The parties of record before the Property Tax Appeal Board are Silber James Mixer and Cheryl R. Mixer, the appellants, and the Adams County Board of Review.

The subject property consists of a 69.29 acre farm located in Adams County.  The farm is improved with a dwelling and a horse barn with an indoor arena.  Appellants are only contesting the assessment of the 18,750 square foot horse barn.  The building was completed at the beginning of 2001.  It has a large heated shop, an office, a tack room, storage and a 12,000 square foot arena.  There are also 20 horse stalls in the building.  The office and tack room have finished walls and there is a bathroom.  The large shop is finished and has concrete floors.  The arena has dirt and sawdust flooring.  The appellants claim both unequal treatment in the assessment process and overvaluation as the bases of the appeal.

The appellant, Cheryl Mixer, was present at the hearing and called her accountant as a witness.  The accountant prepared the appellants' evidence.  Neither he nor the appellants are appraisers.  Mr. Mixer owns a construction company, however, he was not present at the hearing and did not prepare the evidence.

The accountant indicated the evidence he prepared consists of many different ways to value and assess the subject property.  The first was to review five suggested comparable horse barns located in rural Adams County that are from 10 to 12 miles from the subject.  The accountant indicated all five properties were constructed for similar uses as horse training, boarding and for exercising horses and related activities.  Each is a pole building with metal covering, some stalls and a dirt floor arena.  The properties are listed as pole buildings ranging in size from 4,800 to 10,932 square feet.  The property record card for the first suggested comparable indicated it has 10,500 square feet with 8 horse stalls, an office area and a sleeping area.  The appellants' accountant indicated these properties have improvement assessments ranging from $8,000 to $32,400 or from $1.60 to $2.96 per square foot.  The subject contains 18,750 square feet and was reported to have an improvement assessment of $90,030 or $4.80 per square foot.

The appellants' accountant indicated the market values as reflected in the assessments of these five suggested comparables ranged from $4.79 to $8.89 per square foot.  The average of the five is $6.49 per square foot.  The subject's assessment was reported to reflect an estimated value of $14.40 per square foot.  The accountant therefore suggested an improvement assessment for the subject of $6.49 per square foot, reflecting an estimated value for the horse barn of $121,688. 

The accountant then stated the board of review agreed that the first comparable is similar to the subject.  This property has an improvement assessment reported to reflect a market value of $8.89 per square foot.  The accountant argued that as an alternative method, the subject could be assessed $8.89 per square foot, reflecting an estimated market value of $166,688.  However, the accountant further argued a 15% discount should be given for the subject's larger size according to the Marshall Valuation Service.  This would further reduce the appellant's requested value to $141,684. 

The accountant then proposed that the subject could be assessed using the market values as reflected by the three highest assessments of the suggested comparables.  Using this method, the subject would have an estimated value as reflected in the improvement assessment of $128,312.

Yet another method of assessing the subject was proposed by the appellants' accountant.  He indicated the cost of constructing the subject horse barn could be used with appropriate depreciation.  A list of construction costs was presented.  No actual bills were submitted to substantiate the costs.  Also, the accountant indicated the appellants acted as the builder and allocated $20,000 as the value of the unpaid labor.  Another 20% or $22,544 was included for "contingency items."  The total construction costs listed with the labor and contingency items was $135,265.  Discounting this value by 3% per year for three years for depreciation would result in an estimated cost value of $123,091 or $6.56 per square foot.

Another method of assessing the subject barn was proposed.  The accountant first started with the $6.49 per square foot market value as reflected in the average assessments of the suggested comparables.  He used this figure only for the subject arena as he indicated the appellants and board of review agreed there were different areas and components to the subject building.  He then added estimated costs from the Marshall Valuation Service for the shop, stalls, and storage areas to arrive at a total estimated cost of $151,223.  He then discounted the subject 15% because of its larger size.  He then depreciated the subject another 3% per year or 9% for age.  The total depreciated and discounted cost for the horse barn was $126,982 or $6.77 per square foot.

