; and (4) at the time of platting the subject parcels were vacant or used as a farm as defined in Section 1-60 of the Property Tax Code. (35 ILCS 200/1-60). The appellant then argued that Section 10-30(a)(3) of the Property Tax Code does not require that the final plat, which is recorded, be in excess of 10 acres. Moreover, it claimed there is no such recording requirement contained within the statute, but rather only a platting requirement which was satisfied by the original platting of the 50 acre tract.

The appellant also noted the board of review had previously granted the preferential treatment under Section 10-30 of the Property Tax Code to developers of two separate phases of another subdivision. The preferential treatment was granted even though the two phases of the subdivision, when recorded, were both under 10 acres. Lastly, the appellant explained that one of the subject parcels also contains a model home. The appellant claimed that it timely filed a proper application with the county for a model home exemption, however, the county never received the application and the exemption was therefore denied. To support its contention that the application was filed, the appellant included a signed affidavit stating that the application was timely filed and confirming the fact the model home qualifies for the exemption and is used as a model home.

Based on the evidence contained in the record, the appellant requested the Property Tax Appeal Board lower the subject parcels’ land assessments to reflect assessments based on Section 10-30 of the Property Tax Code. In addition, the appellant requested the Board grant the model home exemption which was timely applied for by the appellant, but which was allegedly not received by the county.

The board of review submitted its “Board of Review Notes on Appeals,” wherein the subject parcels’ assessments were disclosed. In support of its assessments, the board of review also provided a copy of Section 10-30 of the Property Tax Code and an explanation of its assessment methodology concerning the subject parcels. The board of review explained that lots or parcels are not assessed until they have been actually recorded. Thus, if the subject parcels were not platted and recorded as a 10 acre tract, they should not receive the preferential treatment contained in Section 10-30 of the Property Tax Code. (35 ILCS 200/10-30). In support of this interpretation, the board of review provided a copy of an Illinois Appellate Court decision.

In Grundy County National Bank v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 297 Ill.App.3d 774 (3rd Dist. 1998), the appellate court addressed the issue of whether the Property Tax Appeal Board correctly interpreted the platting requirement contained in Section 10-30 of the Property Tax Code. In the Grundy case, the Property Tax Appeal Board determined that in order to properly comply with the Plat Act and, therefore qualify for a preferential treatment under Section 10-30 of the Property Tax Code, the initial platting must be recorded with the county in which the land is situated. The appellate court upheld the Property Tax Appeal Board’s decision and held that:

...Section 20g-4 (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1991, Ch. 120, par. 501g-4, now codified at 35 ILCS 200/10-30) specifically requires the platting to be done in conformity with the Plat Act which provides, inter alia: “The statement of the Registered Land Surveyor and of acknowledgment, together with the plat, must be recorded...in the recorder’s office of the county in which the land is situated...” Ill.Rev.Stat. 1991, ch. 109, par.2. (Now codified at 765 ILCS 205/0.01 et.seq.)

In the instant case, the preliminary plat was submitted to the village for approval but was not recorded in the recorder’s office. Therefore, the plain language of section 20g-4(a)(1) and Section 2 of the Plat Act compel us to agree with the PTAB’s determination that the only time the subject lots were platted and subdivided in conformity with Section 2 of the Plat Act was when the final plats in which they were located were recorded. Id.

Based on the aforementioned case, the board of review requested confirmation of the subject properties’ land assessments. In response to the appellant’s assertion its model home, which is located on one of the subject parcels, should receive the statutory exemption, the board of review claimed that no application was received from the appellant and no exemption was subsequently granted. Therefore, the board of review requested confirmation of the subject parcel’s improvement assessment.

After hearing the testimony and considering the evidence, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal. The Property Tax Appeal Board further finds that no reductions are warranted. The primary issue involved in the subject appeal is whether the preferential treatment or assessment available under Section 10-30 of the Property Tax Code applies to the subject parcels. More specifically, the issue is whether the 10 acre size requirement of Section 10-30 of the Property Tax Code should be determined by the original platting of the tract of land or if it should be determined by the platting and actual recording of a tract of land.

The Property Tax Appeal Board finds the board of review properly denied the subject parcels the preferential treatment or assessment offered by Section 10-30 of the Property Tax Code. (35 ILCS 200/10-30). Clearly, the subject parcels, which were the subject of a subsequent platting and recording for a phase of a larger subdivision, did not contain the ten acres required by Section 10-30(a)(3) of the Property Tax Code. In fact, the appellant did not refute the fact the subject parcels and their phase of development failed to meet the 10 acre requirement. The Board also finds the appellant’s contention that the initial platting of the 50 acre tract which included the subject parcels was sufficient to satisfy the 10 acre requirement of Section 10-30(a)(3) of the Property Tax Code, is without merit.

The Board finds Grundy County National Bank v. Property Tax Appeal Board is similar to the subject appeal and is controlling. In Grundy, a developer claimed that his preliminary platting of a 18.96 acre tract was sufficient to satisfy the 10 acre requirement. However, as in the subject appeal, the developer failed to actually record the initial platting, but subsequently platted and recorded a smaller area of the original tract for development which was less than 10 acres. The appellate court held that the Plat Act (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1991, ch. 109, par.2, now codified at 765 ILCS 205/0.01 et.seq.),  required a platting and recording with the county in which the land is situated. Grundy County National Bank v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 297 Ill.App.3d 774 (3rd Dist. 1998).  Therefore, the Board finds in the subject appeal, since the tract containing the subject parcels which was platted and recorded with McHenry County was not in excess of 10 acres, the board of review properly denied the appellant the preferential treatment offered by Section 10-30 of the Property Tax Code. The original platting of the 50 acre tract was not sufficient because it was never recorded with the county.

The appellant further claimed unequal treatment in the board of review’s application of the Section 10-30 preferential assessment. In its legal memorandum and during the hearing, the appellant noted the board of review had previously granted the preferential assessment provided by Section 10-30 of the Property Tax Code for neighboring properties which had phases of development under 10 acres. The Property Tax Appeal Board finds the appellant failed to offer any documentary evidence supporting this contention and, therefore it failed to prove unequal treatment in the assessment process. Notwithstanding its failure to produce evidence in support of the unequal treatment argument, the Board finds the board of review properly assessed the subject parcels pursuant to state statute and correctly denied the preferential assessment.

The appellant also claimed the board of review incorrectly denied a model home exemption for a model home located on one of the subject parcels. The appellant claimed a timely application was filed with the county for the exemption, however, the board of review argued the application was never received. The Property Tax Appeal Board finds that Section 10-25 of the Property Tax Code provides in part:

The person liable for taxes on property eligible for assessment as provided in this Section shall file a verified application with the chief county assessment officer on or before January 31 of each assessment year for which that assessment is desired. Failure to make a timely filing in any assessment year constitutes a waiver of the right to benefit for that assessment year. (35 ILCS 200/10-25).

The Board finds the appellant failed to submit sufficient documentation to support their contention that a timely application was filed with the county. Thus, based on the language contained in the statute, the Board finds the appellant waived its right to the benefit of the statute.

In conclusion, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds the subject properties’ assessments as established by the board of review are correct and no reductions are warranted.

The subject property consists of a 4,688 square foot parcel containing two improvements.  The first improvement is a 95 year old, two-story, frame dwelling containing 1,582 square feet of living area.  The second improvement is a 69 year old, two-story, frame and masonry dwelling containing 800 square feet of living area.  The appellant contends unequal treatment in the assessment process of the subject’s two improvements as the basis of this appeal.

In support of the appellant’s equity argument, photographs and property index numbers were submitted on six properties.  However, the appellant failed to provide assessment and descriptive data regarding these properties.  At hearing, the board of review’s representative was requested to furnish copies of the property characteristic printouts for the appellant’s suggested comparables.

Printouts were submitted on five of the six aforementioned properties.  Upon review of the printouts, the evidence indicated that the five properties contained frame, multi-family dwellings that were either 1.5 to 1.9 story or two-story buildings.  The printouts indicated that each property had been improved with only one building that ranged in age from 89 to 104 years.  These improvements ranged in size from 1,200 to 2,795 square feet of living area.  The improvement assessments ranged from $2,397 to $10,469, or from $.86 to $8.50 per square foot of living area.

At hearing, the appellant testified that the subject property is in average condition because she has not rehabilitated the buildings.  Logistically, she explained that the initial building has two units and is located in the front of the subject parcel, whereas the coach house is located in the back of the subject parcel.  She testified that the limited data accumulated on her suggested comparables was obtained from the newspapers.  She also testified that she took the photographs of the suggested comparables and that these buildings would appear in the same form on the January 1, 1997 assessment date.  Lastly, the appellant testified that her suggested comparables are all located within four blocks of the subject.  On the basis of this analysis, the appellant requested a reduced assessment for the subject’s two improvements.

The board of review submitted "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" wherein the subject's final assessment of $13,406 was disclosed.  Due to clerical errors, this final assessment should represent a total improvement assessment of $10,106.  The first improvement’s assessment is actually $5,737, or $3.63 per square foot, while the second improvement’s assessment is actually $4,369, or $5.46 per square foot pursuant to the property characteristic printouts.

In addition, assessment data and descriptions on four properties were presented for each of the subject’s two improvements.  As to the first improvement, four suggested comparables located within four blocks of the subject were submitted.  These properties contained two-story, frame dwellings that ranged in age from 84 to 94 years.  The improvements ranged in size from 1,360 to 1,717 square feet of living area.  The improvement assessments ranged from $10,589 to $12,285, or from $7.05 to $8.20 per square foot.

As to the second improvement which contains 800 square feet, four suggested comparables located within two blocks of the subject were submitted.  These properties contained two-story, frame dwellings that ranged in age from 89 to 91 years.  The improvements ranged in size from 1,064 to 1,324 square feet.  The improvement assessments ranged from $9,771 to $10,734, or from $7.64 to $9.18 per square foot.

At hearing, the board’s representative testified that each of the four suggested comparables for the subject’s first improvement contained two improvements on each parcel.  However, the second improvement on each parcel was not included in the board’s evidence.  Moreover, for the subject’s second improvement, the four suggested comparables submitted by the board of review are the only improvement located on their respective parcels.  As a result of its analysis, the board requested confirmation of the subject’s assessment.

In rebuttal, the appellant stated that three of the board’s suggested comparables for the first improvement are located on a commercial avenue, Montrose, and should not be compared to her property located on a residential street.  As to the board’s suggested comparables for the second improvement, the appellant testified that these properties are located on residential streets, but that each parcel contains only one single family dwelling.

After hearing the testimony and considering the evidence, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal.

Taxpayers who object to an assessment on the basis of lack of uniformity bear the burden of proving the disparity of assessment valuations by clear and convincing evidence.  Kankakee County Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 131 Ill. 2d 1, 544 N.E.2d 762 (1989).  The evidence must demonstrate a consistent pattern of assessment inequities within in the assessment jurisdiction.  Proof of assessment inequity should include assessment data and documentation establishing the physical, locational, and jurisdictional similarities of the suggested comparables to the subject property.  Property Tax Appeal Board Rule 1910.65(b).  Mathematical equality in the assessment process is not required.  A practical uniformity, rather than an absolute one is the test.  Apex Motor Fuel Co. v. Barrett, 20 Ill. 2d  395, 169 N.E.2d 769 (1960).

Having considered the equity evidence and testimony presented, the Board finds that the appellant has failed to meet this burden  and that no reduction is warranted to the subject’s improvement assessments.

