2004 Synopsis -- Residential Chapter

PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD

SYNOPSIS OF REPRESENTATIVE CASES

 RESIDENTIAL DECISIONS 

 PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD

Section 16-190 of the Property Tax Code

(35 ILCS 200/16-190, Illinois Compiled Statutes)

Official Rules - Section 1910.76

Printed by Authority of the State of Illinois

www.state.il.us/agency/ptab

 RESIDENTIAL CHAPTER

Table of Contents

The parties of record before the Property Tax Appeal Board are Jeffrey A. Cerny, the appellant; and the DuPage County Board of Review.

The subject property is improved with a part two-story and a part one-story single family dwelling that contains 5,370 square feet of living area.  The dwelling has a brick exterior construction; a full, partially finished basement; four fireplaces; central air conditioning; and a three car attached garage.  The dwelling was constructed in 1989.  The property is located in Hinsdale, Downers Grove Township, DuPage County.

The appellant and his attorney appeared before the Property Tax Appeal Board contending assessment inequity as the basis of the appeal.  The appellant argued the subject property was being assessed at a higher percentage of its fair cash value than other properties that sold for similar prices.  The evidence presented by the appellant disclosed the subject property sold in an arm's length transaction in July 2002.  The multiple listing sheet and the appellant's documentation indicated that the subject property sold for a price of $1,344,000.  The subject had a total assessment of $349,440 resulting an assessment to sale price ratio of 26%.

In support of this argument the appellant submitted information on eleven comparables.  The appellant testified he selected the comparables using criteria based on location in Hinsdale, the date of sale and the value of the property.  The witness indicated that he made use of an on line search of the multiple listing service to identify the comparables.  Fourteen sales were identified but three were eliminated because they had partial assessments.  The appellant provided a copy of the report identifying the comparables and copies of the multiple listing sheets for the eleven comparables.  The appellant's information indicated the comparables sold from February 2002 to August 2002 for prices ranging from $1,225,000 to $1,450,000.  These same comparables had assessments ranging from $165,900 to $321,960.  The assessment to sales price ratios ranged from 11.5% to 25.0%.  Based on this evidence the appellant requested the subject's assessment be reduced. 

The board of review submitted its "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" wherein its final assessment of the subject totaling $349,900 was disclosed.  The subject property had an improvement assessment of $227,570 or $42.38 per square foot of living area.  In support of the subject's assessment the board of review presented the testimony and an analysis prepared by deputy township assessor.

The deputy township assessor first analyzed six of the appellant's comparables.  The comparables consisted of similarly styled single-family dwellings that ranged in size from 3,286 to 4,180 square feet of living area.  The homes were of brick or frame and brick exterior construction that were built from 1898 to 2001.  These comparables had total assessments that ranged from $206,330 to $316,820 and improvement assessments that ranged from $126,720 to $203,340 or from $32.99 to $57.33 per square foot of living area.  The board of review also indicated these comparables sold from February 2002 to August 2002 for prices ranging from $1,194,425 to $1,380,000 or from $293.66 to $419.96 per square foot of building area.  Comparing their 2002 assessments with their sales prices resulted in assessment ratios ranging from 16.54% to 22.96%.

The deputy township assessor also submitted information on six additional comparables to demonstrate the subject property was being equitably assessed.  The comparables consisted of similarly styled single-family dwellings that ranged in size from 5,198 to 5,732 square feet of living area.  The comparables were of frame, brick or brick and frame exterior construction and were built from 1989 to 1999.  These properties had total assessments that ranged from $423,280 to $579,310 and improvement assessments that ranged from $322,680 to $441,530 or from $60.12 to $80.22 per square foot of living area.  The board of review contends these comparables demonstrate the subject is being assessed in an equitable manner at $42.38 per square foot of living area.  The board of review argued that its comparables were similar to the subject in physical attributes and neighborhood.

Under cross-examination the deputy township assessor discussed the location of the comparables and the neighborhood codes assigned to the properties.  The witness was also questioned about the reported sales price for the subject of $1,310,400.  She testified the price was taken from the Illinois Real Estate Transfer Declaration.  A copy of the transfer declaration associated with the sale of the subject was offered and accepted into the record.  The transfer declaration indicated the net consideration for the real estate was $1,310,400.

The board of review's evidence disclosed that its comparables 1, 4, 5 and 6 sold from July 1998 to January 2000 for prices ranging from $1,485,492 to $2,300,000.  Its comparables numbered 2 and 3 sold in July 1996 and October 1991 for prices of $1,537,500 and $1,425,000, respectively.

Under redirect the appellant indicated the subject property sold for $1,310,400.  He testified that his wife was the realtor and waived her fee to make the deal happen.  In rebuttal the appellant also submitted an analysis of the board of review's comparables by making adjustments to their sales prices for appreciation over time.  He argued that if the sales prices are adjusted for time and then compared with the current assessments their assessment to sales ratios would range from 19.4% to 23.3%.

After hearing the testimony and reviewing the evidence the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the appeal.  The Board further finds that the evidence in the record supports a reduction in the assessment of the subject property.

The appellant contends unequal treatment in the assessment process as the basis of the appeal.  The Supreme Court of Illinois in Walsh v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 181 Ill.2d 228, 229 Ill.Dec. 487, 692 N.E.2d 260 (1998), set forth the basic tenets of the Illinois Constitution's uniformity clause requirement as it relates to the assessment and taxation of real estate.  The court stated that:

The Illinois property tax scheme is grounded in article IX, section 4, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, which provides in pertinent part that real estate taxes "shall be levied uniformly by valuation ascertained as the General Assembly shall provide by law."  Ill.Const.1970, art. IX, §4(a).  Uniformity requires equality in the burden of taxation.  Kankakee County Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 131 Ill.2d 1, 20, 136 Ill.Dec. 76, 544 N.E.2d 762 (1989).  This, in turn, requires equality of taxation in proportion to the value of property being taxed.  Apex Motor Fuel Co. v. Barrett, 20 Ill.2d 395, 401, 169 N.E.2d 769 (1960).  Thus, taxing officials may not value the same kinds of properties within the same taxing boundary at different proportions of their true value.  Kankakee County Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 131 Ill.2d at 20, 136 Ill.Dec. 76, 544 N.E.2d 762 (1989).  The party objecting to an assessment on lack of uniformity grounds bears the burden of proving the disparity by clear and convincing evidence.  .  Kankakee County Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 131 Ill.2d at 22, 136 Ill.Dec. 76, 544 N.E.2d 762 (1989).

Walsh v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 181 Ill.2d at 234, 229 Ill.Dec. 487, 692 N.E.2d 260 (1998).  The uniform assessment requirement mandates that property not be assessed at a substantially greater proportion of its value when compared to similar properties located within the taxing district.  Kankakee County Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 131 Ill.2d at 21, 136 Ill.Dec. 76, 544 N.E.2d 762 (1989).

In this appeal the appellant submitted sales information and assessment data on eleven comparables to demonstrate the subject property was being assessed at a greater percentage of market value than properties with similar market values.  The comparables were located in Hinsdale and sold from February 2002 to August 2002 for prices ranging from $1,225,000 to $1,450,000.  These same comparables had assessments ranging from $165,900 to $321,960.  The assessment to sales price ratios for these properties ranged from 11.5% to 25.0%.  The appellant's information included five comparables that sold for prices similar to that commanded by the subject ranging from $1,300,000 to $1,380,000 in a period from May 2002 to August 2002.  These comparables had total assessments ranging from $226,630 to $321,960.  The appellant explained his search criteria included finding comparables that sold about the same approximate time as the subject and for a price similar to the subject property.  Accepting the real estate transfer declaration as the best evidence of the sales price of the subject, the subject property sold in July 2002 for a price of $1,310,400.  The subject property had a total assessment of $349,440 resulting in an assessment to sales price ratio of 26.67%.  The board of review did not present any evidence refuting the data used by the appellant to develop his analysis.  The Property Tax Appeal Board finds this evidence demonstrates that the subject property was not being assessed uniformly with properties having similar market values.

The board of review submitted information on six comparables located in Hinsdale that had similar physical attributes as the subject property.  The board of review's comparables were similar to the subject in size ranging from 5,198 to 5,732 square feet of living area and also similar to the subject in age being constructed from 1989 to 1999.  Although these properties had similar attributes as the subject, the board of review did not demonstrate these comparables had similar market values as the subject.  In fact, the Board finds a review of the data indicates that although the board of review's comparables had similar physical characteristics as the subject their market values exceeded that of the subject property.  The board of review's analysis disclosed its comparables sold from October 1991 to January 2000 for prices ranging from $1,425,000 to $2,300,000.  Even though these sales occurred from two to eleven years prior to the subject's sale in 2002, each commanded a higher price than the subject property.  Considering, most likely, the values of these properties appreciated over time from their initial sale dates, their current values would be substantially greater than the subject property.  Thus the Board finds the board of review did not establish with the use of its comparables that the subject property was being assessed at a substantially similar proportion of its value when compared to similar valued properties located within the taxing district. 