The appellants' accountant then reviewed the results of all of his proposed methods of valuing the subject horse barn.  The proposed valuations for the subject ranged from $123,091 to $141,684.  The accountant indicated a value based on all these methods combined would result in yet another proposed valuation of $125,391.  Lastly, he indicated the 2001 value as reflected in the 2001 assessment of the subject barn was $121,200.  The board of review had indicated the 2001 assessment was for an incomplete building.  The accountant used this $121,200 value and depreciated it by 6% for age to arrive at a reduced value for 2003 of $113,928 or $6.07 per square foot.

During cross-examination, the appellants' accountant testified the contingency items category in his construction costs was for items that may have been inadvertently omitted, forgotten or were for items that were purchased for other construction projects but used on the subject property.  He did not know how the appellants arrived at the $20,000 labor figure.

The board of review submitted "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" wherein the subject's assessment was presented.  The assessment for the horse barn was $60,450, reflecting an estimated value of $181,350.  The board of review's evidence indicates the appellants' accountant incorrectly used the assessor's assessment and estimated values for the subject.  The board of review lowered the assessor's figures.  The correct assessment of the subject barn is $60,450 or $3.22 per square foot, not the $4.80 per square foot as indicated by the appellants' evidence.  The market value reflected in the correct assessment was $181,350 or $9.67 not $14.40 per square foot as indicated by the appellants' accountant. 

A board of review member testified he was present when the subject horse barn was inspected.  He stated it has a large heated shop area with concrete floors, a finished tack room and an office and a heated restroom.  There is a large overhead storage area that he testified the appellants' suggested comparables do not have.  It also has the horse stalls and large arena. 

The witness testified the appellant is an excellent builder and the subject horse barn is well built.  He also stated he has no disagreement with the $20,000 labor figure used in the appellants' list of construction costs.  The subject's cost ladder was prepared using the Marshall Valuation Service for arenas and class D average construction.  This classification indicates the building would have siding or stucco on wood frame with some interior finish.  The service's estimated cost per square foot is $10.40 for the arena, stalls, tack/feed rooms and a washroom.  Over and above these features the subject also contains storage and an office.  The life expectancy for this type of arena is 25 years.  The board of review used $10.40 per square foot for a total estimated cost of $195,000.  Depreciation of 7% was taken resulting in a depreciated cost of $181,350.  The assessment for the building was $60,450.  The board of review's calculations and the Marshall Valuation Service manual pages were presented in support of this testimony.

The witness next discussed the appellants' suggested comparables.  A grid analysis was also presented comparing the subject to these properties.  The board member testified he has seen all but one of these properties.  The appellants' first suggested comparable is a Morton building and the finish is not as good as the subject's finish.  It also has less concrete and only 8 stalls as compared to the subject's 20 stalls.  There is a very small office and a tack room.  This building was constructed in 1997 and is listed as class D average construction.

The appellants' second suggested comparable has no riding arena whereas the subject has a very large indoor arena.  The witness testified the building is used to house tractors.  The stalls are not as well built as the subject's stalls.  There are living quarters in this building.  The building was constructed in 1994 and is listed as class D low cost construction.  The third property has a very small riding arena in a separate building.  There are very small living quarters and the building does not have the construction quality of the subject.  It is also a converted machine shed.  The building was built in 1982 with an addition in 1997.  It is listed as class D low cost construction.

The witness has not seen the appellants' fourth suggested comparable.  The board of review's evidence indicates it was built in 1974 and is not used as a horse barn.  It is only used for storage.  The last of the appellants' suggested comparables is an older building constructed in 1973 and is not a horse barn.  The roof has been replaced.  The stalls consist of an old lean-to that is attached to the former arena.  The building is used for storage.

In rebuttal of the board of review member's testimony, the appellant testified the subject barn is used for farm storage when not used for riding.  Horses are boarded year round.  She also argued the tack room has lumber from a church that was cleaned and treated before installation.  The materials used for the stalls are not used as indicated but are new seconds.  The office and tack room have a log finish.  Although the lumber is new, it was given to them.

The appellants also presented a written rebuttal arguing the subject should be viewed as a class D low cost pole arena rather than a class D average arena.  They argued family labor was used even though the appellant is a construction contractor and that low cost materials were used.  Changing the classification would change the cost calculations from $10.40 per square foot to $9.01 per square foot for a class D pole average and to $5.31 per square foot for class D pole low cost.  Using yet another method of calculating the subject's assessment, the appellants argued that by using these lower construction class figures, the subject's arena value would then reflect values, minus depreciation, of $157,112 using $9.01 per square foot and $92,593 using $5.31 per square foot.