As to the appellant’s first improvement containing 1,582 square feet, the Property Tax Appeal Board accords little weight to the appellant’s comparables #3 and #4 due to the difference in improvement size.  The Board finds that the appellant’s comparables #1, #2, and #6 as well as the board’s four comparables are most similar to this subject.  The seven comparables contain frame dwellings of either 1.5 to 1.9 stories or two-story buildings that ranged in age from 84 to 104 years.  The improvements ranged in size from 1,360 to 1,717 square feet with improvement assessments that ranged from $10,167 to $12,285, or from $6.29 to $8.20 per square foot.

In comparison, the subject’s first improvement contained a 95 year old, two-story, frame dwelling with 1,582 square feet.  This subject’s improvement assessment is $5,737, or $3.63 per square foot which is below the range established by the parties’ comparables.

As to the appellant’s second improvement containing 800 square feet, the Property Tax Appeal Board accords little weight to the appellant’s five comparables.  These comparables are not as similar to the subject due to their difference in improvement size.

The Board finds that the board of review’s four comparables are most similar to this subject property.  These four comparables are located within two blocks of the subject.  They contained two-story, frame dwellings that ranged in age from 89 to 91 years.  These improvements ranged in size from 1,064 to 1,324 square feet.  The improvement assessments ranged from $9,771 to $10,734, or from $7.64 to $9.18 per square foot.

In comparison, this subject improvement contains a 69 year old, two-story, frame and masonry dwelling that contains 800 square feet of living area.  This subject’s improvement assessment is $4,369, or $5.46 per square foot which is below the range established by the comparables.

Therefore, based on a review of the equity comparables, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that the appellant has not supported the contention of unequal treatment in the assessment process and that a reduction in the assessment of the subject’s improvements is not warranted.

The subject property consists of a 15 foot by 185 foot lot improved with a one story, brick dwelling containing 2,428 square feet.  Construction of the dwelling was completed in October 1996.

The appellant and his attorney appeared before the Property Tax Appeal Board claiming the Will County Board of Review erroneously assessed the subject improvement as omitted property for the 1997 assessment year.  The appellant received a notice from the board of review on January 21, 1999, for the 1998 assessment year in which the subject’s improvement assessment was changed from zero to $60,381.  An instant assessment of $60,381 for the 1997 assessment year was also added to the 1998 assessment.  The land assessment remained unchanged at $15,000.  The appellant’s attorney argued the appellant has owned the property since 1995 and it was assessed as improved from 1995 to 1998.  He argued a certificate of occupancy was filed with the county but was not forwarded to the township assessor’s office.

The appellant stated the construction of the subject improvement was started in March 1996 and was completed October 1996.  He stated an occupancy permit was given to him by the county.  He stated that he assumed the improvement would have been put on the tax roles once he obtained a building permit. He did not file a notice with the board of review indicating a dwelling had been constructed.  He stated that a conversation with the township assessor revealed that the county did not forward the building permit to the assessor’s office.  A construction agreement and the contractor’s statement were submitted showing a cost of $178,850 on April 1, 1996, for construction of the subject property.  A closing statement dated May 1, 1995, was submitted showing a sale price of $44,000 for the subject lot.  An appraisal report was also submitted in which the subject’s market value was estimated to be $236,000 as of April 24, 1998.  The appellant indicated on the petition that he was requesting a total assessment of $15,000 for the subject property, the same as in the prior year.

The board of review submitted "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" wherein the subject’s assessment totaling $75,381 was disclosed.  An instant assessment of $60,381 was also assigned to the subject property.  The subject’s total assessment without the inclusion of the instant assessment reflects a market value of $227,257 using the county’s three year median level of assessments for 1998 of 33.17%.  The deputy supervisor of assessments was present and testified the instant assessment was added because the construction of the subject property was completed in 1996.  The instant assessment was the assessment that should have been assigned the subject property in 1997 for the improvement.  She explained the City of Joliet sends occupancy permits to the township assessor’s offices.  The supervisor of assessments was present and testified that the occupancy permits serve as notification the construction of improvements has been completed.

After hearing the testimony and reviewing the record, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal.  The Board further finds the appellant has failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove the subject improvement had been assessed in 1997 and therefore should not be assessed as omitted property for that year.  The assessment notice submitted by the appellant indicates that only the land was assessed prior to the 1998 assessment year.  The appellant testified the subject dwelling was completed in October 1996.  The thrust of the appellant’s argument is the issuance of the occupancy permit in September 1996 and the failure of the issuing body to notify the township assessor’s office of the new construction.

Section 9-265 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/9-265), states in pertinent part that:

“If any property is omitted in the assessment of any year or years, so that the taxes, for which the property was liable, have not been paid, or if by reason of defective description or assessment, taxes on any property for any year or years have not been paid, or if any taxes are refunded under subsection (b) of Section 14-5 because the taxes were assessed in the wrong person’s name, the property, when discovered, shall be listed and assessed by the board of review...For purposes of this Section, “defective description or assessment” includes a description or assessment which omits all the improvements thereon as a result of which part of the taxes on the total value of the property as improved remain unpaid...All such property shall be placed on the assessment and tax books.”

Section 9-270 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/9-270), states in pertinent part that:

“No charge for tax of previous years, as provided in Section 9-265, shall be made against any property if (a) the property was last assessed as unimproved, (b) the owner of the property gave notice of subsequent improvement and requested a reassessment as required by Section 9-180, and (c) reassessment was not made within the 16 month period immediately following the receipt of that notice...”

Section 9-180 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/9-180), states in pertinent part that:

“The owner of the improved property shall notify the assessor, within 30 days of completion of the improvements, on a form prescribed by that official, and request that the property be reassessed.  The notice shall be sent by certified mail, return receipt requested and shall include the legal description of the property.”

The Board finds these Sections of the Code indicate that if the property description or assessment omits all improvements on the property, the property is considered omitted property and can be reassessed for those years the property was omitted.  The Code allows an exemption from payment where the owner submits by certified mail, a request for reassessment of the property and one is not made within 16 months of that request.

The Board finds the subject’s improvement was not listed on any county records or assessment notices until January 21, 1999, for the 1998 assessment year.  The notice clearly indicated that prior to the notice the subject property had only a land assessment of $15,000.  The appellant did not question the omission of an improvement assessment for the 1997 assessment year and testified that he did not notify the county by certified mail of a request to have the improvement assessed.

Based upon this analysis, the Board finds the appellant has failed to show the subject improvement was assessed for the 1997 assessment year, even though the construction was fully completed by October 1996.  Therefore, the Board finds the subject property to be omitted property for the 1997 assessment year and the instant assessment placed on the property for the 1998 assessment year by the board of review was appropriate.  The value placed on the subject property by the board of review was less than the value reflected in the subject’s recent appraisal report as provided in the record by the appellant.  Therefore, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds the assessment as established by the board of review is correct and no reduction is warranted.

The subject property consists of a one story, frame dwelling containing 2,113 square feet.  The dwelling is eight and one-half years of age and has an attached, two car garage.  The appellant contends overvaluation and unequal treatment in the assessment process as the bases of the appeal.

In support of these contentions, the appellant submitted descriptions, listing data and assessments on four suggested comparable properties.  Comparables one and two were located within two blocks of the subject property.  Comparables three and four were located from two and one-half miles to three miles from the subject property.  All four comparables were two story dwellings and three were from three to nine years of age.  The appellant did not know the age of comparable four.  These properties ranged in size from 2,400 to 2,700 square feet and had improvement assessments ranging from $45,134 to $56,198 or from $17.88 to $23.42 per square foot.  The subject improvement was assessed at $52,140 or $24.67 per square foot.  The listing prices for the four suggested comparable properties ranged from $176,500 to $188,000 or from $69.04 to $77.04 per square foot.  Two of the properties were listed for sale in 1998 and two were listed for sale in 1999.  The appellant did not disclose if these properties had sold.  Based on this data, the appellant requested a reduction in the subject’s total assessment from $63,852 to $54,000.

The board of review submitted "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" wherein the subject’s assessment totaling $63,852 was disclosed.  The subject’s assessment reflects a market value totaling $192,615 or $91.16 per square foot using the county’s three year median level of assessments for 1998 of 33.15%.  The board of review noted the appellant’s four comparables are two story dwellings, while the subject was a one story dwelling.  No further evidence was submitted by the board of review.

After considering the evidence and reviewing the record, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal.  The Board further finds that a reduction in the subject’s assessment was not supported by the data contained in the record.  The comparable properties used for comparison with the subject property were different in construction style from the subject property.  The Property Tax Appeal Board’s residential appeal form states that the comparable sales utilized by the appellant under Section V should be similar to the subject property in design, age, amenities, and location.  On page 146 of the Property Assessment Valuation published by the International Association of Assessing Officers (1996), it states:

“Structure costs often vary with story height.  For example, a two-story residence ordinarily costs less per square foot of living area to construct than a one-story residence because the cost of the roof and foundation is spread over a larger living area.”

In this case, the appellant did not submit evidence showing that two story residences and one story residences sell for about the same price per square foot. 

Considering the fact the appellant’s comparables were of a different construction style than the subject, two were not similar in location to the subject property, none had sold and two were not advertised until 1999, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that the appellant has not supported his overvaluation contention by a preponderance of the evidence for the 1998 assessment year under appeal.  The Board also finds that the appellant has not supported his equity contention by clear and convincing evidence based on the difference in construction style between the subject property and the four suggested comparable properties as well as the difference in location of two of the comparable properties.  Therefore, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that that a reduction in the subject’s assessment is not warranted and sustains the assessment as assigned by the board of review.

The subject property consists of a one story, masonry dwelling constructed in 1954. 

The first issue to be resolved is the square feet of living area contained in the subject property.  The appellant claimed that his property contained approximately 1,580 square feet of living area.  As evidence of this claim he submitted a spotted survey which contained the outside building dimensions.  However, the survey did not delineate the attached garage area.  The appellant testified that the garage extends to the full depth of the building and is approximately 10 or 11 feet wide.  The board of review asserts that the subject contains 1,633 square feet which is supported by a printout of the property’s characteristics.  The Board finds that the survey is the best evidence of the improvement’s square footage of living space and supports the board’s estimate of square feet of living area.  The appellant testified that the garage was 10 or 11 feet wide or about 280 square feet.  The total area of the building is 1,926 square feet and minus the garage area, results in a living area of 1,646 which is approximately the area indicated by the board.  Therefore, for the purposes of this appeal, the Board finds that the subject contains 1,633 square feet of living area. 

The appellant appeared before the Property Tax Appeal Board and claimed the subject’s assessment is excessive when compared to the assessments of similar homes with superior locations.  The appellant claimed that his street, La Crosse Street, is located between Cicero Avenue and the Edens Expressway, and thus has a lower value than similar homes two and three blocks to the east and west of the subject.  The appellant testified that his lot abuts the expressway.  The appellant’s comparables were all located two to three blocks from the subject’s expressway location.  In support of his claim, the appellant presented evidence of assessment data on three, one story and one and one half story, masonry or masonry and frame dwellings with photographs of each comparable property.  The comparables suggested by the appellant were built between 1930 and 1950 and contain between 1,594 and 2,200 square feet of living area.  Their improvement assessments ranged from $18,843 to $25,866, or from $8.84 to $10.42 per square foot of living area, while the subject improvement was assessed at $16,552, or $10.14 per square foot.  The appellant claimed that similar homes, such as his comparables, located two or three blocks away from the expressway, contain the same or lower assessments than the subject.  The appellant withdrew his land assessment argument.  On the basis of these comparisons, the appellant felt that a total assessment of $18,861 was appropriate.