Based on this record the Property Tax Appeal Board finds a reduction in the subject's assessment is appropriate.

The parties of record before the Property Tax Appeal Board are various appellants that were collectively represented by an attorney, and the Lake County Board of Review,  Prior to the hearing, the appeals under docket numbers 01-01051.001-R-1, 01-01054.001-R-1 and 01-01057.001-R-1 were withdrawn.

The subject properties consist of single-family dwellings in the Nickels and Dimes Subdivision located in Libertyville.  The appellants contend unequal treatment in the assessment process as the basis of the appeal.  More specifically, the appellants argue that the reassessments of the subject properties are illegal because they were performed in a non-quadrennial general assessment year.  The appellants contested the improvement assessments and did not contest the land assessments of the properties.

The appellants contend the Libertyville Township Assessor's authority is limited to only changing assessments during a quadrennial general assessment year.  They claim the increases in the assessments of the various subject properties by the assessor and the board of review's approval of such increases constitutes illegal and unconstitutional treatment in the assessment process.  The appellants claim it is unfair to revalue some properties while all other properties remained at the same assessment they had in the first year of the quadrennial period.  They claim that in 2001, the second year of the quadrennial cycle, the township assessor selected only certain properties to revalue even though there had been no physical changes to the properties from 2000 to 2001.  They further claim there was no independent reassessment made on other similarly situated properties in the township.  For 2001 those properties simply had 1.0259 multipliers applied to their 2000 assessments under a mass appraisal system.

The appellants provided pertinent parts to the following Property Tax Code sections: 35 ILCS 200/9-215, 9/225, 9/155 and 9/95.  These sections state in part that the general assessment years shall be 1995 and every fourth year after; counties may divide into four assessment districts; on or before June 1 in each general assessment year the assessor shall actually view and determine value for each property as of January 1 of that year and; taxes shall be levied and extended during the general assessment period on the assessment as modified or equalized or changed as provided by law.

The appellants presented Group Exhibit A that contains the 2000 land, improvement and total assessments of the subject properties.  It also contains the 2001 revalued land, improvement and total assessments of the subject properties, along with the equalized assessments of the properties for 2001.

In further support of their claims the appellants cited Albee v. Soat, 315 Ill.App.3d 388 (2^nd Dist. 2000).  In that case dealing with the 1996 assessment, the board of review admitted the 1995 assessment had been correct.  The appellants in the instant appeal interpreted the Albee decision to mean that assessors cannot make non-quadrennial increases in assessments unless such increases are uniformly applied to the entire county, township or district.  In Albee the court found that section 9-75 of the Property Tax Code permits an assessor to "revise and correct an assessment as appears to be just."  (35 ILCS 200/9-75.  The court found the assessor does not have the authority to revise or correct where, as in that case, the circumstances of having a correct 1995 assessment did not require a revision and correction.  (emphasis added).

Group Exhibit B presented by the appellants is a list of properties in two other subdivisions in Libertyville Township that had no assessment increases from 2000 to 2001 except for the 1.0259 equalization factor applied in 2001.  The appellants presented property record cards for the subject properties listed in Group A and the properties listed in Group B.  Since the record cards for the subject properties have a column "2001 Reval" and the properties in Group B do not contain this column, the appellants argue the subject properties were assessed using a completely different method.  They argued the Illinois Supreme Court found that uniformity requires that similar properties must be assessed using the same basis of assessment.  Walsh v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 181 Ill.2d 228, 692 N.E.2d 260 (1998). 

The appellants indicated the first property record card for the Group Exhibit B properties indicates a sale of that property in 1998.  The appellants argued this property was not revalued in 2001 like the subject properties.  However, the property was revalued in 2000 and the 2000 and 2001 assessments reflect somewhat higher values than the 1998 sale price.  The appellants also refer to the property record card for the last Group Exhibit B property.  The card shows this property sold in March 2000 for $825,000 but it was not revalued in 2001.  The 2001 assessment reflects an estimated value of $747,000. 

The appellants indicated the land assessments of the subject properties were increased while others were not.  However, none of the appellants appealed the land assessments.  They also argued no changes had been made to the improvements to warrant any increases in value.  In their brief, the appellants indicated they would present a witness to show that no material changes were made to the subject properties.  However, no witness was produced at the hearing.

Group Exhibit C was presented and is a list of properties in the Nickels and Dimes subdivision showing that the land was revalued from the 2000 assessment to the 2001 assessment.  Again, however, the appellants were only contesting the improvement assessments of the subject properties.

The appellants further argued that in the board of review hearings, the assessor provided the board with assessments of other subject properties that had been increased in support of the individual increases.  It is not known what evidence or comparables were used by the appellants in the board of review hearings.  The appellants referred to the final decisions of the board of review for four subject properties: 11-03-101-007, 11-03-101-008, 11-03-102-009, 11-03-102-012 and 11-03-301-016.  The Board notes that the improvement assessment of each of these subject properties was lowered, not raised, from 2000 to 2001.  The final decisions state the following:

The Board approved No Change in Valuation.  The Board feels the subject property's assessment falls within the range established by the comparables presented.  A clear and convincing pattern of assessment inequity has not been demonstrated.  The basis of the appellant's contention of non-uniform treatment in the assessment process rests on the percentage of assessment change from the previous year between various properties and the subject property.  However, assessments rising or falling at different rates is not a measure of uniform treatment.  The Assessor is required to eliminate inequities, which can only be done by raising or lowering assessments at different rates.  The Board feels the subject property is being assessed equitably with the comparables.  Analysis of the comparables submitted indicate that the assessment of the subject property on a price per square foot basis falls within an acceptable range.  Therefore, it is the Board's opinion that equity has been maintained.  The Illinois Supreme Court has ruled that a practical uniformity rather than an absolute one is the test.

The appellants argued Article IX, section 4 of the Illinois Constitution provides for uniformity in the assessment process.  Ill.Const. art.IX, §4(a) (1970).  Uniformity is required in the level of taxation and also in the basis for achieving the levels.  The appellants argued even though state statutes authorize non-quadrennial re-assessments, they must be applied uniformly.  The appellants claim the subject properties were increased while others were not.  Then, an equalization factor of 1.0259 was applied to all properties in the township.  In their briefs the appellants claim that to uphold uniformity the assessor "would have had to determine from her substantive analysis by uniform methodology that properties in the selected area (including the Subject Properties) were under assessed as contrasted to her finding that other properties in her township were not under assessed, in order to avoid a constitutional violation from occurring."  "She would also have had to reassess on the basis of the same methodology used on the properties not reassessed, or else justify the classification of the subject (and other reassessed properties) from reassessment on the basis of different methodology."

As a final argument, the appellants claimed the standard for an appellant to meet in a uniformity appeal is a preponderance of the evidence and not the clear and convincing standard.  The appellants argue that for years the courts have made a mistake in adopting the clear and convincing burden of proof in uniformity appeals. 

The board of review submitted "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" wherein the subject properties' assessments were presented.  In addition, the board of review presented a brief to support the assessments.  Like the appellants, the board of review indicated sections 9-155 and 9-215 of the Property Tax Code apply in these appeals.  35 ILCS 200/9-155, 9-215).  The board argued that in other than general quadrennial assessment years, section 9-75 applies and allows the assessor, in any year, to revise and correct assessments as appears just.  Section 9-205 allows revisions of individual assessments by an assessor under section 9-75.  35 ILCS 200/9-205. 

The board of review claims the appellants simply argued that the assessor selected certain properties to revalue as indicated in their Group Exhibit A.  The board of review argued this exhibit proves nothing more than there were increases to the subject properties' assessments.  In People ex rel.Costello v. Lerner, as cited by the appellants, the taxpayers presented the same argument and claimed this established a per se lack of uniformity.  53 Ill.App.3d 245, 251, 368 N.E.2d 976 (1977).  The court found no legal authority to support this argument and, as here, the board of review argued the appellants have no evidence to support the claim that revisions were not warranted.