The appellants indicated it could be difficult to determine if a building is average or low cost on a manual.  They then indicated that the average of the $9.01 and $5.31 calculations was $124,863 with an assessment of $41,617.

The board of review next called the supervisor of assessments to testify.  She presented a grid analysis of the subject and four suggested comparables and their property record cards.  The first property was also the appellants' first comparable.  However, the supervisor of assessments indicated the board of review measured this property and it contains 10,500 square feet, not 10,932 square feet as listed by the appellants' accountant.  The witness testified all four properties are horse barns.  They were constructed from 1992 to 1997 while the subject was completed in 2001.  They are all pole buildings and contain from 3,456 to 10,500 square feet.  The building assessments ranged from $2.83 to $4.84 per square foot.  The subject's building assessment was $3.22 per square foot and falls within this range. 

After reviewing the record and considering the evidence, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal.  The Board further finds that the appellants have failed to support the contention of overvaluation.  When market value is the basis of the appeal the value must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.  National City Bank of Michigan/Illinois v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 331 Ill.App.3d 1038 (3^rd Dist. 2002), Winnebago County Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 313 Ill.App.3d 179 (2^nd Dist. 2000).

The Board first finds the appellants presented numerous methods of valuing the subject horse barn prepared by their accountant.  The Board finds the accountant is not an expert in the field of real property, appraising real property or assessing real property.

The Board finds the subject horse barn was constructed by the appellant who is a building contractor.  Although a small amount of lumber from a church was used in the tack room, it was first treated for water damage prior to installation.  The logs used in the office and tack room may have been given to the appellants, however, it is new material.  The Board finds the assessment of property does not depend on whether the materials in the structure were gifts or purchased.  The Board finds no real support for the appellants' claim that the subject should be viewed as class D pole low cost construction.  The only used material was a small amount in the tack room.  Also, the appellant is a contractor in the building trade. 

Both parties used the Marshall Valuation Service for their cost figures.  The board of review used $10.40 per square foot for a class D average arena building.  This resulted in total costs of $195,000.  Applying the appropriate depreciation for a 25 year life resulted in a depreciated building cost of $181,350.  The Board notes the subject has some finish in the tack room and heated shop and also contains an office with some finish. 

The appellants used the Marshall Valuation Service Cost figures for class D low cost pole arena.  The Board finds this figure is far less than the appellants' own reported construction costs.  Furthermore, the subject has an office, tack room, storage and a large shop not included in the Marshall Valuation Service description of a class D low cost building.  Therefore, the Board finds the board of review's figure of $10.40 per square foot more closely resembles the subject building. 

With regard to the appellants' construction costs, there were no actual bills presented to substantiate the list of reported costs.  Also, the appellant is a contractor and 20% of the total costs were unaccounted for costs.  The accountant simply listed a 22,544 cost for "contingency items" and stated this figure was for items that may have been omitted or items that were purchased for other projects but used on the subject property.  The Board finds this is a large "miscellaneous" item composing 20% of all reported costs.  Also, there is what appears to be an unexplained arbitrary value of $15,000 for "discounted materials."  The appellants' estimated labor was $20,000, however, their own witness could not explain the method for arriving at this figure.  The Board finds these three items comprise over 40% of the total indicated costs with very little basis in support.

The appellants' accountant also prepared methods whereby the estimated values from the assessments of suggested comparable properties were used to compare to the subject.  The properties had assessments reflecting market values of $4.79 to $9.26 per square foot.  The accountant used the assessor's value of the subject rather than the subsequent final reduced value from the board of review.  The correct value for the subject horse barn as reflected in the assessment was $9.67 per square foot and is only slightly higher than the appellants' own suggested comparables.

The Board finds the subject property is newer and superior to all of the appellants' suggested comparables.  Two properties are not horse barns and are 26 and 27 years older than the subject.  Another property is a converted machine shed of much lower quality than the subject.  Another property has no indoor arena and has a much lower quality of construction for the stalls.  The final property is the most similar to the subject but does not have the finish the subject has, has less concrete and a much smaller office.  This property is also four years older, is only 55% the subject's size and has only 8 stalls compared to the subject's 20 stalls.  This property is a Morton Building and has an assessment reflecting a value of $9.26 per square foot.  The subject's value as reflected in the assessment is $9.67 per square foot and is only slightly higher than this inferior property.  The Board therefore finds the appellants have not supported their claim of overvaluation.