The board of review submitted "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" wherein the subject's final assessment of $25,153 was disclosed.  In addition, assessment data and descriptions on the subject and four comparables was offered by the board.  The comparables suggested by the board were of masonry construction and are located on the same street as the subject.  They were built between 1953 and 1956 and contain between 1,021 and 1,497 square feet of living area.  Their improvement assessments ranged from $13,178 to $17,512, or from $11.70 to $13.08 per square foot of living area.  On the basis of these comparisons, the board requested confirmation of the subject’s assessment.

In rebuttal, the appellant argued that all the homes on his street are less valuable than similar homes two blocks distant from the expressway and Cicero Avenue.  He argued that the board’s comparables located on the subject’s street suffer the same poor location as the subject and that the board’s comparables support the appellant’s claim of overassessment.  As evidence of the overassessment claim, the appellant submitted and testified to three matching pairs of sales.  Each pair contained a sale on the subject’s street and a comparable sale two to three blocks away from the expressway.  Each pair of contemporary sales are the same type of home; contain the same approximate living area; and are similarly assessed for 1997.  The appellant argued that the three sales on his street sold for substantially less than their matching sales with similar assessments and located two and three blocks from La Crosse Street.

After hearing the testimony and reviewing the record, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal.

Taxpayers who object to an assessment on the basis of lack of uniformity bear the burden of proving the disparity of assessment valuations by clear and convincing evidence.  Kankakee County Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 131 Ill.2d 1, 544 N.E.2d 762 (1989).  The evidence must demonstrate a consistent pattern of assessment inequities within the assessment jurisdiction.  Proof of assessment inequity should include assessment data and documentation establishing the physical, locational and jurisdictional similarities of the suggested comparables to the subject property.  Property Tax Appeal Board Rule 1910.65(b).  Mathematical equality in the assessment process is not required.  A practical uniformity, rather than an absolute one is the test.  Apex Motor Fuel Co. v. Barrett, 20 Ill. 2d 395, 169 N.E.2d 769 (1960).  Having considered the evidence presented, the Board concludes that the appellant has satisfied this burden and a reduction is warranted.

The Board finds that the appellant’s argument of locational assessment inequity based on comparative matching sales is persuasive.  The appellant compared sales on his street against sales of comparable properties two or three blocks away.  Because the appellant supplied only total assessments for sales comparisons, the Board will use the total assessments of all submitted properties for comparison purposes.  The first pair of sales (1995) of similar comparables indicate a La Crosse Street sale of $111.89 per square foot compared to a sale (two or three blocks away) of $135.55 per square foot.  Their 1997 total assessments are $14.86 and $14.35 per square foot, respectively.  The second pair of sales (1992 and 1993) indicate a La Crosse Street sale of $130.51 per square foot compared to a sale (two or three blocks away) of $182.99 per square foot.  Their 1997 total assessments are $17.24 and $15.19 per square foot, respectively.  The third pair of sales (1996 and 1997) of similar comparables indicate a La Crosse Street sale of $105.93 per square foot compared to a sale (two or three blocks away) of $191.11 per square foot.  Their 1997 total assessments are $17.89 and $16.82 per square foot, respectively.  The Board finds that the La Crosse sale prices are substantially lower than sales of similar homes located two to three blocks away and that two of the corresponding La Crosse Street sale properties contain higher assessments than the better located comparables.

Both parties submitted a total of 13 properties as suggested assessment comparables to the subject property.  One comparable has been excluded as a duplication and the appellant’s comparable two carries less weight because it is substantially larger.  The Board finds that the remaining comparables are similar to the subject insofar as they are one story and one and part two story, brick or brick and frame dwellings of similar age and size to the subject. 

Both parties submitted a total of 13 similar comparables.  Six of the comparables are located on the appellant’s street and range in total assessments from $16,982 to $25,337 or from $14.86 to $17.89 per square foot of living area.  The subject contains a total assessment of $25,153, or $15.40 per square foot, which is within the range of comparable properties on La Crosse Street.  Seven comparables are located within two or three blocks of the subject but are better located because they are two or three blocks away from Cicero Avenue and the Edens Expressway.  They range in total assessments from $18,843 to $24,434, or from $11.82 to $16.82 per square foot, which is lower than the square foot range on La Crosse Street.  The median assessment for the removed comparables is $14.35 per square foot and the average assessment is $14.40 per square foot.  The subject property is assessed higher than the median and the average with a total assessment of $15.40 per square foot.  The Board finds that the subject suffers from an inferior location compared to the distant comparables and is assessed in relation to these superior properties.  Therefore, a reduction is warranted.

The subject property consists of a 432 square foot frame garage with concrete floor, a 257 square foot wood deck, a 155 square foot enclosed frame porch and a 240 square foot room addition to a mobile home.  The property is located in Havana Township, Mason County, Illinois.  The appellant contends unequal treatment in the assessment process as the basis of the appeal.  He also claimed overvaluation, however, he argued overvaluation should be addressed only if his unequal treatment argument is unsuccessful.

The appellant’s unequal treatment argument was centered around the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Walsh v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 229 Ill.Dec. 487, 692 N.E.2d 260 (1998).  In that case, the Pekin Township Assessor had not performed a quadrennial reassessment since 1957.  For each new quadrennial year, the assessor simply raised the assessment of each property by the Department of Revenue’s three year sales to assessment ratio factor for that year.  In 1992, the subject property in the Walsh appeal was removed from this mass method of assessment and was assessed according to its recent sale price.  The court concluded this removal of one property or a group of properties from a systematic mass method of assessment was in conflict with the constitutional requirements of both equity in the assessment method and equality in the tax burden.

The appellant argued the same mass appraisal method exists in Mason County, however, he did not indicate that the subject was removed from this method.  He indicated by use of this method, the subject is assessed at a higher rate than other properties in his district.  He claimed the assessor has not viewed and performed a reassessment of value for the subject property since 1992.  He further claimed the subject was initially valued and assessed sometime prior to 1987 and then inspected in 1992 after his purchase.  No evidence to substantiate this claim was submitted. The Board notes the property record card for the subject has entries in 1987, 1991, 1992, and 1998.

The appellant further claimed the county unfairly compared the subject to other properties that are not similar.  The subject’s assessment was increased in 1998 by a 6% township multiplier that was applied to all properties.  The appellant argued it was unfair to apply this factor across the board to all properties, including those dissimilar to the subject.  He also stated the assessor corrects under-assessments as they are discovered, but that a substantial number of properties are still under-assessed.

The appellant claimed the assessor told him that if a property sells for 15% higher than its assessment, it is reassessed according to the sale price.  The appellant then assumed properties having assessments that reflect more than their selling prices were ignored and over assessments were not corrected.  He stated the assessor indicated an assessment may be placed on a property which reflects a value slightly below the sale price so that the application of a township equalization factor will not raise the value above the actual sale price.

The appellant presented a table of residential properties in Havana Township that sold in 1998, after the January 1, 1998 assessment date.  No sales from 1995 through 1997 were submitted.  He argued that since the Department of Revenue uses recent sales data in its sales ratio study, the properties in the appellant’s list can be considered like properties to the subject garage, deck, enclosed porch and room addition to a mobile home.  Only parcel numbers, sale prices, total assessments and his assessment to sales price ratio figures were submitted.  His study indicated assessment ratios ranging from 10.9% to 77.9% with the majority of properties falling within the 22.5% to 32.5% range.  Five properties were assessed above this range and three properties were assessed below this range.  No descriptive information was provided. 

The appellant further argued that if some of the sales in his ratio analysis were contract for deed sales, including commercial property, or were otherwise not arm’s length transactions, they are still proper for his ratio study because they should still be assessed at 33 1/3% of the sale price, regardless of validity.  He also incorrectly argued if the questionable sales and the commercial properties were removed from this list, all the Property Tax Appeal Board requires the appellant to prove is that three properties are assessed less than the subject, regardless of how many are assessed above the subject.  Therefore, the appellant requested an assessment rate no higher than 19.6% of fair market value.

For his overvaluation argument, the appellant requested all his unequal treatment evidence be reviewed.  Using this evidence, he again requested a fair market value for the subject of $9,759.  The appellant also presented replacement cost estimates to arrive at a value for the subject improvements of $6,500.  He indicated the subject was in a deteriorated condition and of poor quality.  Adding the land value of $3,330 resulted in a value of $9,830.  A breakdown of his cost schedule was included.  He stated he was a licensed professional engineer and has built ten houses and numerous porches and garages.  A copy of his licensed was submitted.

During cross-examination, the appellant was asked what his assessment claim was for the subject property.  His written documentation and his testimony indicate fair market value claims of $7,952, $9,759 and $9,830.  He indicated his replacement cost estimates of value are not to be used by the Property Tax Appeal Board for his inequity claim.  His requested fair market value for his unequal treatment argument was $9,759, the estimated value reflected in his 1991 assessment.  His overvaluation claim was $9,830 based on his replacement costs in his initial submission.  In his rebuttal, the appellant requested a value of $7,470. 

The appellant testified his cost estimates are self-serving and probably lower than actual costs.  He stated he called Menard’s for materials costs, however, no bids were presented.  He indicated the labor costs were his own costs and not market labor figures.  His concrete costs were prices he charged, not market charges.  He could not recall where he got his costs for one porch.  The deck costs were wrong because his square footage was incorrect.

The board of review submitted "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" wherein the subject's final assessment of $4,746 was presented.  The assessment reflects an estimated value of $14,351 using the three year median level of assessments for 1998 for Mason County of 33.07%.  The board argued the Walsh case does not apply in this appeal because the subject property was never singled out or treated differently from other properties in the county.

The Mason County Supervisor of Assessments was called as a witness.  She testified that contrary to assertions made by the appellant, she viewed the subject in 1991 and again in 1995.  In 1992 through 1994 only a township factor was applied to the assessment.  In 1995, the next quadrennial assessment year, the subject was again viewed and reassessed.  The result of this reassessment was that there had been no change in value and therefore the assessment was not changed.  In 1996 through 1998 township factors were again applied to the subject’s assessment.

The witness testified all room additions to mobile homes are assessed as lined enclosed frame porches throughout the county.  Enclosed porches not finished as room additions are assessed as unlined porches.  She testified all properties in the county are assessed in the same manner.  The cost schedules are reviewed for each property and depreciation is estimated.  Sales, local real estate markets and any other market influences are reviewed to determine trends in values.  Each year the township assessors view the properties and flag those that need to be reviewed.  These properties then receive further consideration.  The witness stated the market is constantly changing and adjustments are frequently made to reflect these changes.  If this were not done, no assessment would be close to actual market value.

She indicated Mason County does not have the funds to staff full time assessors and therefore her office assists the assessors in their work.  In response to the appellant’s statement that the assessors are not qualified to assess property, designations and certificates indicating successful completion of assessment classes were presented for all the assessors and the supervisor of assessments.  The supervisor of assessments also testified the county abides by the Department of Revenue’s assessment guidelines and requirements.

