B. Eventually enacted as 200-page bill also including sex offender registration, an eavesdropping exemption, penalty enhancement for certain criminal offenses, creation of a new criminal offense, authorization to prosecute some juveniles as adults, changes concerning testimony at parole hearings, new fitness hearing requirements for criminal defendants on psychotropic medication, amendment of existing law concerning admissibility of child hearsay statements, and provision imposing an "environmental impact fee" on the sale of fuel.

C. Violated "single - subject" rule of the Illinois Constitution because various provisions have no "natural and logical connection."

II. Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 187 Ill.2d 341, 718 N.E.2d 191 (1999)

A. Single subject rule is satisfied if matters within a public act have a "natural and logical connection."

1. The term "subject" is comprehensive, and may be defined broadly so long as all the provisions have a "natural and logical connection" to a single subject.

2. An act's length, number of provisions, or the number of acts amended is not controlling.

3. Rule requires only that all the provisions relate to a single subject, not that individual provisions "be related to each other."

B. P.A. 89-21

1. Originated as "FY 1996 Budget Implementation Act" - intended to make changes in State programs "necessary to implement the Governor's FY 1996 budget recommendations."

2. As enacted:

a. Amended twenty-one different acts including the State Employees Group Insurance Act, the Illinois Pension Code, the Illinois Act on the Aging, the Civil Administrative Code, the Children and Family Services Act, the Disabled Persons Rehabilitation Act, the State Finance Act, the State Prompt Payment Act, the Illinois Income Tax Act, the State Mandates Act, the School Code, the Nursing Home Care Act, the Child Care Act of 1969, the Riverboat Gambling Act, the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act, the Illinois Public Aid Code, the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act, the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, the Adoption Act, the Probate Act of 1975, and the Unemployment Insurance Act.

b. Replaced existing Tobacco Products Tax Act with the Tobacco Products Tax Act of 1995, which not only changed statutory language but also imposed different tax rate.

C. Did not violate single-subject rule.

1. Although number of existing acts were amended, provisions all had "natural and logical connection" to single subject - implementation of the State budget.

2. The "State budget" is not too broad to constitute a single subject.

a. Johnson v. Edgar and People v. Reedy, which held that "police safety" and "governmental matters" were too broad to be single subject, concerned "obviously discordant provisions" that were related only "because of some tortured connection."

b. Here, the General Assembly "was not attempting to unite obviously discordant provisions under some broad and vague category," but merely including within one bill "all the means reasonably necessary" to implement the State budget.

III. People v. Reedy & Wilson, 186 Ill.2d 1, 708 N.E.2d 1114 (1999)

A. P.A. 89-404, which enacted the "truth-in-sentencing" law effective August 1995, violated the "single-subject" rule.

1. Under Article IV, §8 of the Illinois Constitution, nonappropriation or codification bills are confined to "one subject."

a. Although the term "subject" is generally construed liberally in favor of the legislature, to constitute a single "subject"there must be a "natural and logical connection" between the provisions of a bill.

b. In other words, the single-subject rule is violated where a bill includes unrelated provisions "that by no fair interpretation have any legitimate relation to one another."

2. P.A. 89-404 began as a proposal to modify statutes relating to the insanity defense, but as passed contained ten sections amending Counties Code to restate sheriff's duty as "conservator of the peace," Illinois Municipal Code (redefining local police officers' duties), Criminal Code (redefining the term "insanity" and enhancing the burden of proof for a defendant asserting the insanity defense), Cannabis Control Act (changing the distribution of proceeds from the sale of certain drug forfeiture assets), Illinois Controlled Substances Act (authorizing multiple convictions and sentences for violators, adding new sentencing guidelines and redirecting the distribution of proceeds from the sale of forfeiture assets), Code of Criminal Procedure (defining the term "law enforcement agency" and increasing police officers' authority to make arrests outside their primary jurisdictions), Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act (dropping the requirement that judicial in rem proceedings be conducted without a jury), Code of Corrections (providing for truth-in-sentencing, creating the Illinois Truth-in-Sentencing Commission, redefining the term "insanity" and modifying procedures regulating transfer or release petitions from defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity), Code of Civil Procedure (providing that the homestead exemption is not available to property subject to certain drug asset forfeiture proceedings), and Hospital Lien Act (bringing hospitals operated by local governmental entities within the act and altering procedures for the perfection and satisfaction of liens).