The appellants also claimed the subject was inequitably assessed when compared to other similar properties.  The Board finds the appellants have failed to support the contention of unequal treatment in the assessment process.  The Illinois Supreme Court has held that taxpayers who object to an assessment on the basis of lack of uniformity bear the burden of proving the disparity of assessment valuations by clear and convincing evidence.  Kankakee County Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 131 Ill.2d 1 (1989).  The evidence must demonstrate a consistent pattern of assessment inequities within the assessment jurisdiction.  After an analysis of the assessment data, the Board finds that the appellants has failed to overcome this burden.

As indicated above, the appellants presented five properties that are inferior to the subject with only one property coming somewhat close to the subject in amenities, age and construction.  The board of review presented four comparable horse barns, one of which was the appellants' most similar property.  These four properties are similar in age, however all are significantly smaller than the subject and have fewer amenities.  These properties had improvement assessments ranging from $2.83 to $5.69 per square foot.  The subject's improvement assessment was $3.22 per square foot and falls within this range.  The Board finds the subject's larger size would typically explain a lower assessment per square foot while its amenities would offset this reduction.

The constitutional provision for uniformity of taxation and valuation does not require mathematical equality.  The requirement is satisfied if the intent is evident to adjust the burden with a reasonable degree of uniformity and if such is the effect of the statute enacted by the General Assembly establishing the method of assessing real property in its general operation.  A practical uniformity, rather than an absolute one, is the test.  Apex Motor Fuel Co. v. Barrett, 20 Ill.2d 395 (1960).  Although the comparables presented by the appellant disclosed that properties located in the same area are not assessed at identical levels, all that the constitution requires is a practical uniformity which appears to exist on the basis of the evidence. 

For the foregoing reasons, the Board finds that the appellants have not proven by clear and convincing evidence that the subject horse barn is inequitably assessed.  The Board also finds the appellants have not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject horse barn was overvalued.  Therefore, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that the subject's assessment as established by the board of review is correct and no reduction is warranted.

The parties of record before the Property Tax Appeal Board are David and Kendra Perzee, the appellants, and the Iroquois County Board of Review.

The subject property consists of 9.99 acres in Iroquois Township.  The property is improved with a 2,042 square foot frame single-family dwelling constructed in 1971 with an addition and garage added in 1996.  There are also a 576 square foot detached garage, two sheds with 80 and 432 square feet and a 2,016 square foot pole building.  The subject also contains an in-ground swimming pool. 

The appellant, David Perzee, appeared before the Property Tax Appeal Board claiming unequal treatment in the assessment process with regard to the subject's land classification as the basis of the appeal.  More specifically, the appellant argued the subject's land was improperly classified as residential land.  He claimed other properties similar to the subject were classified as farmland.  The improvement assessment is not in contention in this appeal as the parties previously stipulated to the improvement assessment as established by the board of review of $53,174.

The appellant first presented three suggested comparable properties that were listed as located in the same section or one mile from the subject.  The properties contain from 3 to 8.87 acres and have dwellings and garages.  The land assessments ranged from $6,510 to $13,522 or from $1,524 to $2,170 per acre.  The subject's 9.9 acres had a land assessment of $10,849 or $1,096 per acre and is lower than the appellants' three comparables. 

The appellant also argued he reports the property to the United States Department of Agriculture and presented a document entitled USDA-FSA Summary Acreage History Report, dated July 25, 2002.  The document stated 4.2 acres are listed as cropland.  However, the statement across the middle of the document states: "NO CROPS ON THIS FARM."  Another document entitled United States 2002 Census of Agriculture was presented.  This is a form that the appellants filed listing the number of acres they own.  The document included the subject and other acreage that totaled 325 acres.  The appellant indicated two acres were for pasture and seven acres were woodland.  He reported eight sheep were on the property in 2002 with two being sold.