The witness stated for a useful sales ratio study, at least 25 properties should be used.  An analysis of the appellant’s sales ratio study was submitted indicating only two of eight were arm’s length transactions.  Problems with these eight sales were as follows: one sale had an addition constructed prior to the sale that was not yet assessed; one property was a sale between relatives; one property is a commercial property; two properties had incorrect assessments listed; and two properties were not listed on the open market.  One property sold in 1993 for $6,000, sold again in 1996 for $12,000 and sold a third time in 1998 for $24,000.  The board argued that the small number of properties used by the appellant does not indicate a trend in assessment inequities throughout the township and county.  The board of review further claimed that assessing property requires constant monitoring of sales.

The board of review submitted further evidence to refute the sale properties used in the appellant’s sales ratio study.  The board’s information included eighteen of the appellant’s sale properties, of which five were already addressed as having incorrect assessment data or sales that were not arm’s length in nature.  The board’s complaints on the remaining thirteen properties were as follows: one property sold in 1996 for $12,000 and sold again in 1999 for $24,000; sale price and assessment amounts for one property were incorrect; one property was purchased for commercial business and was not on the open market; one property was purchased by the adjacent landowner and was not listed on the open market; eight properties were masonry or frame one or one and one half story residential dwellings; and one property was a land sale.  The board argued these properties are either not valid arm’s length transactions or not similar to the subject.

The board indicated sales information on the Real Estate Transfer Declarations must be carefully reviewed.  The board argued the appellant’s contention that the board only reviewed properties that sold for 15% higher than the assessment is incorrect.  The board stated all sales are reviewed, along with market factors, construction of additions, and any other influences.  If a property sold for 15% higher or lower than its assessment indicates, it will be viewed, parties to the transaction are questioned regarding the sale, if possible, and any market or personal influences checked to determine the correctness of the sale.  The board indicated some properties sell higher than the actual value due to the buyer’s time constraints.  The board indicated it does not reassess for maintenance and repair to prolong the life of a property, such as a new roof or siding.

The board of review indicated the appellant cannot judge by a property record card whether or not a property has had a physical viewing by the assessor.  If the assessor determines the existing assessment is correct or will be correct after a township factor is applied, no new notations will be found on the card.  For each physical inspection, the assessors knock at the door and attempt to gain permission to view the interior.  If they are not allowed inside, they attempt to gain information from the owner regarding the interior condition.  A card is left for the owner to call if no one is home.  A physical inspection of the exterior is performed and measurements are taken.  The board of review argued the assessor, by statute, can equalize within a township when necessary to arrive at the level of assessments prescribed by law.  The statutes also allow for changes in individual assessments to be made by a township assessor or supervisor of assessments.  The supervisor of assessments also testified the board of review does not place assessments on properties to reflect their recent sale prices.  Sales of similar properties within the three preceding years are used to analyze recent sales data.

In addition, assessment data and descriptions on nine properties similar to the subject in most respects were presented.  They consisted of enclosed frame porches, room additions, carports, sheds and garages of mobile home properties.  The improvement assessments of these properties ranged from $1,795 for an enclosed porch to $5,059 for an enclosed porch, two sheds and a 576 square foot carport.  The information shows the subject contains a room addition, enclosed porch and the largest deck and largest garage and is assessed at $4,746.

The board of review also submitted its sales ratio study for residential properties in Havana Township for 1998 using only sales the board considered arm’s length transactions.  The median level of assessments for the township was 31.30% while the average level of assessments was 33.88%.  The three year median level of assessments for Havana Township was 33.35%.  The Real Estate Transfer Declarations were submitted for these sales.  The board also indicated the Department of Revenue issued a 1.000 multiplier for Mason County in 1997 and again in 1998, indicating the average assessments in the county for these two years was exactly one third of market value.

During cross-examination, the supervisor of assessments testified that in 1998, the three year median level of assessments for Havana Township was 33.25%.  A .06% township multiplier was added to raise the assessments to 33 1/3% of market value.  The subject’s assessment for 1998 was increased only by the amount of the equalization factor.

After hearing the testimony and considering the evidence, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal.  The Board further finds that the appellant has failed to support the contention of unequal treatment in the assessment process.  The Illinois Supreme Court has held that taxpayers who object to an assessment on the basis of lack of uniformity bear the burden of proving the disparity of assessment valuations by clear and convincing evidence.  Kankakee County Board of Review v.  Property Tax Appeal Board, 131 Ill.2d 1 (1989).  The evidence must demonstrate a consistent pattern of assessment inequities within the assessment jurisdiction.  After an analysis of the assessment data, the Board finds that the appellant has failed to overcome this burden.

The Board finds the board of review’s nine comparables of similar additions, decks and porches are the best evidence of comparable properties in the record.  The Board also finds the subject property has a much larger garage and deck than any of the comparables and also contains a room addition and enclosed porch.  The most comparable properties had improvement assessments ranging from $837 for an enclosed porch to $5,059 for an enclosed porch, two sheds and a dirt floor carport.  The subject’s improvement assessment was $3,636 for a 432 square foot concrete floor garage, a room addition, an enclosed porch and a 257 square foot deck.  The suggested comparable improvements assessments are consistent and support the board of review's assessment of the subject's improvements.

The constitutional provision for uniformity of taxation and valuation does not require mathematical equality.  The requirement is satisfied if the intent is evident to adjust the burden with a reasonable degree of uniformity and if such is the effect of the statute enacted by the General Assembly establishing the method of assessing real property in its general operation.  A practical uniformity, rather than an absolute one, is the test.  Apex Motor Fuel Co. v. Barrett, 20 Ill.2d 395 (1960).  Although the comparables presented by the appellant disclosed that properties located in the same area are not assessed at identical levels, all that the constitution requires is a practical uniformity which appears to exist on the basis of the evidence.

The appellant also argued similar properties in Mason County are being assessed using different methods and as a consequence the subject is being assessed at a higher ratio of assessments to fair market value than other similar properties.  He argued that assessing properties using different methods is unconstitutional.  The appellant based this argument on the Illinois Supreme Court’s ruling in Walsh v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 229, Ill. Dec. 487, 692, N.E.2d 260 (1998).  In that case, the court found the property had not actually been inspected and reassessed since 1957.  The statutes require general reassessments to be performed at least every four years at the beginning of each new quadrennial reassessment period.  The court found the county’s method of assessing property consisted of simply mass applying multipliers without reviewing any factual market data that would support this method.  This particular mass appraisal method was found by the court to be wholly inadequate.  Since proper reassessments were not performed for almost forty years, the court found the assessments had little resemblance to actual market value.

The subject property in the Walsh case had a recent sale price and the board of review increased the assessment to more closely reflect the sale price.  Although assessed near 33 1/3% of its fair market value, numerous other properties were found to be assessed at much lower assessment to fair cash value ratios.  The court stated that taking a property out of the county’s uniform assessing method and assessing it based on a recent sale price conflicts with the constitutional requirement of uniformity of assessments and uniformity in the method of assessing property.

In the instant appeal, the Mason County Board of Review has only one system or method of appraising property.  The cost schedules from the Real Property Appraisal Manual are used to find a replacement cost for each property.  Depreciation is assigned and a value is estimated.  Sales of similar properties, market conditions and any other influences are reviewed along with the cost estimate value.  If a property sold for 15% above or below the value reflected in the assessment, the property is reviewed along with the sales information to determine the validity of the sale.  The properties are reviewed each year by the township assessor and those requiring further study are flagged for a field person to inspect.

The Board finds the subject was not removed from the Mason County uniform method of assessing property for taxation purposes.  Unlike the Walsh case, there is no recent sale of the subject property.  Therefore, the Board finds the subject was not removed from the uniform method of assessing property in Mason County and subsequently reassessed based on a recent sale price.  Furthermore, the Board finds no credible evidence in the record to suggest the subject property was removed from Mason County’s uniform method of assessing property and reassessed for any reason or by any other assessment method.

The appellant also argued the subject had not been viewed or reassessed since 1991.  As a consequence, the periodic addition of township equalization factors has raised the assessment to reflect a value higher than its actual market value.  Section 9-155 of the Property Tax Code requires that in each quadrennial assessment year, the assessor’s office “shall actually view and determine as near as practicable the value of each property listed for taxation as of January 1 of that year...”  (35 ILCS 200/9-155).  The Mason County Supervisor of Assessments testified the subject had been viewed and reassessed for the 1995 quadrennial assessment year and she found no change was required in the assessed value.  She further testified if no change is found, there will be no new notations on the property record card.  The Board finds the subject property has been reassessed and inspected since 1991 in compliance with both statute and the board’s uniform method of assessing property in the county.

The appellant also argued his particular sale ratio study proved Mason County was not assessing property uniformly at 33 1/3% of fair market value.

The Board finds the appellant’s sales ratio study included sales of commercial property, incorrect assessment figures, property that had additions made right before the sale that had not been previously assessed, and sales of property that sold numerous times in a short period of time at double the previous sale price.  The appellant’s ratio study also included sales between relatives, a land only sale, a sale to an adjacent landowner and sales that were not listed on the open market.  The Board finds the appellant’s sales ratio evidence is unreliable and inaccurate.  His study does not support the contention that Mason County has failed to determine assessments based on 33 1/3% of fair cash value.  It further fails to indicate the subject was not assessed at 33 1/3% it its fair cash value or that it was assessed differently than other similar properties in the township or county.

The appellant also submitted cost information for the subject to support his overvaluation claim.  However, he requested this information be reviewed only in the event the Board found the record did not support his unequal treatment argument.  By statute, the Board is to render its decision based on equity and the weight of the evidence.  (35 ILCS 200/16-185).  The Board finds it must review all evidence submitted in arriving at the correct assessment for the subject property.

The appellant submitted cost information derived from his own knowledge of construction.  He indicated costs came from a telephone conversation with someone at a home improvement store.  He also stated the labor costs were his own costs and that concrete costs were those he charged and not necessarily market costs.  He further stated his costs were incorrect because he used the wrong measurements.  He stated there were no contractor’s profits included.  He further testified his figures were low and self-serving.  The Board finds the appellant’s evidence is insufficient, misleading and insupportable by his own admission.  The board of review submitted sales information on some mobile home additions, decks and porches which sold along with the land.  The Board finds the board of review’s evidence supports the subject’s assessment.

For the foregoing reasons, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds the appellant has failed to support his unequal treatment argument by clear and convincing evidence.  The Board also finds the appellant has failed to support his overvaluation claim by a preponderance of the evidence.  The Board further finds the record supports the assessment placed on the subject by the board of review and no reduction is warranted.

The subject property consists of a mobile home that is approximately 20 years old containing 1,142 square feet of living area. Amenities include a 196 square foot wood deck. The subject property is located in Fulton County, Illinois.

The record in this appeal contains evidence provided by the appellant suggesting that the fair market value of the subject property is not accurately reflected in its assessed valuation. In support of this claim, the appellant submitted a recent sale price of the subject property, an appraisal report containing a market analysis, and a photograph of the subject property. The subject property was sold by the appellant for $18,000 in September 1998. The appraisal report indicates an estimated market value for the subject of $18,000 as of July 16, 1998. Based on this evidence, the appellant requested a reduction in the subject property’s assessment.

The record in this appeal also contains "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" wherein the subject's final assessment of $11,420 was disclosed. This assessment reflects an estimated market value of $34,260 or $30.32 per square foot of living area including land. In support of the subject’s assessment, the board of review offered a comparative market analysis based on five sales it considered comparable to the subject. The comparables suggested by the board of review consist of one story style single family dwellings of frame construction containing from 912 to 1,290 square feet of living area. Four of the comparables have garages;  three comparables have full basements; and all the comparables are situated on permanent foundations. They range in age from 22 to 67 years and had sales prices ranging from $30,000 to $35,000 or from $27.13 to $38.37 per square foot of living area including land. These transactions occurred between February 1996 and October 1998. The board of review argued the subject’s estimated market value of $30.32 per square foot of living area including land falls within the range established by the board of review’s sales comparables.