3. Act violated the single-subject rule because it contained "as many as five separate legislative topics involving both civil and criminal matters" and "at least two unrelated subjects: matters relating to the criminal justice system, and matters relating to hospital liens."

a. Fact that all provisions dealt with the responsibilities of State's Attorneys did not satisfy the single-subject rule; such a "connection . . . strains credulity."

b. The fact "that these topics might fit within the broad subject of 'governmental matters' is not compelling. . . . [T]he permitted use of such a sweeping and vague category to unite unrelated measures would render the single-subject clause of our constitution meaningless."

B. The court rejected arguments that the act should be upheld despite the violation.

1. The court rejected the "waiver by codification" rule, which would preclude a single-subject rule challenge once an act has been codified.

a. Rule would conflict with "well-established single-subject clause jurisprudence," which treats such violations with "seriousness."

b. Rule would "drastically diminish the effect and importance of the single-subject clause."

c. The time between passage of a bill and its codification is "frequently minute," making it difficult to raise challenge.

d. The rule would emphasize finality at the expense of enacting legislation via constitutional procedures.

2. The court rejected the argument that the legislature cured the single-subject rule violation by enacting P.A. 89-462 (eff. 5/29/96).

a. To cure single-subject problem, legislation "must exhibit on its face evidence that it is intended to cure or validate defective legislation."

b. P.A. 89-462, which amended the truth-in-sentencing statute to include an additional offense, did not "recodify" the truth-in-sentencing scheme and was "entirely devoid of curative language that would validate any actions taken in reliance on P.A. 89-404."

3. The single-subject rule violation was not harmless "because each of the sections within Public Act 89-404 possessed the necessary support for individual passage."

a. Purpose of the rule is not only to prevent legislators from combining unpopular legislation with popular measures, but also to promote orderly and informed legislative debate by limiting the subject of each bill so issues can be more easily understood and debated. The State's argument "ignores" the second requirement and "simply lacks merit."

b. Harmless error analysis is improper for issues involving the procedure by which a law is passed.

4. A criminal defendant may challenge the constitutionality of sentence credit legislation on direct appeal - in view of the "readily apparent" connection between good-time and sentencing hearings, "it would be unjust to hold that defendants lack standing on direct appeal to challenge the constitutionality of the very statute under which they were sentenced."

5. The truth-in-sentencing scheme was reenacted in P.A. 90-592, but only for offenses committed after June 19, 1998.

6. On rehearing, the court rejected the State's argument that sentences imposed while P.A. 89-404 was in effect should be deemed void and therefore subject to resentencing.

C. People v. Ramsey, 192 Ill. 2d 154, 735 N.E.2d 533 (2000)

1. Although the legislature reenacted amendments to insanity defense in P.A. 90-593, which does not suffer from a single-subject rule problem, applying the amendments to defendant's retrial would violate the ex post facto clause by depriving defendant of an affirmative defense and increasing his burden of proof.

2. In concurring opinions, Justices Bilandic, Freeman and McMorrow held that the majority's holding concerning the ex post facto doctrine was unnecessary, but that under Illinois law P.A. 90-593 cannot be applied retroactively.

IV. People v. Cervantes, 189 Ill.2d 80, 723 N.E.2d 265 (1999)

A. Rule has two purposes - to prevent passage of legislation that standing alone could not muster the votes necessary for enactment, and to facilitate orderly and informed legislative process by enabling legislators to better understand and more intelligently debate legislation.

1. The term "subject" is to be liberally construed and may be as comprehensive as the legislature chooses.

2. Single-subject rule is violated where bill includes provisions with no "natural and logical connection" to a single subject.

B. Provisions of P.A. 88-680 (Safe Neighborhoods Act).

1. Originally amended Criminal Code to require community service for certain offenses.

2. Enacted as "An Act to create a Safe Neighborhoods Law"; amended fifty-five statutes, created ten new statutes, and repealed one statute.

a. Amended Juvenile Court Act to: (a) expand the types of offenses for which a minor can be tried as an adult; (b) mandate imprisonment for juveniles adjudicated delinquent for first degree murder; (c) lengthen the time for which the State may continue adjudicatory hearings; and (d)require community service as a condition of supervision for offenses that are gang-related or involve the illegal use of a firearm;