A letter from a veterinarian, dated December 31,2002, stated that he has provided care to the sheep on the subject property for the last several years and that the sheep are exhibited at county fairs and livestock shows.  Bills for veterinary care, grooming, hog panels and posts, entry fees, sale and purchase bills for a few sheep in 2001 and information on a disease that affects sheep were also presented. 

A letter from a 4-H Club member, dated February 11, 2003, indicated that the author showed four sheep at a 2003 county fair that belonged to the appellants and were housed on the subject property.  A photograph showing a small fenced area with fence panels secured with metal posts that did not appear to be permanent.

The appellant also argued 90% of the subject dwellings heating comes from a wood burning furnace.  He moved into the dwelling in March of 1996.  At that time he added a 864 square foot addition to the home and put the wood burning furnace in that addition.  The appellant supplied a copy of the furnace installation contract that was unsigned and a list of fuel bills indicating the propane tanks were filled less often after the installation of the wood-burning furnace. 

Photographs of the subject land were also presented showing a good portion of the subject land is a manicured lawn.  The wooded area is not dense with trees but has them nicely spaced.  No ground was planted in crops and none was fenced or showed any sheep or livestock.  A manual on management of wood ash was also presented.  Information on the subject's soil types was also presented. 

A Property Tax Appeal Board decision on a Boone County property was also presented.  In that decision the Board found 13.42 acres of a 14.32 acre property should be classified as farmland.  The owners of the property carefully evaluated the property and found they could effectively manage a tree crop for heating, hot water and for fuel to run their cooking stove.  They had their own farm management plan and planted trees and a cover crop staring in 1974 and cut a certain amount of wood each year to provide for their needs.  This plan was in effect to provide their subsistence without running out of wood fuel.  The Property Tax Appeal Board found the primary use of 12.42 acres was for the production and harvesting of trees to use as fuel-crop.

The appellant also presented photographs and property record cards for four properties that are classified as farmland that he claims are no different than the subject property.  The appellant also indicated the occupations of each of the owners.  The appellant testified the first property is located a mile from the subject and contains 40 acres.  The appellant was not sure of the homesite size but assumed it was approximately one acre.  The remaining 39 acres they claimed was woods and used as a homesite.  A photograph shows a field where crops have been removed and dense woods.

The appellant testified the second property is .75 of a mile from the subject and has over ten acres.  The property record cards indicate there are 14.27 acres.  The appellant again did not know the size of the homesite but assumed it was two acres.  He testified the balance is grass and trees and that there is no farming activity on this property.  A photograph shows a dwelling, two barns and a large yard.  The other photographs are taken looking toward the dwelling showing the same area.

The third property is four miles from the subject and contains five acres.  The appellant again assumed this property has a two acre homesite with the balance in open pasture and wooded ground.  He claimed there were no crops or animals on this property.  Photographs show a dwelling, a large outbuilding, a barn and a garage.  The photographs were close to the buildings with only the homesite area visible.

The fourth property is located .75 of an acre from the subject and contains over 20 acres.  The property record cards indicate 21.44 acres.  The appellant claimed this property has a homesite with the balance in wooded land.  He testified there are no crops or animals on this property.  Two photographs show close-ups of the dwelling and one photograph shows the dwelling and a pole building.  A fourth photograph shows some wooded area.

The appellant testified the subject outbuilding and garage house a wagon, tractor, disk and harrow.  He stated there is a one acre homesite however, he then stated there are over two acres in the front portion by the road that is grass.  This area is mowed and not used as a pasture.  The balance of the property has trees.  The appellant also indicated the home, buildings and sheep are all located on the one acre homesite area.

The appellant testified he has had from four to ten sheep per year on the subject property and has kept sheep since 1999.  The sheep are housed in small, portable huts on the north side of the dwelling.  The sheep remain confined to the fenced area at all times.  The appellant testified the fenced area is 28 by 48 feet or 1,344 square feet.

During cross-examination the appellant testified the tractor is for manure and tree removal and the disk is for leveling the ground after a tree is removed.  He stated he purchased two or three sheep in the two years preceding January 1, 2001 and has sold two or three in that same timeframe.  He stated he has yet to make a profit and that all the sales are 4-H or county fair sales. 