The appellants also claim a different basis was used when assessing the subject properties in contravention of the constitutional requirement of uniformity as discussed in the Walsh v. Property Tax Appeal Board decision.  (181 Ill.2d 228, 235, 692 N.E.2d 269, 263 (1998)).  In Walsh, the board of review took the subject and several other properties out of the mass appraisal system and valued them using their recent sales prices.  No other properties were valued according to their sales prices.  The board indicated the assessor's letter spells out her analysis in detail and indicates all properties within the township are viewed by the same basis and same method of assessment.  The board also claimed that pursuant to section 9-75 of the Property Tax Code there is no physical change to the properties required in order for the assessor to revise the assessment.  35 ILCS 200/9-75.

The board of review also responded to the appellants' claim that the courts are incorrect in their use of a clear and convincing standard in uniformity appeals.  The board of review pointed out that if the burden is to change, only the legislature, not the Property Tax Appeal Board, can change it.  The board also indicated the legislature is presumably aware of prior interpretations of the statutes and has had ample opportunity to change the statutes.

A five-page letter from the Libertyville Township Assessor, dated May 1, 2003, was presented.  The assessor was called as a witness and testified consistent with her letter.  The assessor indicated that her office maintains a sales database and that when new sales are received they are reviewed against the previous year's level of assessments and a ratio is then calculated.  She indicated she reviews assessments every year and areas meeting certain criteria are further reviewed.  The criteria are as follows: 1) the median level of assessment for an area or neighborhood has dropped below 31.58% of market value and must be adjusted up to 33.33%, 2) assessments in an area or neighborhood are not uniform or, 3) property information is inaccurate or incomplete. 

The assessor further explained the process for revaluing an area or neighborhood if it meets the criteria.  The steps are as follows: 1) the property record card information is checked and corrected if necessary; 2) the mass appraisal database is updated or corrected if necessary; 3) a land study of vacant land and land residuals of improved properties are reviewed to determine land values, 4) sales ratio studies are generated and compared to the mass appraisal database and actual sales from the prior three years and 5) factors are calculated and applied to bring the resulting values in line with actual market sales and to the state mandated 33.33% level of assessments.

After a review of the township in 2001 based on the above criteria, the assessor determined approximately 20% of the township needed to be revalued.  After this revaluation was completed, all properties in Libertyville Township were given 1.0259 equalization factors.  This resulted in a township level of assessments of 33.33%.

The assessor indicated that she decided in late 2000 to revalue the Nickels and Dimes Subdivision because she had continually received uniformity complaints from residents.  Along with these complaints there were other complaints about inaccurately reported property data.  In her research she found the property record card information for this subdivision was inconsistent and unreliable.  A sales ratio study showed land values reflected in the assessments were significantly below market sales, location within the subdivision affected sales prices and the three year median level of assessments from 1998 to 2000 was 29.78%, significantly below the mandated 33.33% level.  Exhibit A was presented and is a summary of the ratio study.

During her inspection of the subdivision in the fall of 2000 the assessor re-measured every home and new drawings were made.  These inspections turned up numerous inaccuracies in the properties with incorrect living area square footage being the most common problem.  Exhibit B contains the old and new property record cards indicating the inaccuracies and the corrections.  The assessor also indicated that the subdivision was originally a farm with some lots having mature trees and/or pond locations while others had been part of the open fields. 

Using the methods previously mentioned, the assessor determined that lot values were low and that assessing each lot the same did not comport to the sales data.  She found lots with mature trees and/or pond locations had higher sales than those lots that were originally open fields.  Therefore, two lot values were used; premium lots and regular lots.  The assessor indicated multiple lot values are not unique and that other neighborhoods in the township also require different lot values.  After correcting the square footage and other problems and changing the land values to reflect market, the assessments for those properties affected were changed.  The resulting three year median level of assessments was 33.37% after equalization.  Looking at only the 1999 and 2000 sales, because 45% of the sales occurred in 1998, the sale ratio was 31.13%.  (See Exhibits C and D).  She indicated this shows the values in the Nickels and Dimes subdivision are continuing to increase. 

The assessor indicated every property in the subdivision and every property in the township was reviewed using the same criteria.  Only 20% of the township was found to need adjustment because the assessments of the remaining 80% were found to be in line with the sales.  The assessor pointed to the appellants' Group Exhibit B as an example.  The three year median level of assessments for the Terre Fair subdivision in this exhibit was 32.17%, as compared to the significantly low 29.78% for the subject properties' subdivision.  (See Exhibit F).  Therefore, a revaluation was not warranted in Terre Fair and only an equalization factor was applied.

The assessor argued that the appellants want uniform percentage assessment changes in non-quadrennial years. She stated this would be unfair because all markets are not equal as they do not change the same way at the same rate at the same time.  Even neighborhoods can have factors that affect only certain parts of the neighborhood.  Market values are not static or uniform and it is the assessor's job to try to maintain equity.  She argued that a uniform percentage change as argued by the appellants would only serve to benefit properties in certain areas that are experiencing strong markets at the expense of properties in slower growth areas. 

During cross-examination, the assessor testified she turned in her books for the township in the fall of 2001 for the assessment year 2001.  Sales from 2001 are not used in the 2001 sales ratio study because the three-year study does not and should not include the present year.  She also testified that the last property in the appellants' Group Exhibit B was not changed to reflect its sale price because she is not to take one property out of the methodology used on all other properties and re-assess it based on its sale price.  She stated all of the properties in the Nickels and Dimes subdivision were revalued.  Only thirty or so properties actually had to have their assessments changed after the revaluation.  In addition, after reviewing the township, approximately 20% of all of the properties, including many other subdivisions, were found to need further review.  The remaining 80% were also reviewed but were within the acceptable range of the sales ratio.  Twenty percent were below the 31.58% of market value and were reviewed further.  One property is not picked out of this system and revalued based on its ratio alone.  The assessor testified that using the appellants' rationale, boards of review could only lower assessments and would not have the authority to raise them where just.

In rebuttal the appellants again referred to Albee v. Soat, 315 Ill.App.3d 888, 735 N.E.2d 716 (2000).  The appellants quoted portions of the opinion but excluded some language between the quoted language.  The appellants also included their own language within the quoted section.  They continually stated that the assessor selectively reassessed 20% of the properties in the township.  The appellants' rebuttal mirrored their arguments in their case-in-chief.

After reviewing the record and considering the evidence, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal. 

The Board must first address the appellants' contention that their burden of proof in a uniformity appeal is a preponderance of the evidence and not clear and convincing evidence.  The Board finds clear and convincing is the standard to be used by the Property Tax Appeal Board in uniformity appeals as found by Illinois courts.  As an example of the many court opinions to that effect, in 1989, the Illinois Supreme Court held that taxpayers who object to an assessment on the basis of lack of uniformity bear the burden of proving the disparity of assessment valuations by clear and convincing evidence.  Kankakee County Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 131 Ill.2d 1 (1989).  The evidence must demonstrate a consistent pattern of assessment inequities within the assessment jurisdiction. 

In Winnebago County Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board, the appellate court spelled out in detail the burden of proof in uniformity appeals.  313 Ill.App.3d 179, 728 N.E.2d 1256 (2000).  The court found one of its own Second District opinions from 1997 and one opinion from the Fourth District in 1994 that used the preponderance of the evidence standard, rather than clear and convincing in a uniformity appeal.  The court clarified the standard of proof in Winnebago as follows:

We recognize that at least two opinions of the appellate court that, to prevail on a claim that an assessment is excessive, the taxpayer must prove that claim by clear and convincing evidence (rather than a mere preponderance).  See Techalloy Co. v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 291 Ill.App.3d 86, 92, 225 Ill.Dec. 262, 683 N.E.2d 206 (1997); Illini Country Club v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 263 Ill.App.3d 410, 416, 200 Ill.Dec. 764, 635 N.E.2d 1347 (1994).  However, we believe these statements are unsound because they confuse claims of excessiveness with claims of nonuniformity.

The court found that the court in Techalloy relied on the court in Illini which in turn incorrectly relied on Kankakee County Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 131 Ill.2d 1, 22, 136 Ill.Dec. 76, 544 N.E.2d 762 (1989), and LaGrange State Bank No. 1713 v. DuPage County Board of Review, 79 Ill.App.3d 474, 480-81, 35 Ill.Dec. 42, 398 N.E.2d 992 (1979).  The appellate court in Winnebago explained that Kankakee and LaGrange "state only that a taxpayer objecting to an assessment on the basis of uniformity must prove the disparity in assessment valuations by clear and convincing evidence.  The court went on to state the following:

We depart from Techalloy and Illini Country Club in that we hold that, consistent with the pertinent regulation (86 Ill.Adm.Code §1910.63(e) (eff. January 1, 1990)), challenges based on excessiveness must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence while those based on a lack of uniformity must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.  Winnebago at 183. 