b. Amended Criminal Code to: (a) increase sentences for intimidation, communicating with jurors and witnesses, and harassment of jurors and witnesses; (b) create the offense of gunrunning; (c) increase the penalty for defacing identification marks on firearms; (d) prevent a court from ordering transfer of a firearm to a private individual other than its owner; (e) provide that possession of a firearm in violation of bail conditions is a felony; (f) increase the authorized sentencing range for attempt first degree murder, aggravated battery with a firearm, aggravated discharge of a firearm, and compelling membership of persons in an organization; (g) expand the scope of the offenses of prostitution, solicitation of a sexual act, pandering, pimping, juvenile pimping, child pornography, and exploitation of a child; (h) create the offense of WIC benefits fraud and require the forfeiture of items of value obtained through WIC fraud or used to commit the offense; (i) increase penalties for unlawful use of weapons, unlawful sale of firearms, unlawful possession of firearms and armed violence; (j) recategorize weapons used to commit armed violence; and (k) create a new classification of "Category III" weapon within the definition of "dangerous weapon";

c. Amended Code of Criminal Procedure to provide for the surrender of firearms by persons released on pretrial bail for certain offenses;

d. Amended Code of Corrections to: (a) permit extended term sentences for felonies committed in furtherance of "gang activities" and require community service as a condition of probation, conditional discharge or supervision for such offenses; (b) require DOC to provide notice of the escape or release of certain prisoners; (c) establish an interagency committee to review whether a minor committed to DCFS should be committed to DOC; (d) prohibit probation for a Class 3 felony violation of the Firearm Owners' Identification Card Act; and (e) impose minimum penalties for a DUI committed on a license that was revoked, suspended or restricted due to a previous DUI;

e. Amended Vehicle Code to require both minimum and enhanced penalties for driving on a revoked or suspended license and increase the penalty for aggravated DUI;

f. Amended Cannabis Control Act and Controlled Substances Act to require a twenty-four-month probation term for first offenders, establish conditions for probation, and allow prior discharged or dismissed drug convictions to be used as aggravation at sentencing;

g. Amended Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act to: (a) allow prosecutors and the Prisoner Review Board to provide victims and witnesses of violent crimes with more information; and (b) expand the rights of victims to present impact statements;

h. Created Secure Residential Youth Care Facility Licensing Act, which required DOC to establish a licensing system for secure residential youth facilities;

i. Amended State Finance Act to add the Secure Residential Youth Care Facility Fund to the list of special funds;

j. Amended Private Correctional Facility Moratorium Act to create an exemption from the general prohibition against privately run correctional facilities for juvenile residential facilities;

k. Amended Women's, Infant and Children (WIC) Vendor Management Act to: (a) expand the types of business entities subject to civil monetary penalties for violating either the WIC Act or program regulations; (b) delete the requirement that training fees or penalty money be used by the Department of Public Health to administer the WIC Act; (c) delete language allowing the Department of Public Health to invest penalty money; and (d) require the Department of Public Health to adopt rules concerning administrative appeals from sanctions authorized in the Act;

l. Amended Firearm Owner's Identification Card Act to: (a) require that each applicant certify that he or she is not an illegal alien, (b) authorize State Police to deny an application or to revoke an FOID card if it finds that the person is an illegal alien, (c) require that FOID expiration dates be displayed on the card's face, and (d) increase the penalties for possession of a firearm without a valid FOID card; and

m. Amended Wrongs to Children Act to expand scope pertaining to the sexual exploitation of a child.

C. The Supreme Court held that P.A. 88-680 violated the single-subject rule.

1. "[N]o matter how liberally the single-subject requirement is construed," there is "no natural and logical connection between the subject of enhancing neighborhood safety" and the amendments to the WIC Vendor Management Act or the creation of the Secure Residential Youth Care Facilities Licensing Act.

a. WIC Vendor Management Act

1) Part of the Public Health chapter

2) Concerns criteria and procedures for vendor's application to participate in WIC program, qualifications and number of such vendors, monitoring of the compliance of such vendors with State and Federal laws, and authority to impose financial penalties and sanctions for program violations.

3) WIC amendments were not related to a single subject merely because act also created new offense of WIC benefits fraud; the amendments to the Vendor Management Act bear no "natural and logical connection to neighborhood safety."

b. In the alternative, Secure Residential Youth Care Facility Licensing Act has no relation to "neighborhood safety."

1) Intended to authorize secure residential youth care facilities owned by private enterprises, so that children too young to be placed in DOC but "too dangerous to be set free" would remain in Illinois instead of being sent out-of-state.

2) Because provisions concern only the geographical location in which such youths will be held in custody, "[w]e determine that these purely administrative licensing provisions are not germane to the subject of safe neighborhoods."