The appellant agreed the U.S.D.A. census states that the two acres of grass can be used for grazing but it has not been used for this purpose.  The milk cows listed on the census form are for his other property.  His plan for the treed area consists of taking out dead trees and planting new ones.

The board of review submitted "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" wherein the subject's final assessment of $64,023 was presented.  The assessment reflects an estimated value for the subject land, dwelling and buildings of $192,088.  In addition, the board of review indicated the appellants purchased the subject property in March of 1996 for $177,900 when the property was comprised of fifteen acres.  In May of 1997 the appellants sold 5.01 acres for $55,000 or $10,978 per acre.  Deeds and real estate transfer declarations were presented to support these sales.

The board of review also presented a grid analysis of the four properties the appellant argued were no different than the subject property but classified as farmland.  One property containing 21.44 acres is being combined with another parcel.  There is a one acre homesite, one acre as wasteland and 18.78 acres of other land.  The board of review's representative did not know what type of farming or other activity was on the property in 2002.  Another property submitted by the appellant has 14.27 acres and contains grain bins, a barn and a tool shed.  Cattle were on the property in 2000.  A total of 12.19 acres are considered other farmland and one acre is a homesite.  The board's representative did not know if the grain bins were being used.  He argued the primary use of this property is different than the subject property.

The board of review argued the appellants' third property is not like the subject in that it contains 44.89 acres of pasture and a one acre homesite.  However, the board of review's witness testified during cross-examination that this property was split from a larger tract of woodland pasture.  He stated he has not reviewed the classification of this parcel since the split and that it may have an incorrect classification for 2002.

The board of review indicated the last of the appellants' properties has five acres with a one acre homesite, 2.63 acres of pasture and a fenced animal lot. 

The board of review also presented four decisions from the Property Tax Appeal Board wherein the Board found that the present use of the property, not alternative uses, determines whether a property is entitled to a farmland classification.  The Board also found there is no minimum acreage in determining whether a property is a farm and the fact a property had previously been assessed as a farm does not prohibit its change in classification if the primary use is not agricultural.

The board of review also presented the Property Tax Appeal Board's 2000 decision on the subject property.  In that appeal as in the present appeal the appellants claimed unequal treatment in the assessment process and that the subject was incorrectly classified as residential land.  The Property Tax Appeal Board found the assessment was correct and made no change.

After reviewing the record and considering the evidence, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal.  The appellants argued the subject property was inequitably assessed as residential property when other similar properties are classified and assessed as farmland. 

The Board further finds that the appellants have failed to support the contention of unequal treatment in the assessment process.  The Illinois Supreme Court has held that taxpayers who object to an assessment on the basis of lack of uniformity bear the burden of proving the disparity of assessment valuations by clear and convincing evidence.  Kankakee County Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 131 Ill.2d 1 (1989).  The evidence must demonstrate a consistent pattern of assessment inequities within the assessment jurisdiction.  After an analysis of the assessment data, the Board finds that the appellants have failed to overcome this burden. 

The appellants first presented three equity comparables on a grid analysis with the subject property.  The suggested comparable properties contain from 3 to 8.87 acres and have land assessments ranging from $6,510 to $13,522 or from $1,524 to $2,170 per acre.  The subject contains 9.99 acres and has a land assessment of $10,849 or $1,096 per acre and is less than their own three comparables.

The appellants also presented four properties they claimed were the same as the subject property but were given farmland classifications.  The Board finds one property contained over 40 acres that was assessed as a farm prior to it being split.  It was unclear what was on the remaining smaller parcel after the split and the board of review agreed the assessment might have been incorrect for 2002.  Another parcel contains 21.44 acres and is being combined with another parcel.  It was unclear whether the assessment was correct after the parcels were combined.  Another property had grain bins, a barn and a tool shed.  Cattle were known to be on the property in 2000.  Photographs of all of these properties were also inconclusive as they were taken of the dwelling and building area or showed fields and woods that would support a farmland assessment.  The Board finds the subject photographs show a manicured lawn setting with no pastureland.  The treed area on the subject was not considered densely wooded. 