In further support, the board of review submitted assessment data on the same suggested comparables. After deducting the assessed value for garages from the comparables, since the subject does not have a garage, the board of review indicated the comparables had improvement assessments ranging from $7.81 to $13.77 per square foot of living area. The board of review argued the subject property has an improvement assessment of $8.10 per square foot of living area, which falls within the range established by the comparables. On the basis of these comparisons, the board of review requested confirmation of the subject property’s assessment.

After reviewing the record and considering the evidence, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal. The Board further finds a reduction in the subject property’s assessment is warranted.

The board of review submitted assessment data on five suggested comparable properties. The board accords this evidence little weight. The appellant’s argument was based on the fair market value of the subject property, not on assessment inequity. Moreover, the comparables offered by the board of review are not similar to the subject property. All the suggested comparables have permanent foundations and four comparables have full basements. In addition, the board of review deducted the garage value from the comparables to create an assessed value range for comparison to the subject. No evidence was offered into the record indicating the value of the garages or how the values were derived.

Both parties offered market analyses and the appellant submitted a recent sale of the subject property. The Board accords little weight to this evidence for determining the correct assessment of the subject property. The Board finds the evidence clearly indicates the subject property is a mobile home. The photograph of the subject property shows the subject is not resting on a permanent foundation. Metal skirting was installed to protect the undercarriage and plumbing from the elements. Furthermore, the board of review did not refute the subject’s classification as a mobile home by the appellant’s appraiser. Thus, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that the appellant's mobile home falls under the definition of a "mobile home" and is not "resting in whole on a permanent foundation".  Therefore, the dwelling is not subject to ad valorem taxation as real estate.  Real property is defined (35 ILCS 200/1-130) as: 

 "...any vehicle or similar portable structure used or so constructed as to permit its being used as a dwelling place...if structure is resting on a permanent foundation."  (Emphasis added) 

The Mobile Home Local Services Tax Act (35 ILCS 515/1) states in part: 

“a factory assembled structure designed for the permanent habitation and so constructed as to permit its transport on wheels...from the place of its construction to the location, or subsequent locations, at which it is intended to be a permanent habitation...provided that any such structure resting in whole on a permanent foundation...shall not be construed as a 'mobile home' but shall be assessed and taxed as real property...". (Emphasis added) 

Both citations require permanent foundations as fundamental in establishing whether a vehicle or portable structure is real property or subject to privilege tax. The Illinois Manufactured Housing and Mobile Home Safety Act, 430 ILCS 115/2(1) defines “permanent foundation” as a: 

"...a closed perimeter formation consisting of materials such as concrete, mortared concrete block, or mortared brick extending into the ground below the frost line which shall include, but not necessarily be limited to cellars, basements, or crawl spaces, but does exclude the use of piers". 

Based on these statutes and the evidence, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that the mobile home is not resting in whole on a permanent foundation and that it fits the statutory definition of a "mobile home". Therefore, the appellant's mobile home is not subject to ad valorem taxation, but subject to the privilege tax. The Board notes the suject property contains a wood deck, however, the record is void of any data indicating this is personal property. Thus, the Board finds the board of review properly assessed the deck according to ad valorem taxation.  As a result, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds the classification of the subject dwelling as real estate, as established by the Fulton Country Board of Review, is in error and accordingly grants a reduction in the subject’s assessment.

The subject property consists of 40 duplex units located in Golfview Greens I and Golfview Greens II subdivisions of the Village of Rantoul, Illinois.

The appellant appeared by its attorney before the Property Tax Appeal Board and claimed the subject units’ market values were not accurately reflected in their assessments.  The attorney explained that after the Chanute Air Force Base in Rantoul, Illinois, was closed in 1993, the property was divided into parcels and auctioned off by the Air Force.  The contested duplex units along with 110 additional duplex units and 556 townhouse units were purchased by the appellant for $2,400,000 or $4,400 per unit in 1994.  Exhibit A was submitted showing the number of units sold between 1995 and 1998.  The evidence indicated the average price paid for each duplex unit was $46,000.  The attorney explained that prior to the 1998 assessment year, the township assessor had valued the unsold units at $4,400 per unit.  In 1998 the township assessor assessed the unsold units at $15,000 each or at $45,000 full value based on the sale prices of the sold units.  The attorney was of the opinion the proper assessment for each of the duplex units is somewhere between the $4,400 per unit sale price and the market value of $45,000 per unit as established by the township assessor.  He suggested a market value of $22,500 as the appropriate market value to be assigned to the units.

The attorney cited Section 10-30 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/10-30) and claimed the appellant’s situation is similar with a developer who holds unsold lots.  He stated that in this case the appellant acquired un-platted ground on which dwelling units had been previously constructed by the Air Force.  The appellant then subdivided the land to create a separate lot for each existing duplex unit.  He claimed the appellant had no choice to delay construction of dwelling units as a developer may have under Section 10-30.

The appellant’s attorney next cited a portion of Section 16-55 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/16-55) which states:

. . . the board shall review the assessment, and correct it, as appears to be just, . . .

He was of the opinion that it would be just to assess the subject duplex units in the same manner as outlined under Section 10-30 of the Property Tax Code for subdivided land.  However, once the units sold, their assessments should reflect the recent sale price.

The appellant’s attorney stated that on September 10, 1998, the appellant filed 40 complaints with the board of review.  In response to the appellant’s complaints, the board of review granted a small assessment reduction on 15 of the units.  A hearing was then requested and held on December 8, 1998.  As a result of the hearing, the board of review reduced the assessed valuations on many of the units by $8,750 to reflect the cost to bring the units to code in order to obtain an occupancy permit.  In addition, he indicated the board of review increased the assessments on six of the units based on their higher listing prices.  A portion of Section 16-55 of the Property Tax Code was cited by the appellant’s attorney which states in part:

. . . No assessment shall be increased until the person to be affected has been notified and given an opportunity to be heard.  . . . .

The appellant’s attorney argued that the board of review’s increase in the assessed valuation of the six subject units following the hearing was not allowed by statute and that such increase in assessed valuation must be rescinded.

In summary, the appellant’s attorney requested assessed valuations of $7,500 for each duplex unit under appeal or at least to have the increased assessments for the six units rescinded.

The board of review submitted “Board of Review Notes on Appeal” wherein the subjects’ assessments were disclosed.  The assessments for the 40 units ranged from $11,470 to $17,550.  Two of the board of review members were present at the hearing and explained their procedure for assessing the subject units.  They stated the assessments were increased in 1998 to reflect the sales prices of like kind units.  They stated that sale prices for duplex units in the subjects’ development ranged from $43,500 to $61,900 depending on size and location.  Documentation supporting the sales prices was submitted by the board of review under Exhibits C and D.  They explained that some of the units’ assessed valuations were reduced by the cost to make them ready for occupancy.  Exhibit B was submitted showing the work required for an occupancy permit.  Based on this data, the board of review requested that the subjects’ assessments be sustained based on the listed prices, the actual sales prices and the adjustments made for obtaining village occupancy permits.

After hearing the testimony and reviewing the record, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal.  The Board further finds that the appellant has not supported its contention of overvaluation for the subject units.  Section 9-145 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/9-145) states in part:

Except in counties with more than 200,000 inhabitants which classify property for purposes of taxation, property shall be valued as follows:

(a)  Each tract or lot of property shall be valued at 33 1/3% of its fair cash value.

The Illinois Supreme Court has defined “fair cash market value” as what the property would bring at a voluntary sale where the owner was ready, willing and able to sell but not compelled to do so, and the buyer was ready, willing and able to buy but not forced to do so.  Springfield Marine Bank v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 44 Ill. 2d 428 (1970).

In this appeal, the appellant requested an assessment reflecting a market value of $22,500 for each of the duplex units under appeal.  The market value evidence in the record does not support this valuation conclusion as opined by the appellant.  The board of review’s evidence under Exhibits C and D demonstrate that sale prices for units located in the subject development sell from $43,500 to $61,900 depending on size and location.  The assessments assigned to the 40 subject units range from $11,470 to $17,550.  These assessments reflect market values ranging from $34,413 to $52,655.  The evidence and testimony disclosed that the cost of bringing the units to code in order to obtain an occupancy permit from the Village of Rantoul was deducted from the assessments.  Based thereon, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that the assessments assigned to the subject units are well supported by the market data contained in the record.

The appellant cited Section 10-30 of the Property Tax Code regarding subdivisions in counties of less than 3,000,000 and claimed the same preferential assessment treatment should be applied to the subject units.  The Board finds this section of the Property Tax Code has no relevance with respect to the assessment of the subject parcels.  One of the requirements for eligibility under this section is:

(4) At the time of platting the property is vacant or used as a farm as defined in Section 1-60.

Subsection (c) of this Section states in part that “upon completion of a habitable structure on any lot of subdivided property . . . the provisions of subsection (b) of this Section shall no longer apply in determining the assessed valuation of the lot.”

At the time the subdivision in which the 40 duplex units are located was platted, the property was not vacant or used as a farm, but was improved with townhomes and duplex units.  Thus, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that the appellant’s argument with respect to this issue has no merit.

Finally, the appellant argued that the increase in the assessed valuation of six of the units by the board of review following the hearing was not allowed by statute.  The appellant cited Section 16-55 of the Property Tax Code which states in part

. . . No assessment shall be increased until the person to be affected has been notified and given an opportunity to be heard . . .

The Board also finds that this argument has no merit.  The increased assessment for the six units came as a result of a board of review hearing where the appellant was given an opportunity to be heard and the appellant was notified of the final decision of the board of review.

Section 12-50 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/12-50) states in part:

If final board of review or board of appeals action regarding any property, including equalization under Section 16-60 or Section 16-65, results in an increased or decreased assessment, the board shall mail a notice to the taxpayer, at his or her address as it appears in the assessment records, whose property is affected by such action, and in the case of a complaint filed with a board of review under Section 16-25 or 16-115, to the taxing body filing the complaint. . . . The written notice shall also set forth specifically the facts upon which the board’s decision is based and shall also contain the following statement:  “You may appeal this decision to the Property Tax Appeal Board by filing a petition for review with the Property Tax Appeal Board within 30 days after this notice is mailed to your or your agent, or is personally served upon you or your agent;  . . .

The Board finds that the board of review met the notice and hearing requirements set forth in the Property Tax Code.  Thus, the Board finds that the increased assessment of the six units shall stand as established by the board of review.

In conclusion, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that the subject’s assessments as established by the board of review are correct and no reductions are warranted.

The subject property consists of two contiguous parcels of land.  The first parcel contains 4,800 square feet of land and is improved with a two-story, masonry, multi-family dwelling containing three apartments.  The second parcel is unimproved and contains 2,400 square feet of land.

Because the appellant experienced a medical emergency, the appellant’s daughter who also resides within the subject property appeared on the appellant’s behalf without objection from the board of review’s representative.  The appellant contends unequal treatment in the assessment process of the subject parcels as the basis of this appeal.

The first issue before the Property Tax Appeal Board is the various building code violations cited by the appellant of neighboring parcels and buildings.  The Property Tax Appeal Board finds that this issue is beyond the scope of the Board’s jurisdiction.