The Board finds the proper burden of proof in the uniformity appeals presented by the appellants is clear and convincing evidence.  Based on this standard, the Board finds the appellants have failed to prove the subject properties were inequitably assessed. 

The Board finds the appellants' main argument is that the township assessor selectively revalued only some properties in the township, including the subject properties, in a non-quadrennial year.  They claim the assessor can only revalue property in quadrennial assessment years.  They do agree however, that equalization factors applied at the same percentage can be applied in non-quadrennial years.  They argue that while other properties received only a 1.0259 equalization factor, the subject properties were revalued and then received the 1.0259 factor.  The appellants claim this reassessment of only some properties is illegal, inequitable and against the uniformity clause of the Illinois Constitution.

In support of their arguments the appellants cite several sections of the Property Tax Code, the Illinois Constitution and several court cases.  In support of the assessments, the board of review presented testimony from the Libertyville Township Assessor along with a letter from the assessor explaining in great detail her methodology of assessing the subject properties and all properties in the township.  The board of review also examined the cases and statutes cited by the appellant and presented several statutes and cases to support the assessment process.  The Board finds the assessor's explanation of her assessment process and the board of review's interpretations of the cases presented are reasoned, accurate and supported in the record and indicate the assessments of the subject properties were uniformly determined.

The four statutes relied upon by the appellants are 9-215, 9-225, 9-155 and 9-95 of the Property Tax Code.  (35 ILCS 200/9-215, 9-225, 9-155 and 9-95). 

Section 9-215 states in pertinent part as follows:

General assessment years: counties of less than 3,000,000.  Except as otherwise provided in sections 9-220 and 9-225, ... the general assessment years shall be 1995 and every fourth year thereafter...  35 ILCS 200/9-215

Section 9-225 states in pertinent part the following:

Division of county into four assessment districts.  Resolutions of any county board dividing the county into four assessment districts, if adopted before January 1, 1990, shall remain valid thereafter unless and until repealed by the county board...  35 ILCS 200/9-225.

Section 9-155 states in pertinent part the following:

Valuation in general assessment years.  On or before June 1 in each general assessment year in all counties with less than 3,000,000 inhabitants... the assessor, in person or by deputy, shall actually view and determine as near as practicable the value of each property listed for taxation as of January 1 of that year... and assess the property at 33 1/3% of its fair cash value...  35 ILCS 200/9-155

Section 9-95 states in pertinent part as follows:

Listing of property.  All property subject to taxation under this Code... shall be listed by the proper legal description in the name of the owner, and assessed at the times and in the manner provided in Sections 9-215 through 9-225...  The assessment, as modified or equalized or changed as provided by law, shall be the assessment upon which taxes shall be levied and extended during the general assessment period for which the assessment was made...  35 ILCS 200/9-95  (emphasis added)

The Board finds there is no dispute that by resolution the Lake County Board has adopted to divide the county into four districts for assessment purposes.  It is not in dispute that the general assessment year for Libertyville was 2000.  It is also not in dispute that the Libertyville Township Assessor viewed and reassessed property in the township for the 2000 assessment year.  There is a dispute however, as to whether the assessor or board of review can change assessments in a non-quadrennial assessment year.  The Board finds several statutes in the Property Tax Code authoritative on the issue.

Section 9-75 states as follows:

Revisions of assessments; Counties of less than 3,000,000.  The chief county assessment officer of any county with less than 3,000,000 inhabitants, or the township or multi-township assessor of any township in that county, may in any year revise and correct an assessment as appears to be just...  35 ILCS 200/9-75

Section 9-205 states as follows:

Equalization.  When deemed necessary to equalize assessments between or within townships or between classes of property, or when deemed necessary to raise of lower assessments within a county or any part thereof to the level prescribed by law, changes in individual assessments may be made by a township assessor or chief county assessment officer, under Section 9-75, by application of a percentage increase or decrease to each assessment.  35 ILCS 200/9-205

The Board also finds Section 9-75 was previously section 46 of the Revenue Act of 1939.  (35 ILCS 205/46)  It read as follows:

In counties containing less than 150,000 inhabitants, the assessors or supervisors of assessment shall not in any year, except the year of the quadrennial assessment, change the valuation of any real estate or improvements or the division thereof, except as provided in Sections 37 and 44 of this Act.  (35 ILCS 205/46)

This section was amended by Public Act 77-556 on July 31, 1971, and read as follows:

In counties containing less than 150,000, the assessors or supervisors of assessments shall not in any year, except the year of the quadrennial assessment, change the valuation of any real estate or improvements of the division thereof, except as provided in this Section and in Sections 37 and 44 of this Act.  The supervisor of assessments, the county assessor or the board of assessors of any county having fewer than 1,000,000 inhabitants, or the township assessor of any township in any such county, may in any year revise an assessment and correct such assessment as shall appear to him or them to be just.  A notice of any such revision shall be given in the manner provided in Section 103 to the taxpayer as to whose property the assessment has been changed.  (new language in italics)  35 ILCS 200/46

The Board also finds several other sections were amended to allow changes in years other than a quadrennial assessment year.  (See P.A.77-556, sections 130(7), 146, 148, 151, 160, 161 and 162).

Section 46 was further amended by Public Act 80-366 on August 26, 1977, and basically omitted the first sentence.  It then read as follows:

The supervisor of assessments or the board of assessors of any county having fewer than 1,000,000 inhabitants, or the township assessor of any township in any such county, may in any year revise an assessment and correct such assessment as shall appear to him or them to be just.  A notice of any such revision shall be given in the manner provided in Section 103 to the taxpayer as to whose property the assessment has been changed.  35 ILCS 205/46

The Board finds the present language in what is now the Illinois Property Tax Code is essentially the same as the amended language.  (35 ILCS 200/9-75)

The Board finds the Libertyville Township Assessor had the authority for the 2001 assessment year, a non-quadrennial year, to revise and correct the assessments in the township where the assessments for the quadrennial year, 2000, were found to be incorrect.  The assessor testified she reviewed sales and assessments each year as part of her job.  Every property in the township was reviewed for the 2001 assessment year in the same manner.  Further review was warranted based on the same criteria for all property.  1) If the median level of assessment of any area dropped below 31.58% the assessment had to be adjusted up to the state mandated 33.33%; 2) If assessments in an area or neighborhood were not uniform, they needed adjustment to make them uniform and equitable; 3) If property information was inaccurate or incomplete, changes to make them correct needed to be made. 

The subject properties basically met all three criteria for further review: assessment complaints from the neighborhood including inaccurate property data; property record cards that proved unreliable and inconsistent and, a three year level of assessments of 29.58%, well below the 31.58% acceptable level and the statutorily mandated 33.33%. 

All property found to have acceptable levels of assessment, were in areas of uniform assessments and, found to have correct property descriptions were not reviewed any further.  The Board finds this only makes sense.  The appellants' argument that the subject properties were picked out and assessed differently on a different basis is unfounded.  The Board finds the appellants' argument would require the assessor to either 1) leave all the incorrect information in place and promote inequitable and non-uniform assessments for the remainder of the four year period to the detriment of some taxpayers and to the advantage of others, or, 2) change all the assessments equally which would only promote further inaccuracies and inequality. 

The Board also finds the property record cards for several subject dwellings included incorrect living area square footage that when corrected, actually reduced the improvement assessment for 2001.  It would be illogical for the appellants to argue they request their improvement assessments to be increased again based on incorrect information.  Also, the Board finds the appellants only appealed the improvement assessments.  Both before and after the application of the equalization factor, several of the subject properties' improvement assessments were actually lower than the 2000 improvement assessments.

The Board further finds the criteria used by the township assessor to review incorrect assessments was used uniformly and consistently on all properties found to be incorrectly assessed.  The property record card information was rechecked and corrected as needed; the mass appraisal database was updated with these changes; vacant land sales and residual land values were used to determine land values if they were questionable; sales ratio studies were performed to compare the mass appraisal value calculations with actual sales from the prior three years and; factors were determined from these studies to bring the calculated values in line with actual market sales.  New assessments were calculated for the entire subdivision based on this criteria. 

The Board finds the township assessor prepared all assessments using the same basis and in the same manner.  The Board also finds the Code provides the assessor with authority to revise and correct assessments where it appears to be just.  (35 ILCS 200/9-75).  The Board finds where assessments are found to be questionable and the data is found to be unreliable, the assessor has the authority and is required to correct the assessment to promote fairness and uniformity in the system.  The Board also finds the assessor, when assessments were found to be unreliable, reviewed all questionable assessments on the same basis and used the same method in correcting the errors.  Once the assessment records were corrected and checked against actual sales to confirm the findings, the assessments were changed.  In addition, a 1.0259 equalization factor was applied to all properties in Libertyville Township for 2001 to attain the mandated 33.33% statutory level of assessments as authorized by the Property Tax Code.  (35 ILCS 200/9-205).