The constitutional provision for uniformity of taxation and valuation does not require mathematical equality.  The requirement is satisfied if the intent is evident to adjust the burden with a reasonable degree of uniformity and if such is the effect of the statute enacted by the General Assembly establishing the method of assessing real property in its general operation.  A practical uniformity, rather than an absolute one, is the test.  Apex Motor Fuel Co. v. Barrett, 20 Ill.2d 395 (1960).  Although the comparables presented by the appellant disclosed that properties located in the same area are not assessed at identical levels, all that the constitution requires is a practical uniformity which appears to exist on the basis of the evidence.  For the foregoing reasons, the Board finds that the appellants have not proven by clear and convincing evidence that the subject property is inequitably assessed. 

Regarding the appellants' claim that the subject property was improperly classified and assessed as residential land, the Board finds that when overvaluation and market value are the bases of the appeal the value must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.  Winnebago County Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 313 Ill.App.3d 179 (2^nd Dist. 2000).  The Board finds the appellants have failed to meet this burden.

Section 1-60 of the Property Tax Code defines a farm in pertinent part as follows:

When used in connection with valuing land and buildings for an agricultural use, any property used solely for the growing and harvesting of crops; for feeding, breeding and management of livestock; for dairying or for any other agricultural or horticultural use or combination thereof; including, but not limited to hay, grain, fruit, truck or vegetable crops, floriculture, mushroom growing, plant or tree nurseries, orchards, forestry, sod farming and greenhouses; the keeping, raising and feeding of livestock or poultry, including dairying, poultry, swine, sheep, beef cattle, ponies or horses, fur farming, bees, fish and wildlife farming...For purposes of this Code, "farm" does not include property which is primarily used for residential purposes even though some farm products may be grown or farm animals bred or fed on the property incidental to its primary use...  35 ILCS 200/1-60

Additionally, in order to qualify for an agricultural assessment the land must be used for agricultural purposes for at least two years preceding the date of assessment.  35 ILCS 200/10-110

The Board finds no part of the subject property falls within the definition of a farm for classification and assessment purposes.  The Board finds the subject is primarily used for residential purposes.  The area where the subject dwelling is located along with the front two acres are well maintained manicured lawns.  There is no farming activity here and the appellants agreed this area, although able to support a pasture, is not used for pasture.  The sheep are corralled in a small 28 x 48 foot area with a small shed and very small portable huts.  The Board finds the area for the sheep is no larger than a large dog pen and the huts are no larger than doghouses.  The Board finds the fencing around the pen rests on the ground and is held by metal posts that could easily be taken down and moved.  The Board finds this is a hobby area with a good cause, however, the primary use of subject land is residential.

With regard to the appellants' claim that they are growing and harvesting the trees on the wooded area, the Board finds the wooded area of the subject property is also for residential purposes and enhances the dwelling and grounds.  The trees appear to be evenly spaced for appearance and located at some distance from each other.  The Board finds the subject land is residential with appealing wooded area.  Although the appellants use the dead wood for wood to heat the furnace, the primary use is aesthetic and for the residential property.  The appellants have another furnace and there was no showing the property was purchased for the wood to heat the home.  The appellants also have no reasoned, methodically implemented plan for harvesting the wood.  They simply use the dead wood and replace a dead tree with another tree.  These activities happen on residential property.  The Board finds that one furnace in the subject dwelling is not a controlling factor in the classification of this wooded area.

Based on this analysis of the record, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds the appellants have not proven the subject property is inequitably assessed or improperly classified.  Therefore, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that the subject's assessment as established by the board of review is correct and no reduction is warranted.

The parties of record before the Property Tax Appeal Board are Steven C. and Ruth A. Young, the appellants, and the Macon County Board of Review.

The subject property consists of 1.51 acres improved with a 1,983 square foot split-level frame dwelling located near Decatur.  The dwelling was constructed in 1999 and has two and one half bathrooms, central air conditioning, a partial basement, a deck and a two car attached garage.  The appellants claim unequal treatment in the assessment process as the basis of the appeal.

The appellants first argued that they appealed the prior year's assessment to the Property Tax Appeal Board and received a reduction in the improvement assessment.  The instant appeal was filed within 30 days of receiving the Board's 2001 decision.  The appellants explained that for the 2001 appeal, the subject consisted of farmland and the homesite and dwelling.  In 2002, they requested that the board of review split off 1.51 acres from the farm.  This was done and the subject 1.51 acres was given a new parcel number.  The appellants claim there is no farmland on this new, smaller parcel and request the $146 farmland portion of the subject's assessment be removed.