The second issue before the Property Tax Appeal Board is the square footage of the subject’s improvement.  The appellant asserts that the improvement contains 3,809 square feet of living area.  She testified that this figure is based upon the computations derived from a signed and certified plat of survey.  This survey had been submitted into evidence and indicated a date of May, 1998.  The appellant further testified that her square footage total includes the two above-grade living areas as well as the basement area which is a smaller apartment.  She testified that only three-fifths of the basement is utilized as living area.  In further support of her assertions, the appellant had submitted copies of two floor plans.  The first floor plan was for the building’s first floor, while the second floor plan represented the building’s basement level.

In the alternative, the board of review contends that the improvement contains 4,244 square feet pursuant to the property characteristic printouts.  The Property Tax Appeal Board finds that the best evidence of the improvement’s size was submitted by the appellant.  Therefore, the Board finds that the subject’s improvement contains 3,809 square feet of living area.

In support of the appellant’s equity argument regarding the unimproved parcel, assessment data and descriptions were submitted on four properties located within two blocks of the subject.  These properties contained 2,400 square feet of land.  These properties all contained land assessments of $1,226, or $.51 per square foot, while the subject property contains 2,400 square feet of land and has a land assessment of $1,308, or $.55 per square foot.  However, the property characteristic printouts reflect that all four of these parcels are improved, but that the appellant is utilizing the land assessment values alone to compare to the subject’s unimproved parcel.

In support of the appellant’s equity argument regarding the improved parcel, assessment data, descriptions, and photographs were submitted on ten properties out of 12 properties.  However, incomplete data was submitted on the first and the twelfth property.  The land assessment of the improved parcel is not at issue.

The appellant’s ten properties were located within two blocks of the subject and are located on parcels that range in size from 2,088 to 4,800 square feet of land.  These parcels are improved with masonry dwellings that are either two-story, three-story, four-story, or two-story dwellings with a coach house.  These multi-family dwellings contained from two to six apartments.  The improvements range in age from one to 99 years and range in size from 2,128 to 7,380 square feet of living area.  However, the appellant used 1996 rather than 1997 land and improvement assessment amounts.

Therefore, based upon the property characteristic printouts, they contain improvement assessments that range from $0 to $29,398, or from $.0 to $8.96 per square foot.  The subject’s current improvement assessment is $30,556 or $8.02 per square foot based upon 3,809 square feet.

At hearing, the appellant’s representative asserted that the subject properties’ value is diminished for the following reasons:  the subjects’ location within an area suffering from rodent infestation; the subjects’ close proximity to the Kennedy Expressway; and the subjects’ location across the street from a tavern and a vacant lot.  Therefore, the appellant asserts that the subjects’ value is diminished for it suffers from external obsolescence.

Moreover, she provided lengthy testimony regarding the historical perspective of the buildings and parcels within the subject’s neighborhood as well as elaborating on construction details regarding the interiors and the exteriors of those buildings.  She also testified that she took the photographs of the appellant’s suggested comparables and of the board of review’s properties.  She stated that these photographs would accurately reflect each properties’ condition on the assessment date of January 1, 1997 with the exception of the one property with new construction.

On the basis of this analysis, the appellant requested an assessment for the subject’s improvement of $22,419, or $5.89 per square foot.

The board of review submitted "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" wherein the subjects’ final assessment of $33,173 for the improved parcel and a land assessment for the unimproved parcel of $1,308 were disclosed.  The improved parcel’s final assessment represented an improvement assessment of $30,556 and a land assessment of $2,617.

As to the unimproved parcel’s assessment, assessment data and descriptions on four properties located within the same Sidwell block of the subject were submitted.  These four parcels are all unimproved land with a land unit price of $400.  They all contain 24 front feet with a depth factor of .852.  They all contain a land assessment of $1,308.  The subject’s unimproved parcel also contains 24 front feet, a depth factor of .852 and a land unit price of $400.

As to the improved parcel’s assessment, assessment data and descriptions of three properties located within two blocks of the subject were submitted.  These parcels contain lot sizes that range from 3,000 to 4,800 square feet.  The properties contain two-story, masonry, multi-family dwellings that contained from two to six apartments.  The buildings range in age from 57 to 99 years and range in size from 3,430 to 4,623 square feet.  The improvement assessments range from $24,599 to $32,569, or from $7.04 to $7.26 per square foot.

In addition, the board of review submitted copies of property characteristic printouts for the aforementioned suggested comparables as well as copies of the documents submitted at the county-level hearing.

As rebuttal evidence, the appellant submitted documentation reiterating her prior positions regarding the subjects’ property taxes.  Specifically, she indicated that the subject properties suffer external obsolescence from the close proximity to the Kennedy Expressway as well as being situated across the street from a tavern and a vacant lot.  She stated that the vacant lot was not only unsightly, but was a rodent haven.  Moreover, she asserted that the Kennedy Expressway is not only a source of noise pollution, but also a source of land pollution from the garbage that the wind blows from the expressway onto her property.  In addition, the appellant asserted that the data on the neighboring properties’ characteristic printouts continues to be inaccurate and submitted photographs to support these inaccuracies.

As to the board of review’s suggested comparables, the appellant’s representative testified that the board of review’s suggested comparable #1 is also the appellant’s suggested comparable #8.  She further stated that the data reflected on the board of review’s notes for this property is in error.  She stated that to her personal knowledge the building had been extended into four apartments instead of two apartments and that the square footage quoted by the board was too small.  She further testified that this knowledge is based upon the fact that a friend had resided in the building as well as the submitted photographs to support her assertions.

Moreover, the appellant’s rebuttal evidence indicated that the board’s suggested comparable #3 was not located within two blocks of the subject, but is actually located more than four blocks away from the subject.  Copies of assessor’s maps were submitted to support this assertion.  In addition, the appellant asserted that the building’s data as represented on the property characteristic printouts is inaccurate.  The vast amount of photographs of the board’s comparable #3 reflects that the building does not have a tar and gravel roof, is larger than the subject property, contains a three-story building with six apartments and an attic, and contains a three-car masonry detached garage.  In addition, the appellant asserted that this property does not suffer external obsolescence because it is located across from a church and a school.

Lastly, the appellant’s representative submitted copies of the subject’s 1998 property tax appeal before the Cook County Assessor.  The Assessor’s decision indicates that a reduction in the 1998 property taxes from $33,173 to $31,551 is appropriate based upon an analysis of comparable properties.

After hearing the testimony and considering the evidence, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal.

When unequal treatment in the assessment process is the basis of an appeal, the inequity of an assessment must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.  Property Tax Appeal Board Rule 1910.63(e).  The evidence must demonstrate a consistent pattern of assessment inequities within the assessment jurisdiction.  Proof of assessment inequity should include assessment data and documentation establishing the physical, locational, and jurisdictional similarities of the suggested comparables to the subject property.  Property Tax Appeal Board Rule 1910.65(b).  Mathematical equality in the assessment process is not required.  A practical uniformity, rather than an absolute one is the test.  Apex Motor Fuel Co. v. Barrett, 20 Ill. 2d  395, 169 N.E.2d 769 (1960).

Having considered the equity evidence and testimony presented, the Board concludes that the evidence supports a reduction to the subject’s improvement assessment.

As to the improved parcel, in all, the parties submitted 12 equity comparables.  The Property Tax Appeal Board accords less weight to the appellant’s comparables #4 through #10 as well as the board of review’s comparables due to their disparity in size and/or location in comparison to the subject.

The Board finds that the appellant’s comparables #2, #3, and #11 were most similar to the subject property and support a reduction in the subject’s assessment.  These three comparables were located within one block of the subject.  The comparables contained two-story or three-story, masonry, multi-family dwellings with three apartments.  The improvements ranged in age from 68 to 77 years and ranged in size from 4,023 to 4,364 square feet of living area.  The improvement assessments ranged from $12,212 to $28,003, or from $2.80 to $6.96 per square foot.

In comparison, the subject’s improvement is a two-story, masonry, multi-family dwelling with three apartments.  The subject is 18 years old and contains 3,809 square feet of living area.  The subject’s improvement assessment currently stands at $30,556, or $8.02 per square foot.  The appellant’s improvement assessment falls above the range established by the most similar comparables.

The Board further finds that the appellant’s assertion that the subject’s market value is diminished due to external obsolescence is unpersuasive.  The appellant failed to provide evidence indicating how such external obsolescence would diminish the property’s market value.  Specifically, sales of properties affected by similar external obsolescence in comparison to sales of unaffected properties.

As to the unimproved parcel, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that the best evidence of value was submitted by the board of review.  The Board accords little weight to the appellant’s suggested properties for the appellant utilized the land assessments of improved parcels to compare to the subject’s unimproved parcel.  Whereas, the Board finds that the board of review’s comparables are four unimproved parcels located within the same Sidwell block as the subject parcel.  These four parcels all contained:  a land unit price of $400, 24 front feet, as well as a depth factor of .852.  They all contain a land assessment of $1,308.

In comparison, the subject’s unimproved parcel also contains:  24 front feet, a depth factor of .852, and a land unit price of $400.  Therefore, the Board finds that the subject’s unimproved parcel contains a land assessment which is exactly the same as the comparables and that no reduction is warranted.

Therefore, based on a review of the equity comparables, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that the evidence has supported the contention of unequal treatment in the assessment process of the improved parcel and that a reduction in the assessment of the subject’s improvement is warranted.

The subject property consists of a 10.65 acre tract improved with an older, two story, frame dwelling containing 1,764 square feet, a detached garage and several outbuildings.  The subject property is described as Lot 1 in Rocky Hill Farm 1st Addition, a rural subdivision created in 1994.  The appellant purchased the subject property in December 1996, for $159,000 and uses the property for a bed and breakfast.

The appellant appeared before the Property Tax Appeal Board contesting the assessments assigned to the subject dwelling, the outbuildings and the land.  The appellant claimed the subject tract should be classified and assessed as a farm.  He testified that hay was grown on the property in 1997 and 1998.  His written evidence indicated that several acres of corn were planted in 1997.  The property was not owned by the appellant in 1996 and was idle land.  He testified that currently, 3.6 acres are set-aside with the ASCS Office and have been accepted into the CRP program in 1999, five acres consist of woodlands, one acre consists of a pond, stocked with catfish in 1997, and one acre is improved with the residence and outbuildings.  Christmas trees were planted in the Spring of 1998.  The evidence disclosed that besides the production of catfish, the farm currently produces organic fresh eggs, raspberries, cherries, grapes, tomatoes and a variety of herbs.  As a result, a farmland assessment and classification was requested by the appellant.

Under the present classification of the subject land, the appellant requested an assessment reduction to $8,492.  This was computed at a value of $11,000 for the first acre and $1,500 per acre for the remaining acreage.  He claimed this is the formula used throughout the county for valuing land.

The appellant claimed the subject dwelling was inequitably assessed and submitted assessment data and descriptions on four suggested comparable properties.  The comparable properties contained from 2.98 acres to 131.60 acres and were improved with one and one half, one and three fourths and two story, frame or brick dwellings.  The dwellings were older structures like the subject and ranged in size from 1,596 to 2,528 square feet of living area.  Amenities varied and each of the properties had outbuildings.  The appellant lumped in the assessment for the dwellings, garages and outbuildings in his analysis.  The improvement assessments for the comparables ranged from $16,557 to $28,924 or from $10.37 to $12.80 per square foot.  The subject improvements, including outbuildings, were assessed at $26,753 or $15.17 per square foot.  The appellant requested the average assessment per square foot of $11.46 per square foot or $20,215  ($11.46 x 1,764 square feet) be applied to the subject improvements. Property record cards and photographs were submitted on the subject property and the comparable properties.  The appellant claimed the subject dwelling has crumbling and crooked plaster and lath walls.  The basement is unfinished, uninsulated and very wet with ten house jacks supporting the first floor.