With regard to the board of review, the Board finds several sections of the Code apply.  Section 16-20 states as follows:

Powers and duties of boards of review.  In counties with less than 3,000,000 inhabitants, the board of review shall, in any year, whether the year of the general assessment or not, perform the functions set forth in Sections 16-25 through 16-90.  35 ILCS 200/16-20  (emphasis added)

Section 16-55 of the Code states in pertinent part as follows:

Complaints.  On written complaint that any property is overassessed or underassessed, the board shall review the assessment, and correct it, as appears to be just, but in no case shall the property be assessed at a higher percentage of fair cash value than other property in the assessment district prior to equalization by the board or the Department...  The board may also, at any time before its revision of the assessments is completed in every year, increase, reduce, or otherwise adjust the assessment of any property, making changes in the valuation as may be just, and shall have full power over the assessment of any person and may do anything in regard thereto that it may deem necessary to make a just assessment, but the property shall not be assessed at a higher percentage of fair cash value than the assessed valuation of other property in the assessment district prior to equalization by the board or Department...  35 ILCS 200/16-55  (emphasis added)

Section 16-60 of the Code states as follows:

Equalization within counties – Publication and hearing.  After notice and hearing as required by Section 12-40, the board of review may increase or reduce the entire assessment, or the assessment of any class included therein, if, in its opinion, the assessment has not been made upon the proper basis.  The board may also equalize the assessment in any multi-township or township, or part thereof, or any portion of the county.  35 ILCS 200/16-60  (emphasis added)

The Board finds the board of review has the statutory authority to raise or lower assessments of individual properties, areas or classes of property in any year where it appears to be just.  The board of review determined the Libertyville Township Assessor made proper, consistent and uniform changes by the proper basis to correct mistakes and errors that resulted in uniform assessments.  The Board finds the appellants appealed to the board of review in a non-quadrennial year in an attempt to lower their assessments.  One could only conclude by their complaints to the board of review that the appellants agree the board has the authority to change assessments in non-quadrennial years.  As required by statute, the board of review accepted the appellants' complaints and found no reductions were warranted.  The Board also notes the improvement assessments of some of the subject properties were actually lowered by the assessor and were still lower than their 2000 improvement assessments after equalization.  The appellants were, in essence arguing that the higher 2000 improvement assessments be reinstated. 

The appellants also presented the Albee v. Soat opinion from the Second District Appellate Court.  315 Ill.App.3d 888, 735 N.E.2d 716 (2000).  The Board finds the facts in that opinion are easily distinguishable from the instant appeal.  In Albee, the assessor testified that 1995 was a general assessment year and that the assessments were correct in that year.  The taxpayers appealed the 1996 reassessment of their property.  The court found the assessor overstepped statutory authority because the 1996 changes in the assessment were not made to revise and correct the assessment.  As correctly noted by the appellants in this appeal, the court stated the assessor does not have the right to revise or correct assessments.  There must be a correction made.  The court stated that "the circumstances in the instant appeal do not require a revision and correction of the assessment to cure an 'unjust' assessment... The record shows that the reason for the reassessment in 1996 was not due to an incorrect assessment in the 1995 quadrennial year or to changes made to the property."  Id. at 891.  In the instant appeal, the assessment changes were made to correct errors in the incorrect assessments in 2000.  For instance, there were errors in the property record cards used to assess the properties in 2000.  In some instances, corrections actually reduced the improvement assessments.  Also there were corrections to the 2000 assessment to bring the median level of assessments to an acceptable level because the subject properties were severely under-assessed and not equitable with others properties.

The appellants also cited Walsh v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 181 Ill.2d 228, 692 N.E.2d 260 (1998), to support their claim that the changes made to the assessments were unconstitutional.  The Board finds Walsh is distinguishable from the instant appeals.  In Walsh the assessor had not performed quadrennial reassessments since 1957.  The assessor simply applied equalization factors to all of the properties in the township year after year.  However, the assessor valued the subject and several other properties based on their recent sales prices.  The Supreme Court found that the values reflected in the assessments that had only been changed by equalization factors had no support in the market.  The court also found the assessor used a different basis in assessing the subject and other recently sold properties which violates the uniformity clause of the Illinois Constitution.  The Court found the properties having only equalization factors applied year after year "contribute less than their fair share of the collective tax burden, in conflict with article IX, section 4(a) of the Illinois Constitution. Id. at 237.

The Board finds there is no dispute that the Libertyville Township Assessor in the instant appeals had the authority and performed a quadrennial reassessment in 2000.  It is clear, as indicated earlier, that the assessments were made uniformly.  It is also clear that when possible errors were detected, primarily from complaints within the appellants' own subdivision, the basis for the criteria and the method used for corrections was uniformly applied.

The constitutional provision for uniformity of taxation and valuation does not require mathematical equality.  The requirement is satisfied if the intent is evident to adjust the burden with a reasonable degree of uniformity and if such is the effect of the statute enacted by the General Assembly establishing the method of assessing real property in its general operation.  A practical uniformity, rather than an absolute one, is the test.  Apex Motor Fuel Co. v. Barrett, 20 Ill.2d 395 (1960).  Although the comparables presented by the appellant disclosed that properties located in the same area are not assessed at identical levels, all that the constitution requires is a practical uniformity which appears to exist on the basis of the evidence.

As a final note, the Board finds all of the appellants appealed only the improvement assessment for 2001.  The Board finds that in 14 of the 24 appeals, the 2001 improvement assessments prior to equalization were actually lower than the 2000 improvement assessments.  In 10 of these appeals, the improvement assessments after equalization in 2001 were still lower than the 2000 improvement assessments.

For the foregoing reasons, the Board finds that the appellants have not proven by clear and convincing evidence that the subject properties are inequitably assessed.  Therefore, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds no reductions are warranted.

The parties of record before the Property Tax Appeal Board are Cora and James Maynen, the appellants, and the McHenry County Board of Review.

The subject property consists of a 7,807 square foot lot improved with a single-family dwelling.  The subject property is located in the adult community of Sun City in the Village of Huntley, McHenry County.  The subject lot backs near the middle of the fairway on the 14^th hole of Whisper Creek Golf Course. 

The appellants appeared before the Property Tax Appeal Board claiming overvaluation and unequal treatment in the assessment process regarding the subject's land assessment as the bases of the appeal.  In support of these arguments, the appellant offered the descriptions and land assessments for 35 comparables located in the subject's community.  In addition, the appellant submitted land assessment data for seven suggested comparable lots located on three different golf courses throughout the subject's township.  The appellants also offered testimony, a map of the subject's area, and photographs of the subject's area. 

The appellants categorized the comparables located in the subject's community based on the following features.  Many of the comparables have combinations of these features.  Fourteen comparables are contiguous to large open areas; six comparables have views of the 14^th green or tee; four comparable have a view of the 14^th fairway; two comparables are located across from the subject near the middle of the 14^th fairway; eleven comparables have views of the 13^th tee, fairway, or green with six of these properties also fronting a creek; three comparables have views of the 15^th tee or fairway; two comparables are contiguous to small open areas that have views of the 15^th tee or fairway; six comparables are located across from the neighborhood park; three comparables are corner lots; one comparable is located in a cul-de-sac; and one comparable is not located on the golf course, but located on the subject's street.  The comparables range in size from 7,881 to 14,353 square feet of land area and have land assessments ranging from $19,009 to $34,563 or from $1.44 to $4.23 per square foot of land area, with an average land assessment of $2.84 per square foot of land area.  The subject property has a land assessment of $29,378 or $3.76 per square foot of land area. 

The seven other comparables, which are located in other golf course communities in McHenry County, range in size from 18,656 to 36,658 square feet of land area and have land assessments ranging from $24,886 to $46,981 or from $.90 to $2.26 per square foot of land area.

The appellants claim the subject's land assessment is higher in comparison to larger more attractive lots.  The appellants claimed the township assessor bases land assessments in Sun City from information provided by the developer that include high lot premiums during a buying frenzy.  The appellants claimed since the buying frenzy ended, values have declined and prospective buyers were given incentives to purchase.  The appellants also opined that little if any of the lot premiums will be realized in the resale market.  The appellants also argued the public cannot use the common areas that are located adjacent to many of the comparables.  The appellants also alluded to a newspaper article that indicates five homes in Sun City, which are located in Kane County, are advertised for sale for less than their original cost.  No descriptive information for these properties, such as their ages, sizes, design, amenities, sale prices, sales dates, or their original costs was submitted. 