IV. People v. Wooters, 188 Ill.2d 500, 722 N.E.2d 1102 (1999)

A. P.A. 89-203 expanded the circumstances under which a person charged with a felony while on bail must appear in court for bail to be reset, defined "solicits" for the offense of indecent solicitation of a child, added definition of "arranges" for the offense of indecent solicitation of an adult, required restitution in certain domestic battery offenses, added minimum mandatory sentence of life imprisonment for a person seventeen years or older who is convicted of murdering a child less than twelve years old, modified conditions under which an individual convicted of DUI may receive a temporary driving permit, added imprisonment as punishment for persons arrested for DUI while accompanied by a person under sixteen, authorized counties to establish programs to reduce, prevent or control juvenile delinquency, and amended Mortgage Foreclosure Law to authorize removal of residents of foreclosed property only if they were personally named in the foreclosure complaint.

B. The act violated the single-subject rule.

1. Although the defendant raised the single-subject rule challenge for the first time on appeal, the State conceded that "the constitutional dimension of the question permits this court to address" the argument.

2. Act was entitled "An Act in relation to crime," and most of the amendments were related to "crime."

3. However, amendments to the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law were "distinctly noncriminal in nature" and lacked "even a tenuous connection" to the subject of "crime."

4. Mortgage Foreclosure Law changes were not related to "law enforcement" merely because the sheriff is required to enforce orders of possession and notices of eviction.

a. Amendments to the Mortgage Foreclosure Law were intended to "correct procedural due process violations caused by a lack of specificity in orders of possession and eviction notices."

b. The fact that the sheriff might compose and serve eviction notices was "incidental to the notice provisions" that were the subject of the amendments.

c. The subject of P.A. 89-203, as reflected by the title and legislative debates, was "crime" rather than "law enforcement."

5. Court rejected argument that act should be upheld because it did not offend the purpose of the single subject clause - to prevent the attachment of unpopular legislation to a popular bill to insure passage of the unpopular provisions.

a. Single subject rule has an equally important second purpose - to promote orderly legislative debate on bills encompassing only one subject.

b. The State's representations concerning the legislative history of P.A. 89-203 was "somewhat misleading," because the provisions of the act were never considered individually by both chambers of the General Assembly.

6. The court again rejected request to adopt the "codification" principle, under which the codification of a bill would be held to cure any constitutional infirmity arising from a violation of the single-subject rule. (See People v. Reedy).

7. In dicta, three members of the court expressed the opinion that a mandatory natural life provision for the murder of a child under seventeen does not violate the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution.

V. People v. Tellez-Valencia & Moore, 188 Ill.2d 523, 723 N.E.2d 223 (1999)

A. When act is held unconstitutional under single subject rule, its provisions are "rendered void ab initio; that is, it was as if the law never existed."

B. Where defendants were charged under an instrument alleging an offense that was created by act later held unconstitutional under single-subject rule, the charge failed to state an offense. Thus, the conviction could not stand.

C. The State may not amend a charging instrument on appeal to change the name of the conviction from a void offense to one with the same elements, or to change the name of the offense to one which has not been held unconstitutional.

1. Although formal defects in a charging instrument may be amended any time, the failure to state an offense is a substantial defect, not merely a formal one.

2. An instrument charging an offense that did not exist at the time of the crime is fatally defective and cannot be cured by amendment.

VI. People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 739 N.E.2d 433 (2000)

A. P.A. 89-8, which amended the Sex Offender Registration Act (730 ILCS 150/1) to expand the class of persons required to register, did not violate the single-subject rule.

B. Was entitled "An Act in relation to criminal and correctional matters, amending named acts."

1. Three acts (Medical Practice Act of 1987, Code of Civil Procedure, and Civil Administrative Code) seem unrelated to crime and correctional matters.

2. However, "closer look" shows that all three are related.

a. Medical Practice Act of 1987 - amendment renders disciplinary action unavailable for persons who carry out or assist in the court-ordered imposition of the death penalty.

b. Code of Civil Procedure - amendment requires DOC to notify State's Attorney of settlement, verdict or judgment in excess of $500 against DOC for damages incurred by inmate.

c. Civil Administrative Code - amendment makes technical change to reflect name change of Habitual Child Sex Offender Registration Act to Sex Offender Registration Act.

VII. Other Challenges

A. P.A. 90-456

1. Changed some disorderly conducts to Class 4 felonies, defined making a false 911 call as disorderly conduct, enacted new provisions dealing with "no-knock" warrants, and amended the Juvenile Court Act with respect to hearings in abuse, neglect and dependency cases.