The appellant also claimed the outbuildings were inequitably assessed.  He explained that when part of a farm, outbuildings are depreciated on a different schedule than outbuildings that are not part of a farm.  He claimed that since the property is used as a farm, the same depreciation schedule used for farm outbuildings should apply.

The board of review submitted "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" wherein the subject’s assessment totaling $38,420 was disclosed.  The subject’s assessment reflects a market value of $115,967 using the county’s three year median level of assessments for 1998 of 32.47%.  The supervisor of assessments was present at the hearing and explained the assessment process in the valuation of the subject property.  The subject parcel was part of a larger, farmed parcel prior to the 1994 development.  The farm was purchased and subdivided into the Rocky Hill Farm 1st Addition and consists of 22 lots.  The subject lot was reclassified from farmland to residential when it sold in September 1994 for $125,000 because it was no longer being farmed.  The appellant subsequently purchased the property in December 1996 for $159,000.  Exhibit A was submitted showing the assessed values of the lots located in the subject’s subdivision.  A map showing the location of the lots was also submitted.  The evidence disclosed that all land in the county is not computed at $11,000 for the first acre and $1,500 for each additional acre.  The supervisor of assessments stated that values for land are established by sales in the area.  Fourteen of the lots located in the subject’s subdivision are assessed using the developer’s rate.  The remaining lots have assessments ranging from $7,917 to $11,667 or from $974 to $2,711 per acre.  The subject land is assessed at $11,667 or $1,095 per acre.

A portion of the visitor’s guide to Galena, Illinois, was submitted showing the advertisement for the subject property.  The property was described in part in the pamphlet as: 

“A turn-of-the-century farm house with two guest rooms, private baths.  Continental breakfast.  Enjoy open fields, wooded areas, and a large swimming pond.” 

The supervisor of assessments claimed that according to the pamphlet the subject dwelling has been restored. 

Exhibit C was submitted which consists of a spreadsheet detailing the appellant’s four suggested comparable properties and one additional property.  In this exhibit, the assessment of the outbuildings were separated from the assessment of the dwellings.  The improvement assessments for the dwellings ranged from $15,447 to $24,473 or from $9.07 to $14.31 per square foot.  The subject dwelling was assessed at $22,027 or $12.49 per square foot.  The assessment of the outbuildings ranged from $1,307 to $15,791 while the subject’s outbuildings were assessed at $4,726. 

Exhibit D consists of spreadsheets detailing 14 suggested comparable properties located in the same township as the subject property.  As in Exhibit C, the assessment of the outbuildings were separated from the assessment of the dwellings.  The suggested comparable dwellings were all older, frame or brick dwellings that varied in construction style.  They ranged in size from 1,172 to 1,968 square feet and their dwelling assessments ranged from $14,297 to $24,473 or from $9.72 to $14.31 per square foot.  The outbuildings had assessments ranging from 422 to $61,033.  Property record cards and photographs were submitted on the suggested comparable properties.

In conclusion, the supervisor of assessments claimed the subject dwelling and land were equitably assessed.  She was of the opinion there was no farming activity on the parcel and as a result, it should not receive a farmland assessment and classification.  Thus, she requested confirmation of the subject property’s assessment.  She noted that the appellant’s contention the outbuildings were not assessed appropriately due to the depreciation applied was a new argument raised in the rebuttal evidence submitted by him and that she had no opportunity to provide the appropriate supporting data.

In the appellant’s rebuttal evidence, he amended his assessment request for the subject dwelling.  He was of the opinion the dwelling should be assessed at $9.07 per square foot or $15,999, the same as his comparable one which is located in the subject’s immediate neighborhood.  In the rebuttal data, he submitted a chart showing the method of assessment applied to the subject outbuildings by the supervisor of assessments and the assessments that should be applied to these buildings.  His assessment request for the outbuildings was based on the fact that farm buildings that are no longer in use and are considered fully depreciated at 90%.  Farm buildings that are actively being used depreciate at 3% per annum, until fully depreciated, after 30 years.  Based on these parameters, the appellant computed a full value for the outbuildings of $9,063 for an assessment of $3,021.  The supervisor of assessments has the buildings valued at $14,180 for an assessment of $4,726.  The appellant claimed that the subject outbuildings should be assessed equitably with other farm buildings in the county.

In the rebuttal data, the appellant also questioned why 14 of the lots in the subject’s subdivision were assessed substantially lower than the subject lot.  The appellant also submitted new comparables in the rebuttal data, consisting of the property record cards for the lots located in Valley View Subdivision, which is also a rural development.

After hearing the testimony and reviewing the record, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal.  The Board further finds that a reduction in the subject’s assessment is not warranted based on the appellant’s contentions.  The Board finds that the subject dwelling and land are equitably assessed with like kind properties.  The Board also finds that the subject property is not entitled to a farmland assessment and classification.  In addition, the Board finds that pursuant to its rules, some of the appellant’s rebuttal data, was not admissible in the record.  The following is the Board’s analysis with respect to these issues.

FARMLAND ASSESSMENT AND CLASSIFICATION ISSUE

The Board finds that the subject property is not entitled to a farmland classification and assessment.  Section 1-60 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/1-60) defines "farm" in part as

any property used solely for the growing and harvesting of crops; for the feeding, breeding and management of livestock; for dairying or for any other agricultural or horticultural use or combination thereof; including, but not limited to hay, grain, fruit, truck or vegetable crops, floriculture, mushroom growing, plant or tree nurseries, orchards, forestry, sod farming and greenhouses; the keeping, raising and feeding of livestock or poultry, including dairying, poultry, swine, sheep, beef cattle, ponies or horses, fur farming, bees, fish and wildlife farming...

To qualify for an agricultural assessment, the land must be farmed at least two years preceding the date of assessment. (35 ILCS 200/10-110).  Testimony revealed that the subject property has not been used as a farm the two years preceding the date of assessment.  The testimony and evidence disclosed the farming operation had not commenced until 1997.  In order to qualify for a farmland assessment and classification for the 1998 assessment year, the property must have been used as a farm for the years 1996 and 1997.  The testimony revealed the property was idle land in 1996 and was not being farmed.  Thus, the testimony presented by the appellant indicated that the subject has not been used for agricultural purposes for two years preceding the assessment date.  Therefore, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that the subject property does not qualify for an agricultural assessment for the 1998 assessment year.

EQUITY OF THE DWELLING ASSESSMENT

The Illinois Supreme Court has held that taxpayers who object to an assessment on the basis of lack of uniformity bear the burden of proving the disparity of assessment valuations by clear and convincing evidence.  Kankakee County Board of Review v.  Property Tax Appeal Board, 131 Ill.2d 1 (1989).  The evidence must demonstrate a consistent pattern of assessment inequities within the assessment jurisdiction.  After an analysis of the assessment data, the Board finds that the appellant has failed to overcome this burden.

The per square foot assessment of the suggested comparable dwellings submitted by the parties support the board of review's assessment of the subject dwelling.  The comparables submitted for comparison suggest that the subject's assessment is within the range at $12.49 per square foot of living area.  In all, assessment data and descriptions were provided on 19 suggested comparable properties.  The subject’s assessment of $12.49 per square foot was well within the range established by these properties.  The appellant requested the same assessment as his comparable one of $9.07 per square foot.  However, this dwelling was substantially larger than the subject property. The properties more similar in size to the subject support the assessment of $12.49 per square foot.  Thus, no reduction in the subject’s dwelling assessment based on the appellant’s equity contention is warranted.

EQUITY OF OUTBUILDING ASSESSMENTS

The appellant contends the outbuildings located on the subject property should be assessed in the same manner as farm buildings located on a farm parcel.  The testimony disclosed that the assessment procedure for valuing outbuildings varies depending on whether or not the buildings are part of a farm parcel.  Since the subject property does not qualify as a farm for the assessment year under appeal, the Board finds that the appellant’s argument regarding the proper assessment and depreciation of the buildings is without merit.  Moreover, this argument had not been presented in the appellant’s initial appeal, but was raised in detail in the rebuttal argument, precluding the board of review from filing evidence in support of the farm building assessments.  Thus, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that a reduction in the outbuilding assessments is not supported.

EQUITY OF THE LAND ASSESSMENT

Eight lots in the subject’s subdivision were sold, including the subject lot.  The lots had assessments ranging from $974 to $2,711 per acre.  The subject lot was assessed at $1,095 per acre and was well within the range established by the sold lots.  The remainder of the lots were assessed according to the developer’s rate under Section 10-30 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/10-30).  This statues provides under subsection (b) that:

Except as provided in subsection (c) of this Section, the assessed valuation of property so platted and subdivided shall be determined each year based on the estimated price the property would bring at a fair voluntary sale for use by the buyer for the same purposes for which the property was used when last assessed prior to its platting.

Subsection (c) states in part:

Upon completion of a habitable structure on any lot of subdivided property, or upon the use of any lot, either alone or in conjunction with any contiguous property, for any business, commercial or residential purpose, or upon the initial sale of any platted lot, including a platted lot which is vacant:  (i) the provisions of subsection (b) of this Section shall no longer apply in determining the assessed valuation of the lot.

Pursuant to this Section, lots held by a developer, when qualified under Section 10-30 of the Property Tax Code, are assessed under a different scheme than the lots when sold.

The appellant’s comparables submitted with the rebuttal evidence showing the assessments of lots located in a similar rural subdivision were given no weight by the Board in its analysis pursuant to Section 1910.66, subsection b) of the Property Tax Appeal Board’s Official Rules which states:

Rebuttal evidence shall not consist of new evidence such as an appraisal or newly discovered comparable properties.  A party to the appeal shall be precluded from submitting its own case in chief in the guise of rebuttal evidence.

Based thereon, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that the appellant has not supported his unequal treatment contentions.

The constitutional provision for uniformity of taxation and valuation does not require mathematical equality.  The requirement is satisfied if the intent is evident to adjust the burden with a reasonable degree of uniformity and if such is the effect of the statute enacted by the General Assembly establishing the method of assessing real property in its general operation.  A practical uniformity, rather than an absolute one, is the test.  Apex Motor Fuel Co. v. Barrett, 20 Ill.2d 395 (1960).  Although the comparables presented by the appellant disclosed that properties located in the same area are not assessed at identical levels, all that the constitution requires is a practical uniformity which appears to exist on the basis of the evidence.  For the foregoing reasons, the Board finds that the appellant has not proven by clear and convincing evidence that the subject property is inequitably assessed.  Therefore, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that the subject's assessment as established by the board of review is correct and no reduction is warranted.

The subject property consists of a bi-level, owner occupied, single family dwelling with 1,080 square feet of living area.  Amenities include central air conditioning, a fireplace, a basement with 513 square feet of finished area and an attached two car garage.