The evidence also revealed the appellants purchased the subject property in June 2000 for $321,370.  The appellants claimed the sale price included costs for common areas, open spaces, and a 40 million dollar recreation center.  No documentary evidence to support this claim was submitted.  The appellants also claimed the lot premiums were used to build the golf course.  The subject lot price was reported to cost $55,000 plus a lot premium of $30,000 or a total cost of $85,000.  The appellant agreed new homes that are similar in size to the subject have increased in price, but are priced less than the subject's original cost.  The appellant also argued golf balls frequently strike the subject's home and enter the yard making it dangerous and compromises their privacy.  Finally, the appellants argued golf course management refuses to irrigate and maintain weeds behind the subject lot citing the course design.  In summary, the appellants argued land assessments should be based on location, size, frontage, lot depths, and dwelling sizes, not based on the developers original listing prices.  Based on this evidence, the appellants requested a reduction in the subject's assessment.

Under cross-examination, the appellants testified they inspected the subject lot prior to purchase and were well aware of the golf course location in relation to the subject.  The appellant also testified the developer would not disclose any information that would suggest the subject's sale price included fees for the clubhouse or subdivision infrastructure.  The locations for many of the comparables were also discussed. 

The board of review submitted its "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" wherein the subject's assessment of $92,793 was disclosed.  The subject's assessment reflects an estimated market value of $278,490 using McHenry County's three-year median level of assessments of 33.32%.  The subject property has a land assessment of $29,378 or $3.76 per square foot of land area.  In support of the subject property’s assessment, the board of review submitted sales and assessment data on four suggested comparables, a letter prepared by the township assessor, photographs, property record cards, and a map of the subject area.  Testimony from the township assessor was also provided. 

The assessor testified that all lots in Sun City are assessed on a site basis plus their lot premium as provided by the developer and a study of all lot sales in the subject's subdivision.  He also testified there are three categories of lots in the Sun City development: "classic, premier, and estate" lots.  The subject as well as all "premier" lots are valued at $55,000 plus their lot premium and the 2001 1.0369% township equalization factor.  "Estate" lots are valued at a value starting at $75,000 plus the premium.  The assessor also noted that the comparables presented by the appellants are "premier" lots valued at $55,000 plus their lot premiums, which ranged from $2,500 to $45,000.  He also indicted the subject is the only "premier" lot on its side of the golf course with the other lots being "estate" lots.  The assessor also prepared a list of sixteen golf course lots located in the Sun City development that had land assessments ranging from $22,467 to $34,563.  

The four other comparables submmited by the board of review consist of one-story style dwellings of frame construction that are from one to three years old.  The comparables are not located on the golf course like the subject, but are the same model type as the subject.  They are situated on lots that range in size from 7,761 to 11,094 square feet of land area.  The dwellings contain 1,848 square feet of living area.  Two comparables have crawlspace foundations and two comparables have full basements.  Other amenities include two bathrooms, central air conditioning, and 455 square foot garages.  These properties sold for prices ranging from $253,905 to $297,180 or from $137.45 to $160.81 per square foot of living area including land.  The transactions occurred from March 2000 to March 2001.  The assessor also testified a new series of homes are being constructed by a different contractor.  These homes are not the same model types as previously offered.  He also argued the subject's model type has steadily increased in value over the last three years. 

Under cross-examination, the township assessor testified that he had no information that the developer has dropped the lot premiums or is giving other incentives to purchase property. 

After reviewing the record and considering the evidence, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal.  The Board further finds no reduction in the subject's assessment is warranted. 

The appellants argued the subject's lot was inequitably assessed.  The Illinois Supreme Court has held that taxpayers who object to an assessment on the basis of lack of uniformity bear the burden of proving the disparity of assessment valuations by clear and convincing evidence.  Kankakee County Board of Review v.  Property Tax Appeal Board, 131 Ill.2d 1 (1989).  The evidence must demonstrate a consistent pattern of assessment inequities within the assessment jurisdiction.  The Board finds the appellants have not overcome this burden and no reduction in the subject's assessment is warranted.

First, the Board finds the subject's land assessment is supported by the assessment methodology described by the township assessor.  The evidence clearly indicates land assessments in the subject's subdivision are determined on site basis with no regard to size.  Lots are categorized as "classic, premier, or estate" lots.  The evidence clearing indicates all "premier" lots, like the subject, are valued at $55,000 plus their lot premium, which ranged from $2,500 to $45,000.  The appellants paid a lot premium of $30,000.

The site value unit of comparison is used when the market does not indicate a significant difference in lot value even when there is a difference in lot sizes. Property Assessment Valuation, 75, International Association of Assessing Officers 2^nd ed. 1996.  The Board finds land assessments in the subject's subdivision to be uniform.  The comparables located in the subject's development submitted by both parties have land assessments ranging from a low of $19,874 to a high of $38,020.  The Board finds the subject land assessment of $29,378 is well supported by both parties' comparables on a site basis. 

Additionally, using a per square foot method of comparison, Board finds 18 land comparable submmited by the appellants to be most similar to the subject in terms of size, location, and view.   These comparables range in size from 7,881 to 8,839 square feet of land area and have land assessments ranging from $22,467 to $34,563 or from $2.75 to $4.23 per square foot of land area.  The Board finds the subject's land assessment of $29,378 or $3.76 per square foot of land area is well supported by the most similar comparables contained in the record on a per square foot basis.  The Board gave less weight to the remaining comparables due to their dissimilar size or location. 

The constitutional provision for uniformity of taxation and valuation does not require mathematical equality.  The requirement is satisfied if the intent is evident to adjust the burden with a reasonable degree of uniformity and if such is the effect of the statute enacted by the General Assembly establishing the method of assessing real property in its general operation.  A practical uniformity, rather than an absolute one, is the test.  Apex Motor Fuel Co. v. Barrett, 20 Ill.2d 395 (1960).  Although the comparables presented by the appellants disclosed that properties located in the same area are not assessed at identical levels, all that the constitution requires is a practical uniformity, which appears to exist on the basis of the evidence.

The appellants also claim the subject property is overvalued because its value has decreased due to the new construction of similar properties, lack of a resale market, lack of maintenance for the golf course, danger of golf balls striking the dwelling, and a lack of privacy.  When market value is the basis of the appeal, the value must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Winnebago County Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 313 Ill.App.3d 179, 183, 728 N.E.2d 1256 (2nd Dist. 2000).  The Board finds the appellants have not overcome this burden.  

First, the board finds the appellant submmited no credible market evidence that would indicate the subject's land assessment is not reflective of its fair market value.  In addition, the Board finds the board of review submmited four sales of identical model types as the subject with similar features with the exception of two properties that do not have basements.  However, these suggested comparables are not located on the golf course lots like the subject.  They sold for prices ranging from $253,905 to $297,180 or from $137.45 to $160.81 per square foot of living area including land.  The subject's assessment reflects an estimated market value of $278,490 or $148.45 per square foot of living area including land, which falls with the range established by the only comparable sales contained in the record. In fact the subject property's estimated market value as reflected by its assessment is lower than three of the four comparables on a per square foot basis.  After considering any necessary adjustments to the comparable sales for differences to the subject, such as the lack of a golf course location and basements for two comparables, the Board finds the subject's estimated market value as reflected by the assessment is supported. 

More importantly, the Board finds the appellants purchased the subject property in June 2000 for $321,670 or $171.47 per square foot of living area including land, substantially more than its estimated market value as reflected by its assessment of $278,490 or $148.45 per square foot of living area including land.  The Property Tax Appeal Board finds the best evidence of the subject's fair market value is its sale price.  The Illinois Supreme Court defined fair cash value as "what the property would bring at a voluntary sale where the owner is ready, willing, and able to sell but not compelled to do so, and the buyer is ready, willing and able to buy but not forced to do so." Springfield Marine Bank v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 44 Ill.2d. 428, (1970).  A contemporaneous sale of property between parties dealing at arm's-length is a relevant factor in determining the correctness of an assessment and may be practically conclusive on the issue of whether an assessment is reflective of market value. Rosewell v. 2626 Lakeview Limited Partnership, 120 Ill.App.3d 369 (1^st Dist. 1983), People ex rel. Munson v. Morningside Heights, Inc, 45 Ill.2d 338 (1970), People ex rel. Korzen v. Belt Railway Co. of Chicago, 37 Ill.2d 158 (1967); and People ex rel. Rhodes v. Turk, 391 Ill. 424 (1945). 

