No. 99581 In re Rolandis G.

Appellate citation: 352 Ill. App. 3d 776.

JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Chief Justice Fitzgerald and Justices Freeman, Garman, and Karmeier concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Justice Thomas specially concurred, with opinion.
Justice Kilbride also specially concurred, with opinion.

In juvenile proceedings in Winnebago County, this 11-year-old Rockford respondent was found guilty of the 2002 aggravated criminal sexual assault of a six-year-old boy. He was adjudicated delinquent and made a ward of the court.

The alleged victim took the stand, answered a few preliminary questions, and identified respondent as someone he had known from his neighborhood. However, he would not answer questions about the events at issue.

His mother testified as to how her son came home in the company of respondent, but refused to go back out with him. Her son then began washing his mouth out with water. She testified her son said that the respondent “made me suck his dick,” that the respondent threatened him with a stick, and that he was forced to swear not to tell. She called police.

The police officer who came to the home testified, giving a similar account. A police detective testified as to a child advocate’s interview with the alleged victim at a children’s center which took place later. (This social worker did not testify.) The respondent testified, admitting he had been with the boy on that day, but denying any impropriety.

After the proceedings in the circuit court, and while the juvenile respondent’s appeal was pending in the appellate court, the United States Supreme Court, in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), clarified the constitutional principles concerning confrontation. It held that, if a witness repeats in court what another person is claimed to have said (i.e., gives hearsay) and if what was claimed to have been said is “testimonial” in nature, it is inadmissible unless either the person who purportedly made the statement testifies or if that person is unavailable and the accused had a prior opportunity to cross-examine. Applying these principles, the appellate court held that the mother’s testimony as to what her son said was admissible, but the officials’ was not. It reversed and remanded for a new trial.

In this decision, the supreme court did not characterize the statements differently than the appellate court had done, but reached a different result. Like the appellate court, it held that the remarks which police repeated in court were “testimonial” in nature and, thus, were improperly admitted because the minor did not testify and had not been cross-examined. Because the statements made to the mother were not “testimonial” in nature, they were not subject to these requirements and there was no error in admitting her testimony as to what her son had said. However, the supreme court then addressed an issue not raised in the appellate court, namely, harmless error. It held that the mother’s testimony (not only as to what her son had said, but as to her observations of his behavior), along with respondent’s testimony to having been at the time and place in question, overwhelmingly supported the conclusion that the offense occurred. Therefore, the error in admitting the officials’ testimony did not call for reversal because it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The circuit court’s original adjudication was to be reinstated.