The appellant's petition indicated unequal treatment in the assessment process as the basis of the appeal.  In support of this argument, the appellant presented evidence of assessment data on similar properties in the area to compare to the subject property.  The comparables suggested by the appellant consisted of six bi-level style dwellings similar to the subject in age and amenities.  The comparables ranged in size from 1,080 to 1,136 square feet of living area.  The comparables had improvement assessments ranging from $22,018 to $28,260 or from $19.44 to $26.17 per square foot of living area.  The subject property has an improvement assessment of $27,674 or $25.62 per square foot of living area.  The appellant also submitted copies of two decisions rendered by the Property Tax Appeal Board concerning the subject’s 1996 and 1997 assessments under Docket Nos. 96-4402-R-1 and 97-4990-R-1.  In those decisions the Property Tax Appeal Board reduced the subject’s assessment to $34,745.  Based on this evidence the appellant requested the subject’s total assessment be reduced to $34,745.  The evidence further revealed the appellant filed the appeal directly to the Property Tax Appeal Board following receipt of the notice of an equalization factor.

The board of review submitted its “Board of Review Notes on Appeal” wherein its final assessment of the subject totaling $35,512 was disclosed.  The board of review noted the property was the subject matter of two decisions rendered by the Property Tax Appeal Board concerning the 1996 and 1997 assessment year under Docket Nos. 96-4402-R-1 and 97-4990-R-1.  As previously mentioned, the Property Tax Appeal Board reduced the subject’s assessment to $34,745 in each of those appeals.  The board of review increased the subject’s assessment from 1997 to 1998 by the application of a township equalization factor of 1.0221.  The board of review argued the increase in assessment by the application of an equalization factor was in accordance with section 16-185 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/16-185) and requested confirmation of the subject’s assessment.

After reviewing the record and considering the evidence, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the appeal.  The Board further finds that a reduction in the subject’s assessment is not supported by the evidence in the record.  The appellant contends the subject’s assessment is excessive when compared to the assessments of other similar properties.  The Illinois Supreme Court has held that taxpayers who object to an assessment on the basis of lack of uniformity bear the burden of proving the disparity of assessment valuations by clear and convincing evidence.  Kankakee County Board of Review v.  Property Tax Appeal Board, 131 Ill.2d 1 (1989).  The evidence must demonstrate a consistent pattern of assessment inequities within the assessment jurisdiction.  After an analysis of the assessment data, the Board finds that the appellant has failed to overcome this burden.  The per square foot assessment of the suggested comparable improvements submitted by the appellant supports the board of review's assessment of the subject's improvements.  The comparables had improvement assessments ranging from $22,018 to $28,260 or from $19.44 to $26.17 per square foot of living area.  The subject property has an improvement assessment of $27,674 or $25.62 per square foot of living area which is within the range established by the comparables.

Additionally, the Board finds the board of review’s assessment of the subject was proper pursuant to section 16-185 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/16-185).  Section 16-185 of the Property Tax Code provides in part:

If the Property Tax Appeal Board renders a decision lowering the assessment of a particular parcel on which a residence occupied by the owner is situated, such reduced assessment, subject to equalization, shall remain in effect for the remainder of the general assessment period as provided in Sections 9-215 through 9-225, unless that parcel is subsequently sold in an arm's length transaction establishing a fair cash value for the parcel that is different from the fair cash value on which the Board's assessment is based, or unless the decision of the Property Tax Appeal Board is reversed or modified upon review.  (35 ILCS 200/16-185).

The record discloses that in determining the subject’s 1998 assessment, the board of review increased the 1997 assessment of the property as determined by the Property Tax Appeal Board by a township equalization factor.  This increase in the subject’s assessment by an equalization factor is allowed by section 16-185 of the Property Tax Code.  Furthermore, the record contains no evidence indicating the subject property subsequently sold in an arm's length transaction establishing a fair cash value for the parcel that is different from the fair cash value on which the Board based its original decision or that the assessment year in question is in a different general assessment period.  For these reasons the Board finds that a reduction is not warranted.

The subject property consists of a two story, frame, single family dwelling constructed more than 100 years ago.  The subject is situated on a 8,550 square foot lot in Oak Park, Illinois.  At the hearing, the parties agreed that the subject property contains 2,078 square feet of living area.

The appellant appeared before the Property Tax Appeal Board claiming that the market value of the subject property is not accurately reflected in the subject’s valuation based on its  recent sale price.  In support, the appellant testified that he purchased the property on May 30, 1997 for $190,000.  The appellant further testified that the property was advertised for sale by a Realtor for 64 days in a local paper, the seller’s mortgage was not assumed, and the sale was not between family or related corporations.  The appellant provided the subject’s Settlement Statement and Escrow Receipt And Disbursement Authorization.  Based on the testimony and evidence submitted, the appellant requested a total assessment of $19,000.

The board of review submitted its “Board of Review Notes On Appeal” wherein the subject’s final total assessment of $22,587 was disclosed.  The board of review also submitted property characteristic printouts for the subject and three suggested sales and equity comparables.  The suggested comparables are two story dwellings of frame construction.  Ranging in age from 91 to 94 years, the improvements range in size from 1,768 to 1,808 square feet of living area.  The three suggested comparables sold from June, 1992 to September, 1996 for prices ranging from $239,000 to $260,000, or $135.18 to $143.81 per square foot including land.  In addition, the board provided two additional equity comparables.  Evidence from the local board of review hearing was also submitted.

Furthermore, the board of review submitted an Addendum to its “Notes on Appeal” in which it was indicated the board was not submitting assessment level evidence pursuant to Property Tax Appeal Board Rule 1910.50(c)(2).  The board of review maintained that the Department of Revenue’s annual sales ratio studies are flawed in their methodology and conclusions, but offered no evidence in support of this contention.  Based on an analysis of their comparables, the board of review requested confirmation of the subject’s assessment.

After hearing the testimony and considering the evidence, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal.

When overvaluation is claimed, the appellant has the burden of proving the value of the property by a preponderance of the evidence.  Property Tax Appeal Board Rule 1910.63(e).  Proof of market value may consist of an appraisal, a recent arm’s length sale of the subject property, recent sales of comparable properties, or recent construction costs of the subject property.  Property Tax Appeal Board Rule 1910.65(c).  Having considered the evidence and testimony presented, the Board concludes that the appellant has satisfied this burden and that a reduction is warranted.

The Property Tax Appeal Board finds that the best evidence of market value is the sale of the subject on May 30, 1997 for $190,000 as indicated by the subject’s settlement statement.  The property was advertised for sale by a Realtor for 64 days in a local paper, the seller’s mortgage was not assumed, and the sale was not between family or related corporations.  The board of review did not submit any evidence to refute the arm’s length nature of the transaction.

Further, Property Tax Appeal Board Rule 1910.50(c)(2) provides that the Board may consider evidence of the appropriate level of assessment for property designated as Class 2 including the Department of Revenue’s annual sales ratio studies for the previous three years.  Pursuant to Property Tax Appeal Board Rule 1910.90(i), the Board takes official notice of the 1997 Department of Revenue’s three year median level of assessments for Class 2 property of 10.09%.  Furthermore, the Board finds the best evidence in the record as to the appropriate assessment level is the Department’s 1997 studies.  The board of review’s contention that the Department’s studies are flawed was given little weight since no evidence was submitted to support this contention.  Further, the Illinois Supreme Court has recognized the validity of the Department’s studies to establish assessment levels.  Commonwealth Edison Co. v. The Property Tax Appeal Board, 102 Ill.2d 443, 468 N.E.2d 948 (1984).  See also Board of Review of Grundy County v. The Property Tax Appeal Board, 201 Ill.App.3d 999, 559 N.E.2d 504 (3d Dist. 1990).

Utilizing the Department’s 1997 three year median level of assessments for Cook County Class 2 property of 10.09%, the subject’s sale price should reflect a total assessment of $19,171.  Since the current total assessment of $22,587 is greater than the assessment warranted by the subject’s sale price, a reduction is appropriate.

Considering all of the evidence, the Board finds the subject had a market value of $190,000 as of the assessment date.  Since the market value of the subject has been established, the Department of Revenue’s 1997 three year median level of assessments for Cook County Class 2 property of 10.09% will apply.

The subject property consists of a residential property located in McLean County. The appellant claims overvaluation as the basis of the appeal.

The record contains documentation submitted by the appellant in support of the complaint.  The evidence further revealed that the appellant did not file a complaint with the board of review but filed an appeal directly to the Property Tax Appeal Board following receipt of the notice of an equalization factor.

The board of review submitted its notes on appeal wherein the subject property's final assessment was disclosed. After reviewing the appellant's evidence, the board of review agreed to the removal of the equalization factor.

After reviewing the record and considering the evidence, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal.  Based upon the evidence submitted, the Board finds that a reduction in the subject's assessment is supported.  However, the record indicates that the appellant did not file a complaint with the board of review but appealed the assessment directly to the Property Tax Appeal Board based on notice of an equalization factor.  Since the appeal was filed after notification of an equalization factor, the amount of relief that the Property Tax Appeal Board can grant is limited pursuant to section 16-180 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/16-180).  This section provides in pertinent part:

"where no complaint has been made to the board of review of the county where the property is located and the appeal is based solely on the effect of an equalization factor assigned to all property or to a class of property by the board of review, the Property Tax Appeal Board may not grant a reduction in the assessment greater than the amount that was added as the result of the equalization factor."

The Board has interpreted this provision to mean that where a taxpayer has not filed a complaint with the board of review, but files an appeal directly to the Property Tax Appeal Board after notice of application of an equalization factor, the Board cannot grant a reduction of assessment greater than the amount of increase caused by the equalization factor.  Based on a review of the evidence contained in the record, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds a reduction in the assessment of the subject property is supported.  However, the reduction is limited to the increase in the assessment caused by the application of the equalization factor.

RESIDENTIAL CHAPTER

Index

SUBJECT MATTER

Assessment Rollover
(35 ILCS 200/16-185)

Board of Review Hearing Notice Requirements
(35 ILCS 200/12-50)

Comparable Matching Sales 

Condominiums - Equity Contention, Dissimilar Comparables Offered
(Official Rules of the Property Tax Appeal Board 1910.65(b)) 

Construction Costs - Overvaluation 

Correct Square Footage of Improvement 

Department of Revenue - Median Level of Assessments
(Cook County, Official Rules of the Property Tax Appeal Board
1910.50(c)(2), 1910.63(e), 1910.65(c))

Developer’s Exemption
(35 ILCS 200/10-30, 35 ILCS 200/10-25)

Developer’s Exemption
(35 ILCS 200/10-30, 35 ILCS 200/10-25)

Equalization Factor Appeal 

Equity Issue - Apartment Building, Coach House
(Official Rules of the Property Tax Appeal Board 1910.65(b))

Equity Issue - Farmland Classification 

Equity Issue - Lake Frontage 

Equity Issue - Similarity of Equity Comparables 

Jurisdiction Limited to Appealed Property
(35 ILCS 200/9-160)

Jurisdictional Issue - Filing Requirements
(35 ILCS 200/12-50, 35 ILCS 200/16-185)

Mass Appraisal Methodology – Equitable Application 

Mobile Home Classification
(35 ILCS 515/1, 430 ILCS 115(2)(1))

Omitted Property
(35 ILCS 200/9-265, 35 ILCS 200/9-270, 35 ILCS 200/9-180)

Overvaluation - Renovation, Recent Sale, External Factors
(Official Rules of the Property Tax Appeal Board 1910.63(e), 1910.65(a))

 Partial Assessment 

Rebuttal Evidence 

Recent Sale - Executor’s Deed 

Recent Sale Price - Inclusion of Personal Property 

Sales Ratio Studies 

Standing Issue

Timeliness of Publication of Board of Review Equalization Factor
(35 ILCS 200/12-10, 35 ILCS 200/24-24, 35 ILCS 200/26-5)