Furthermore, section 1-50 of the Property Tax Code defines fair cash value as:

The amount for which a property can be sold in the due course of business and trade, not under duress, between a willing buyer and a willing seller. (35 ILCS 200/1-50)

From a review of the record, the Board finds there is no evidence suggesting that subject's sale was not an arm's-length transaction.  Since the subject's assessment reflects a fair market value considerably less than its sale price, the Board finds no reduction in the subject's assessment is warranted. 

In conclusion, the Board finds the appellants failed to demonstrate that the subject property was inequitably assessed by clear and convincing or overvalued by a preponderance of the evidence.  Therefore, the Board finds no reduction in the subject's assessment is warranted.

The parties of record before the Property Tax Appeal Board are Chris Showalter, the appellant, and the Mason County Board of Review.

The subject property consists of a 1998 mobile home containing 1,216 square feet of living area that is located in the Village of Bath, Mason County, Illinois. 

The appellant appeared before the Property Tax Appeal Board arguing the board of review erroneously classified and assessed the subject dwelling as real property subject to ad valorem taxation.  In support of this claim, the appellant submitted photographs of the subject dwelling's undercarriage, a vehicle title for the subject dwelling, and cited section 1-130 of the Property Tax Code. (35 ILCS 200/1-130).

Photographs and testimony offered by the appellant depict the subject dwelling was placed on un-mortared concrete blocks supported by concrete piers.  Wood shims were placed between the un-mortared concrete blocks and the steel I-beam frame of the dwelling for leveling purposes.  The dwelling was anchored with metal tie down straps to prevent the dwelling from shifting.  A mortared concrete block skirting was installed that surrounds the perimeter of the mobile home as required by a local zoning ordinance.  However, the photographs depict that the dwelling is not resting or supported by the concrete block perimeter. 

The appellant also cited section 1-130 of the Property Tax Code, which defines real property in part as:

The land itself, with all things contained therein, and also buildings, structures and improvements, and other permanent fixtures thereon, ...and all rights and privileges belonging or pertaining thereto, except otherwise specified by this Code.  Included therein is any vehicle or similar portable structure used or so constructed as to permit its use as a dwelling place, if the structure is resting on a permanent foundation. (35 ILCS 200/1-130).

The appellant argued the subject dwelling does not have a permanent foundation.  Therefore, the appellant requested the Board change the subject dwelling's classification from real property to a mobile home that is subject the privilege tax as provided under the Mobile Home Local Services Tax Act. (35 ILCS 515/1 et seq.).

The board of review presented its "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" wherein the subject's final assessment of $14,391 was disclosed. In support of the subject’s assessment, the board of review presented testimony, local zoning ordinances, and a copy the Mobile Home Local Services Tax Act (35 ILCS 515/1 et seq.). 

The board of review argued the subject dwelling is used for permanent habitation and its combination of the mortared block perimeter and pier foundation constitutes a permanent foundation as defined in local zoning ordinances.  The board of review argued the Village of Bath Zoning Office indicated the subject dwelling was placed a permanent foundation in 1999 and was therefore assessed as real property.  The board of review argued a Village of Bath zoning ordinance requires no mobile home shall be located within the village except when the mobile home is situated in a licensed mobile home park.  A mobile home designed and built for habitation and complying with the minimum requirements for a dwelling that is not situated within a licensed and approved mobile home park shall be placed on a permanent foundation.  The zoning ordinance defines a permanent foundation as:

[A] closed perimeter formation consisting of materials such as concrete, mortared concrete block or mortared brick extending into the ground a minimum depth of one (1) foot and placed upon a footing which has a minimum thickness of six (6) inches and a minimum width of (2) feet.

The board of review also cited section 515/1 of the Mobile Home Local Services Tax Act, which provides:

[a] factory assembled structure designed for permanent habitation and so constructed as to permit its transport on wheels, temporarily or permanently attached to its frame, from the place of its construction to the location, or subsequent locations, and placement on a temporary foundation, at which it is intended to be a permanent habitation, and situated so as to permit the occupancy thereof as a dwelling place for one or more persons, provided that any such structure resting in whole on a permanent foundation, with wheels, tongue and hitch removed at the time of registration provided for in Section 4 of this Act, shall not be construed as a 'mobile home', but shall be assessed and taxed as real property as defined by Section 1-130 of the Property Tax Code. (35 ILCS 515/1).

The board of review argued that since the subject dwelling's wheels, tongue and hitch were removed, the dwelling should be legally assessed and classified as real property. 

The board of review also submmited several comparable properties that have pier foundations and are classified and assessed as real property.  The board of review argued the need for pier foundations are not limited to mobile homes.  The evidence and testimony also reveled these properties were not factory assembled structures constructed as to permit its transport on wheels, temporarily or permanently attached to its frame, from the place of its construction to the location, or subsequent locations.  Additionally, the board of review submitted numerous property record cards indicating its policy of assessing mobile homes as real property that were in place prior to January 1, 1979 "freeze act". (35 ILCS 200/24-5).  The board of review also submmited an appraisal of the subject property that was submmited by the appellant at a previous local board of review hearing.  The appraisal estimates a fair market value for the subject property of $43,000 as of August 8, 2000.  

Finally, the board of review cited section 9-150 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/9-150) regarding the classification of property; section 605/2(c) of the Condominium Property Act (765 ILCS 605/2(c)); and section 77/5 of the Residential Real Property Disclosure Act (765 ILCS 77/5) to further support its position that the subject dwelling is correctly classified and assessed as real property.  Based on this evidence, the board of review requested confirmation of the subject’s classification and assessment.

After reviewing the record and considering the evidence, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal.  The Board further finds a reduction in the subject property’s assessment is warranted.

The Board finds the evidence clearly indicates the subject property is a mobile home.  Therefore, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that the subject dwelling falls under the statutory definition of a mobile home and is not resting in whole on a permanent foundation.  Thus, the Board finds the board of review's classification of the subject dwelling as real property was not based on the permanency of its foundation as required by the Property Tax Code and the Mobile Home Local Services Tax Act. 

The Mobile Home Local Services Tax Act was created as a mechanism for taxing mobile home owners who use their homes as permanent habitations but do not have permanent foundations.  Lee County Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 278 Ill.App.3d 711,724, (2nd Dist. 1996).  Portable structures may only be assessable under the Property Tax Code if they rest on permanent foundations. Lee County Board of Review, 278 Ill.App.3d at 724.

The Board finds the evidence submitted clearly indicates the subject dwelling is a mobile home.  Photographs indicate the subject dwelling is not resting on a permanent perimeter foundation.  Concrete block skirting was installed to comply with a local zoning ordinance.  However, the Board finds the record is clear the perimeter skirting does not support, anchor, or come in contact with the mobile home.  Evidence further indicates un-mortared concrete blocks were situated directly on concrete piers, which extend below grade, supporting the subject's steel frame.  As a result, the Board finds the subject dwelling is not "resting in whole on a permanent foundation" and is not subject to ad valorem taxation as real property, but subject only to the privilege tax as provided under the Mobile Home Local Services Tax Act. (35 ILCS 515/1 et seq.).

Section 1-130 of the Property Tax Code defines real property in part as:

The land itself, with all things contained therein, and also buildings, structures and improvements, and other permanent fixtures thereon, ...and all rights and privileges belonging or pertaining thereto, except otherwise specified by this Code.  Included therein is any vehicle or similar portable structure used or so constructed as to permit its use as a dwelling place, if the structure is resting on a permanent foundation. (Emphasis added) (35 ILCS 200/1-130).

Additionally, Section 515/1 of the Mobile Home Local Services Tax Act defines a mobile home as:

[a] factory assembled structure designed for permanent habitation and so constructed as to permit its transport on wheels, temporarily or permanently attached to its frame, from the place of its construction to the location, or subsequent locations, and placement on a temporary foundation, at which it is intended to be a permanent habitation, and situated so as to permit the occupancy thereof as a dwelling place for one or more persons, provided that any such structure resting in whole on a permanent foundation (Emphasis added), with wheels, tongue and hitch removed at the time of registration provided for in Section 4 of this Act, shall not be construed as a 'mobile home', but shall be assessed and taxed as real property as defined by Section 1-130 of the Property Tax Code. (35 ILCS 515/1).

The Property Tax Appeal Board finds that although the Mobile Home Local Services Tax Act (35 ILCS 515/1) mentions the removal of the axle, tongue, and hitch as factors for consideration in determining whether a dwelling is real property, it requires the dwelling to be resting on a permanent foundation.  Similarly, Section 1-130 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/1-130) defines real property in part as "any vehicle or similar portable structure used or so constructed as to permit its use as a dwelling place, if the structure is resting in whole on a permanent foundation."  The Board finds both provisions require permanent foundations as fundamental in determining whether a vehicle or portable structure used as a dwelling is real property or personal property subject to the privilege tax as provided under the Mobile Home Local Services Tax Act. (35 ILCS 515/1 et seq.).