2. Pending in Supreme Court in People v. Sypien, No. 89265.

B. P.A. 89-689

1. Expanded definitions of "escape" and "aiding escape," amended Code of Corrections concerning unclaimed accounts of persons committed to DOC, provided cost of living increase for unjustly imprisoned persons, created criminal offense for maliciously harming a guide dog, added an additional basis for imposing an extended-term sentence, authorized limited civil immunity for persons who at the request of a law enforcement officer obtain blood or urine for evidentiary purposes under the Illinois Vehicle Code, made changes to the county impact incarceration program, amended Juvenile Court Act to add another type of disposition for wards of the court, amended Criminal Identification Act, amended Code of Criminal Procedure to provide that a defendant who is receiving psychotropic drugs is entitled to a fitness hearing only if there is a bona fide doubt of fitness, required competitive bidding for some backlog cases of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, reenacted procedures for the Prisoner Review Board and amended restitution provisions of the Code of Corrections, created new hearsay exception for out-of-court statements where the declarant refuses to testify in a criminal proceeding, amended definition of a hate crime, amended the factors in aggravation for sentencing provisions of the Code of Corrections, changed the penalty for solicitation of murder, authorized DOC to develop a program for tracing inmates' gang affiliations, changed the reporting date for the Truth-in-Sentencing Commission, and required DOC to prohibit the use of curtains on prisoners' cells.

2. Held not to violate the single-subject rule in People v. Majors, 308 Ill.App.3d 1021, 721 N.E.2d 753 (4th Dist. 1999) and People v. Startz, 312 Ill.App.3d 863, 728 N.E.2d 825 (3d Dist. 2000).

C. P.A. 86-980

1. Amended Juvenile Court Act to authorize confiscation of weapons in possession of minors found delinquent for weapons-related offenses, and amended the Criminal Code to create offenses of aggravated battery with a firearm and inducement to commit suicide.

2. People v. Vasquez, 315 Ill. App. 3d 1131, 734 N.E.2d 1023 (1st Dist. 2000)

a. No single-subject rule violation.

b. Each provision involves criminal conduct, whether reflected by the Juvenile Court Act or the Criminal Code.

D. P.A. 89-688

1. Allowed court clerk to assess Violent Crime Victims fine, increased sentence for soliciting a person under 17 to commit murder, changed provision for dealing with request for additional statewide grand jury, required that first time offenders committed to DOC or placed on probation must attend GED courses, made various changes to statutes governing DOC, including authorization to develop program for tracing inmates' gang affiliations and tracking gang membership in prison, required annual confidential report to the governor on the strength of various gangs in prison, added "electronic contraband" to list of items that cannot be brought into a prison, and authorized Attorney General to file counterclaims on behalf of State employees who are sued civilly.

2. Held to violate single-subject rule in People v. Foster, 316 Ill.App.3d 855, 737 N.E.2d 1125 (4th Dist. 1999); People v. Burdunice, ___ Ill.App.3d ___, ___ N.E.2d ___ (3rd Dist. 2003) (No. 3-01-0776, 5/29/03).

E. P.A. 83-942

1. Amended Post-Conviction Hearing Act to permit summary dismissal of frivolous petitions, added threats against certain local officials to offense of threatening public officials, allowed bids from local governments to construct DOC facilities, required quarterly reports by DOC to the General Assembly, required notice to legislative leaders before announcement of the selection of a site for a new prison, deleted minimum square footage requirement for inmates, and modified Illinois Sentencing Commission statute to add member and change various procedures.

2. Held not to violate single-subject rule in People v. Boclair, McCain & Johnson, 202 Ill.2d 89, ___N.E.2d ___ (2002) (Nos. 89388, 89471 & 89534, 8/29/02).

F. P.A. 89-707

1. Made commission of any form of aggravated kidnapping a Class X felony, made numerous changes to Child Sex Offender and Murderer Community Notification Law (including extending criminal and civil immunity to the secondary release of information obtained under the Act), added "county corrections officer" to list of persons who may appear in court to satisfy requirement that sheriff attend court sessions, and amended Police Training Act to change some definitions, delete requirement that minimum standards for court security officers be developed, and add requirement that person hired as court security officer must show compliance with training requirements.

2. Pending in People v. Fuller, (No. 1-00-1485).

VIII. Sources for Public Acts

A. Copies of individual Public Acts may be obtained from the Index Department of the Secretary of State's office (217-782-7017) or the State Archives(217-782-4866).

B. Acts may be available at law libraries in either the Laws of Illinois (also referred to as the Session Laws) published by the Secretary of State, or the West Illinois Legislative Service.

C. Public Acts since 1997 are available at the Legislative Information Services web site at "http://www.legis.state.il.us/".

OSAD Webmaster |Site Map