The appellants also submitted assessment data and local multiple listing information on three properties located from one to two miles from the subject.  The lot sizes are 12,000, 13,300 and 45,000 square feet.  The dwellings are a one and one half story cape cod, a tri-level and a ranch style home.  The dwellings are of frame construction and were built from 1996 and 2001.  One property was listed as a "shell erect" dwelling with the buyer designing the interior.  The properties have central air conditioning, one and one half to two and one half bathrooms, two have fireplaces and each has a garage.  None of the three have basements.  The properties had improvement assessments ranging from $29,009 to $33,768 or from $13.41 to $23.32 per square foot, while the subject improvement was valued at $51,858 or $26.15 per square foot.

The appellants also argued the subject land was inequitably assessed.  The comparables had land sizes ranging from 12,000 to 45,000 square feet and had land assessments ranging from $2,431 to $4,941 or from $.35 to $.54 per square foot.  The subject contains 60,000 square feet of land area and has a land assessment of $3,293 or $.54 per square foot.  There was an additional $146 farmland assessment.

The board of review submitted "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" wherein the subject's final assessment was presented.  The assessment reflects an estimated market value, using the 2002 three year median level of assessments of 33.19%, of $166,607 including the $146 farmland assessment and $166,168 without the farmland assessment.  In addition, the board of review presented a real estate transfer declaration form indicating the appellants sold the subject property in June 2004 for $162,000.  The board of review also presented the subject's property record card and agreed the subject contains 1.51 acres in 2002.  No other assessment or valuation evidence was presented.

After reviewing the record and considering the evidence, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal.  The Board also finds the size and classification of the subject land has changed from the 2001 assessment year.  In 2001, the subject contained 32 acres.  In 2002, the appellants requested the subject's 1.51 acres of residential land be split from the farmland.  The board of review complied and the subject received a new parcel number.  The appellants argued no farming is taking place on the 1.51 acre subject.  The Board finds the $146 farmland assessment on the subject property should be removed.  Therefore a reduction in the land assessment is warranted based on the classification change.

The appellants also argued unequal treatment in the assessment process.  The Illinois Supreme Court has held that taxpayers who object to an assessment on the basis of lack of uniformity bear the burden of proving the disparity of assessment valuations by clear and convincing evidence.  Kankakee County Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 131 Ill.2d 1 (1989).  The evidence must demonstrate a consistent pattern of assessment inequities within the assessment jurisdiction.  After an analysis of the assessment data, the Board finds that a slight reduction in the improvement assessment and removal of the farmland assessment are warranted.

The appellants presented three properties to compare to the subject.  The improvement assessments ranged from $13.41 to $23.32 per square foot.  The subject's improvement assessment was $26.15 per square foot.  Only one of these properties was also used in the 2001 appeal.  The Board finds the suggested comparable properties are a one and one half story cape cod, a tri-level and a ranch style dwelling while the subject is a split-level dwelling.  All three are older than the subject, one is over 500 square feet smaller and none have basements.  Furthermore, the land sizes for these properties are significantly smaller than the subject.  The Board therefore finds the subject should have an assessment somewhat higher than these properties. 

The Board finds the board of review presented no assessment comparables in the record.  The board of review presented the sale price of the subject property in June 2004 of $162,000.  The Board finds the subject's sale price is two and one half years after the January 1, 2002 assessment date at issue in this appeal.  Also, the Board finds the subject's assessment, without the farmland assessment, reflects a value of $166,168 and is higher than the sale price.

The appellants also argued the land assessment was inequitable.  The comparables had land sizes ranging from 12,000 to 45,000 square feet and had land assessments ranging from $.35 to $.54 per square foot.  The subject's homesite assessment was $.54 per square foot.  The Board finds the subject's homesite assessment is within the range and identical to one of the comparables.  Therefore, no reduction in the land assessment, except for the removal of the farmland assessment, is warranted.

For the foregoing reasons, the Board finds that the record supports a reduction in the subject property's assessment.  The Board finds the subject has no farmland and the farmland assessment should be removed.  The Board also finds a slight reduction in the improvement assessment is warranted.