Neither the Property Tax Code nor the Mobile Home Local Services Tax Act defines a permanent foundation.  However, other statutes dealing with mobile homes contain definitions for permanent foundations.

The Illinois Manufactured Housing and Mobile Home Safety Act (430 ILCS 115/2(1)) defines "permanent foundation" as:

...a closed perimeter formation consisting of materials such as concrete, mortared concrete block, or mortared brick extending into the ground below the frost line which shall include, but not necessarily be limited to cellars, basements, or crawl spaces, but does exclude the use of piers. (Emphasis added) (430 ILCS 115/2(1)).

In addition, other definitions of "permanent foundation" can be found in the Illinois Administrative Code.  The Illinois Mobile Home Tiedown Code (77 Ill.Adm.Code 870.20) defines permanent foundations as:

A continuous perimeter formation intended to support and anchor (emphasis added) the unit to withstand the specified design loads.  It shall consist of materials such as concrete, mortared concrete blocks or mortared brick, steel, or treated lumber extending into the ground below the frost line depth which shall include basements or crawl spaces. (77 Ill.Adm.Code 870.20).

The Manufactured Home Community Code addresses the issue of immobilization of a mobile home, which appears to be analogous to having a permanent foundation.  A manufactured home is considered immobilized when a home is connected to public utilities (77 Ill.Adm.Code 860.150(a)) and:

The wheels, tongue, and hitch shall be removed and the home shall be supported (emphasis added) by a continuous perimeter foundation of material such as concrete, mortared concrete blocks or mortared brick which extends below the established frost line . . . (77 Ill.Adm.Code 860.150(b)).

Here, as previously established, the subject dwelling is not resting on a permanent foundation as described by the aforementioned provisions.  Based on these statutes and the evidence presented in the record, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that the subject dwelling is not resting in whole on a permanent foundation so as to be considered real estate.

Furthermore, in Lee County Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 278 Ill.App.3d 711 (2nd Dist. 1996), the appellate court found that the Property Tax Appeal Board did not error in construing the Revenue Act and the Illinois Manufactured Housing and Mobile Home Safety Act together in an effort to define a permanent foundation.  The determining factor, as stated by the court, concerns the physical nature of the portable structure's foundation.  The court affirmed the Property Tax Appeal Board's use of the definition of a permanent foundation contained in the Illinois Manufactured Housing and Mobile Home Safety Act.

The board of review also claimed piers are permanent foundations and submitted local zoning ordinances in support of this argument.  The Property Tax Appeal Board accords this evidence no weight.  The Board finds the definition of a permanent foundation contained within a local zoning ordinance do not supercede or override applicable state statute for classification and taxation of mobile homes.  The board of review further argued the dwelling is used for permanent habitation, which indicates it is real property.  The Board further finds that although the subject dwelling may be used as a permanent residence, there is no case law or statutory authority that suggests it shall be assessed as real property on that basis.

The Property Tax Appeal Board further finds the board of review's practice of classifying mobile homes as real estate prior to 1979 does not "freeze" the assessments under section 24-5 of the Property Tax Code. (35 ILCS 200/24-5).  Section 24-5 of the Property Tax Code, commonly know as the "Freeze Act" provides in part that "[n]o property lawfully assessed and taxed as real property prior to January 1, 1979, or property of like kind acquired or placed in use after January 1, 1979, shall be classified as personal property."  (35 ILCS 200/24-5).  The Freeze Act freezes classification of property as real or personal only if it was lawfully made.  Oregon Community Unit School District No. 220 v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 285 Ill.App.3d 170, 177-178, (2^nd Dist 1996).  From the testimony and evidence contained in the record it appears the Mason County Board of Review instituted a policy during the 1970s that mobile homes were classified as real estate.  However, at the time this policy was instituted the Revenue Act of 1939, as amended, (Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 120, ¶482) and the Mobile Home Local Services Tax Act, (Ill.Rev. Stat.1973, ch.120, ¶1201) with an effective date of August, 28, 1973, which predated the Freeze Act, provided that a mobile home could only be classified as real estate if the home was resting in whole on a permanent foundation.  Thus, the Board finds the board of review's policy of classifying mobile homes as real estate based on a village zoning ordinance and not based on the type of foundation appears to be unlawful in the sense that it was not in accordance with the relevant provisions of the then existing Revenue Act of 1939 or the Mobile Home Local Services Tax Act.

Furthermore, an assessment of taxes on property is not lawful if it creates a "substantial disparity between similar properties or classes of taxpayers."  Moniot v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 11 Ill.App.3d 309, 314 (1973).  The testimony presented by the board of review and the board of review's written submission show that similar mobile homes would be classified and taxed differently dependent on whether the mobile home is located within a licensed mobile home park or situated in other parts of the county that are not within a licensed mobile home park.  The board's pre-1979 and current policy would classify a mobile home as real estate, regardless of type of foundation, if the mobile home were not situated within licensed mobile home park.  In direct contrast, a mobile home that is situated within a licensed mobile home park would be classified and taxed as provided by the Mobile Home Local Services Tax Act, regardless of the type of foundation.  This practice could potentially result in mobile homes with similar foundations being classified and taxed differently depending on the location within the county.  This disparate treatment is not allowed under the uniformity provisions provided by Article IX, section 4(a), of the Illinois Constitution of 1970.  For these reasons the Property Tax Appeal Board finds the Mason County Board of Review's pre-1979 assessment practices did not "freeze the assessments" of the mobile homes.

The board of review also cited section 9-150 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/9-150) regarding the classification of property; section 605/2(c) of the Condominium Property Act (765 ILCS 605/2(c)); and section 77/5 of the Residential Real Property Disclosure Act (765 ILCS 77/5) to further support its position that the subject dwelling is correctly classified and assessed as real property.  The Board gives no weight to this evidence. The board finds these statutes do not pertain and are not applicable in the classification and taxation of mobile homes.  

In conclusion, the Board finds the subject dwelling is a mobile home as defined by the aforementioned statutes and case law.  Thus, the Board finds the subject dwelling is not subject to ad valorem taxation, but subject to the privilege tax as provided by the Mobile Home Local Services Tax Act.  As a result of this analysis, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds the classification and assessment of the subject dwelling as real property as established by the Mason County Board of Review is in error and accordingly grants a reduction in the subject’s assessment. 

 RESIDENTIAL CHAPTER

Index

 SUBJECT MATTER

Apartment Complex Valuation--Appraisal Report
(Official Rules of the Property Tax Appeal Board,
Section 1910.50(c))

Assessment Rollover, (35 ILCS 200/16-185)

Assessment Rollover--Does Not Apply,
(35 ILCS 200/16-185)

Authority to Reassess Property Within a
General Assessment Period,
(35 ILCS 200/9-215, 35 ILCS 200/12-10,
35 ILCS 200/12-30, 35 ILCS 200/9-75,
35 ILCS 200/16-55, 35 ILCS 200/9-80)

Authority to Reassess Property Within a
General Assessment Period,
(35 ILCS 200/9-215, 35 ILCS 200/12-10,
35 ILCS 200/12-30, 35 ILCS 200/9-75,
35 ILCS 200/16-55, 35 ILCS 200/9-80)

Classification of Property Using the Cook County
Real Property Classification Ordinance

Equity Contention--Cook County

Equity Contention--Assessor Allegedly Used Different
Assessment Scheme for Subject Property When Compared
To Other Properties in Area, (35 ILCS 200/9-145, 9-155)

Equity Contention--Using Comparables With Sales
Data Arguing the Subject is Assessed at a Greater
Percentage of Market Value

Equity Contention--Using Comparables With Sales
Data Arguing the Subject is Assessed at a Greater
Percentage of Market Value

Equity and Overvaluation Contentions Concerning
Land Assessment

Income Analysis Using the Subject's Own
Income and Expenses

Mobile Home, (35 ILCS 200/1-130, 35 ILCS 515/1,
430 ILCS 115/2(1), 77 Ill.Adm.Code 860.150(b) & 870.20)

Mobile Home--City Ordinance Regarding Permanent
Foundations, (35 ILCS 200/1-130, 35 ILCS 515/1,
430 ILCS 115/2(1), 77 Ill.Adm.Code 860.150(b) & 870.20)

Overvaluation--Land Sales

Pro-rated Assessment, (35 ILCS 200/9-160)

Vacancy and Pro-rated Assessments, (35 ILCS 200/9-180)